What If ISIS Never Formed?

The Actual History

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL, IS, or Daesh) emerged as one of the most brutal and powerful terrorist organizations in modern history. Its roots can be traced back to 1999 when Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) in Jordan. Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi's group gained prominence by conducting devastating attacks against coalition forces, Iraqi government institutions, and Shia civilians.

In 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and his organization was renamed "al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI). After Zarqawi's death in a US airstrike in 2006, AQI announced the formation of the "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Despite significant territorial and personnel losses during the US military surge and the Sunni Awakening movement between 2007 and 2009, ISI survived as an underground terrorist organization.

The group's fortunes changed dramatically with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, which created a power vacuum and sectarian tensions that ISI exploited. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who had taken over leadership after Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's death in 2010) announced the group's expansion into Syria and renamed it the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS). This move created tensions with al-Qaeda's leadership, eventually leading to ISIS's formal separation from al-Qaeda in February 2014.

In June 2014, ISIS captured Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, in a lightning offensive that shocked the world. Shortly thereafter, on June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared at Mosul's Great Mosque of al-Nuri to proclaim the establishment of a "caliphate," declaring himself "Caliph Ibrahim" and calling on Muslims worldwide to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State.

At its peak in late 2014, ISIS controlled approximately one-third of Syria and 40% of Iraq—territory roughly the size of the United Kingdom with a population of nearly 8 million people. The group became notorious for its extreme interpretation of Islamic law, public executions, enslavement of women (particularly Yazidis), destruction of cultural heritage sites, and sophisticated propaganda that attracted thousands of foreign fighters from around the world.

The international response to ISIS culminated in the formation of a US-led coalition that conducted airstrikes against the group beginning in August 2014. On the ground, Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, various Syrian opposition groups, and Iranian-backed militias gradually pushed back ISIS from its territorial holdings. By March 2019, the last territorial enclave of ISIS in Baghouz, Syria, fell to Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed during a US Special Forces raid in Syria's Idlib province on October 26, 2019. While ISIS lost its territorial "caliphate," it has continued to operate as an insurgency in Iraq and Syria while maintaining global networks through affiliated groups across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. By 2025, though significantly diminished in capability, ISIS remains a persistent threat through its decentralized network and ideology that continues to inspire lone-wolf attacks globally.

The Point of Divergence

What if ISIS never formed? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the confluence of factors that led to the rise of one of history's most notorious terrorist organizations never aligned, fundamentally altering the trajectory of the Middle East and global terrorism in the 21st century.

Several plausible divergence points could have prevented ISIS's emergence:

Scenario 1: The Zarqawi Neutralization (2002-2003) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian jihadist whose brutal tactics and sectarian ideology formed the foundation of what would become ISIS, might have been captured or killed before he could establish his network in Iraq. In this alternate timeline, perhaps the failed attempt to assassinate Zarqawi at his training camp in northeastern Iraq in 2002 (before the US invasion) succeeded. Without Zarqawi's leadership and vision, the particularly virulent strain of jihadism that emphasized sectarian conflict and territorial control might never have taken root in post-invasion Iraq.

Scenario 2: Different US Post-Invasion Policies in Iraq (2003-2004) The de-Baathification policy and dissolution of the Iraqi army implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority under Paul Bremer created a massive pool of unemployed, armed, and disaffected Sunnis who became recruits for insurgent groups. In this alternate timeline, the US implements more moderate policies that incorporate former Baathist military and civil servants into the new Iraqi state, addressing Sunni grievances before they fester into support for extremism.

Scenario 3: Effective Decapitation Strategy During the Surge (2007-2010) Although the US military surge and Sunni Awakening severely damaged AQI/ISI, the organization survived underground. In this timeline, more effective intelligence leads to the capture or killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other key leaders during this period, preventing the organization from reconstituting itself when opportunity arose with the Syrian Civil War.

Scenario 4: Prevention of Iraqi Political Sectarianism (2010-2013) Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's sectarian policies after the US withdrawal alienated Iraq's Sunni population, creating fertile ground for extremist recruitment. In our alternate timeline, perhaps a different political outcome in the 2010 Iraqi elections leads to a more inclusive government that successfully integrates Sunnis into the political process, addressing grievances before they manifest as support for extremist alternatives.

For this exploration, we'll focus primarily on Scenario 2—a more successful US post-invasion policy in Iraq that prevents the security vacuum and sectarian tensions that ISIS exploited—as our primary point of divergence, while acknowledging these other factors would likely play supporting roles in preventing ISIS's formation.

Immediate Aftermath

A Different Iraq War Aftermath (2003-2006)

In this alternate timeline, the Coalition Provisional Authority under Paul Bremer takes a dramatically different approach to post-invasion Iraq. Rather than implementing sweeping de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi military, the occupation authority adopts a more nuanced approach:

Selective De-Baathification: Only the highest-ranking Baath Party members and those directly implicated in Saddam Hussein's atrocities are removed from positions of power, while allowing mid-level bureaucrats and technical experts to continue in their roles.
Military Reformation Rather Than Dissolution: The Iraqi military is reformed rather than disbanded, with only the most senior officers and Republican Guard commanders removed. This prevents hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers from becoming unemployed and resentful.
Sunni Inclusion: Greater efforts are made to include Sunni leaders in the political reconstruction of Iraq, addressing concerns about Shia dominance and Iranian influence.

These policy differences yield immediate results. By keeping much of Iraq's security apparatus intact, the coalition forces have Iraqi partners in maintaining security, preventing the widespread looting and chaos that plagued the actual timeline. The insurgency that develops is significantly smaller and less capable without the pool of former military officers and soldiers who, in our timeline, brought their expertise to groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi still attempts to establish a foothold in Iraq, but his "Organization of Monotheism and Jihad" struggles to gain traction without the widespread Sunni disaffection that fueled recruitment in our timeline. His attempts to ignite sectarian conflict through attacks on Shia civilians and holy sites generate backlash even among Sunni communities, who see more viable political options for addressing their concerns.

Zarqawi's Downfall and Al-Qaeda's Evolution (2005-2008)

Without a large support base, Zarqawi's network becomes more vulnerable to counterterrorism operations. In this timeline, he is killed in late 2005, nearly a year earlier than in our timeline, before his organization can fully integrate with Al-Qaeda's global network or establish deep roots in Iraqi society.

Without Zarqawi's particularly extreme vision and tactics, the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq never evolves into the "Islamic State of Iraq." Instead, Al-Qaeda Central maintains tighter control over its Iraq operations, emphasizing its global jihad priorities rather than Zarqawi's focus on establishing an Islamic state and provoking sectarian conflict.

The US troop surge of 2007, combined with the Sunni Awakening movement, proves even more effective in this timeline. Without the hardcore ideological foundation that ISI maintained in our timeline, reconcilable insurgents have fewer reservations about working with coalition forces and the Iraqi government against foreign fighters and extremists.

Iraq's Political Development (2006-2010)

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution still establishes a federal system, but with greater Sunni input, creating more balanced power-sharing arrangements. The first permanent government formed under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in 2006 includes significant Sunni representation, partly due to international pressure and partly due to the reduced sectarian violence that makes cross-sectarian cooperation more politically viable.

By 2008, Iraq experiences a faster security improvement than in our timeline. Provincial elections in 2009 proceed with higher Sunni participation, reducing the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics. The 2010 parliamentary elections become a crucial turning point—whereas in our timeline, Maliki clung to power despite his coalition not winning the most seats, fueling Sunni resentment, in this alternate timeline, a more inclusive government forms that better represents Iraq's diversity.

Different Trajectory in Syria (2011-2013)

When the Arab Spring reaches Syria in 2011, Bashar al-Assad's regime still responds with violent repression, triggering civil war. However, several crucial differences emerge:

Less Extremist Infiltration: Without ISI seeking to expand from Iraq, the Syrian opposition remains more dominated by nationalist and moderate Islamist factions in its early phases.
More Coherent Opposition: Without the infighting between ISIS and other groups that occurred in our timeline, the Syrian opposition maintains greater cohesion, potentially attracting more consistent international support.
Reduced Sectarian Dimension: While the Syrian conflict still has sectarian elements due to the Alawite-dominated regime and Sunni-majority opposition, the absence of an explicitly sectarian group like ISIS prevents the conflict from becoming as starkly divided along religious lines.

By 2013, though Syria remains embroiled in civil war, the nature of that conflict differs significantly from our timeline. Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda's affiliate) emerges as the most extreme element among the opposition, but without ISI/ISIS competing for dominance and territory, it adopts a more pragmatic approach, focusing on building local support rather than imposing harsh governance that alienates civilians.

International Response (2011-2014)

The international community's response to both Iraq and Syria evolves differently:

Sustained Iraq Engagement: With more visible progress in Iraq, the US maintains a more substantial advisory presence after formal combat operations end, helping to professionalize Iraqi security forces.
Syria Policy: Without ISIS capturing headlines through territorial conquest and atrocities, Western powers develop a more coherent policy toward the Syrian conflict, focusing on diplomatic pressure against the Assad regime and support for moderate opposition elements.
Regional Politics: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states still support Sunni opposition groups in Syria, while Iran backs the Assad regime, but the proxy conflict takes different forms without ISIS as a factor escalating sectarian tensions.

By 2014, the point where ISIS declared its "caliphate" in our timeline, the Middle East faces significantly different security challenges—still severe, but lacking the particular threat that ISIS represented.

Long-term Impact

Regional Security Landscape (2014-2018)

Without ISIS's dramatic territorial conquests and declaration of a "caliphate," the security landscape across the Middle East evolves along very different lines:

Iraq's Trajectory

Political Development: Iraq still faces significant challenges with corruption, sectarian tensions, and Iranian influence, but the absence of ISIS as an existential threat allows Iraqi politics to develop more organically. Without the fall of Mosul and the humiliation of the Iraqi Army in 2014, the Iraqi state maintains greater legitimacy and sovereignty.

Security Forces: The Iraqi military develops more gradually, without the dramatic collapse and subsequent rebuilding necessitated by ISIS conquests. While less battle-hardened than in our timeline, Iraqi security forces maintain better institutional continuity and professionalism.

Reduced Iranian Influence: One of the most significant differences is the reduced role of Iranian-backed militias. In our timeline, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) formed in response to ISIS and became a powerful political-military force. Without this catalyst, Iran's proxy influence in Iraq grows more gradually and faces greater constraints.

Kurdish Relations: Without the ISIS crisis that provided an opportunity for Kurdish independence aspirations (and the subsequent recapture of Kirkuk by Iraqi forces), Kurdish-Baghdad relations follow a different, potentially more stable trajectory, focused on constitutional disputes rather than territorial conflicts.

Syria's Civil War

Less Internationalized Conflict: The Syrian Civil War remains a devastating humanitarian crisis, but without ISIS controlling eastern Syria, the international military intervention takes different forms. Russia still intervenes to support Assad beginning in 2015, but the US-led coalition focuses on diplomatic pressure and limited support to opposition groups rather than the anti-ISIS campaign that dominated our timeline.

Territorial Control Patterns: Without ISIS controlling the eastern third of Syria, the country's territory remains contested primarily between the Assad regime, various opposition factions, and Kurdish forces. This creates different conflict dynamics, potentially leading to earlier negotiated settlements in some regions.

Refugee Crisis: The Syrian refugee crisis still occurs, with millions fleeing to neighboring countries and Europe, but the specific drivers differ. Without ISIS atrocities against minorities like Yazidis and Christians, some of the most horrific aspects of displacement are avoided, though the overall scale remains massive due to regime bombing and general civil war violence.

Global Terrorism Evolution (2014-2025)

Without ISIS's emergence as a "brand name" in global terrorism, the evolution of extremist threats follows a different trajectory:

Al-Qaeda's Continued Primacy

Organizational Continuity: Al-Qaeda remains the preeminent global jihadist organization, without the rival "caliphate" that split the jihadist movement. Ayman al-Zawahiri's leadership, though less charismatic than Osama bin Laden's, maintains organizational coherence across regional affiliates.

Tactical Evolution: Al-Qaeda continues its evolution toward a more localized approach, with regional affiliates like AQAP (Yemen), AQIM (North Africa), and Al-Shabaab (Somalia) focusing on building local support while maintaining loose connections to the central organization.

Reduced Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: One of the most notable differences is the absence of the massive foreign fighter flow that ISIS attracted. Without the appeal of a physical "caliphate" and ISIS's sophisticated social media recruitment, fewer than 20% of the approximately 40,000 foreign fighters who joined ISIS in our timeline become involved in jihadist movements.

Terrorism in Western Countries

Different Attack Patterns: Without ISIS's consistent calls for simple, lone-wolf attacks against Western civilian targets, the terrorism threat in Europe and North America develops differently. Al-Qaeda's traditional focus on spectacular, coordinated attacks means fewer but potentially more sophisticated plots.

Reduced Online Radicalization: ISIS's digital propaganda strategy represented a quantum leap in terrorist recruitment and radicalization. Without this development, online radicalization remains a threat but lacks the volume and effectiveness seen in our timeline.

Security Responses: Western counterterrorism agencies focus more consistently on Al-Qaeda networks rather than dividing attention between competing threats. This potentially leads to more effective disruption of plots, though AL-Qaeda's security consciousness makes it a challenging target.

Geopolitical Realignments (2014-2025)

The absence of ISIS as a geopolitical factor creates subtle but significant shifts in international relations:

US Middle East Policy

Iraq Engagement: Without the ISIS emergency requiring renewed military intervention in Iraq, the US maintains a more conventional diplomatic and advisory relationship with Baghdad. This potentially allows for more balanced approaches to Iranian influence and internal Iraqi politics.

Syria Approach: US policy toward Syria likely remains focused on diplomatic pressure against Assad rather than prioritizing counter-terrorism operations against ISIS. This could potentially lead to earlier diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict, though not necessarily more successfully given Russian and Iranian support for Assad.

Regional Partnerships: Without the anti-ISIS coalition as a framework for cooperation, US relationships with partners like the Kurdish YPG/SDF never develop to the same extent, altering dynamics with Turkey and other regional actors.

Russia's Middle Eastern Role

Syrian Intervention: Russia still intervenes in Syria to support Assad beginning in 2015, but without ISIS as a partial justification for its actions, faces stronger international opposition. However, the intervention likely proceeds regardless due to Russia's strategic interests in maintaining its Mediterranean naval base and regional influence.

Diplomatic Position: Without being able to present its Syria intervention as part of a broader anti-terrorism campaign against ISIS, Russia faces a more unified Western position opposing its support for Assad, potentially leading to greater isolation on this issue.

Regional Power Competition

Saudi-Iran Rivalry: The fundamental Sunni-Shia proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran continues, but without ISIS exacerbating sectarian tensions, it manifests differently—potentially with more focus on political influence in places like Lebanon and Yemen rather than direct military confrontation through proxies in Syria and Iraq.

Turkey's Evolution: Turkey's foreign policy evolution differs significantly without the ISIS threat on its border and the subsequent rise of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. President Erdogan still consolidates power domestically, but Turkish military operations in Syria likely never occur or take very different forms.

Social and Religious Impact (2018-2025)

The absence of ISIS creates significant differences in religious discourse and social dynamics:

Within Islam

Intra-Faith Dialogue: Without ISIS's extreme takfiri ideology (declaring other Muslims apostates) gaining prominence, intra-Islamic sectarian tensions, while still present, don't reach the same level of virulence. This potentially creates more space for dialogue between Sunni and Shia communities and scholars.

Religious Authority: ISIS's claims to have restored the caliphate represented a fundamental challenge to traditional Islamic religious authority. Without this challenge, established religious institutions like Al-Azhar in Egypt maintain more consistent influence over religious discourse.

Reform Movements: Without ISIS's extremism creating a crisis moment for Islamic theological discourse, reform movements within Islam follow different trajectories—potentially more gradual but possibly more sustainable.

Global Perceptions

Reduced Islamophobia: Without ISIS's atrocities and sophisticated propaganda dominating news cycles, the spike in anti-Muslim sentiment seen in Western countries between 2014-2017 is less pronounced. While Islamophobia remains a serious issue, it lacks the specific catalyst that ISIS provided.

Media Narratives: Media coverage of conflicts in the Middle East focuses more on political dynamics and humanitarian concerns rather than the terrorism-dominated framing that ISIS imposed on discourse about the region.

Cultural Heritage: Without ISIS's systematic destruction of archaeological sites and cultural artifacts, places like Palmyra in Syria and numerous sites in Iraq preserve their historical heritage, maintaining important connections to the region's ancient past.

By 2025, the Middle East remains a region facing significant challenges—authoritarian governance, economic stagnation, sectarian tensions, and great power competition. However, without ISIS having emerged as a territorial entity and global terrorist brand, the specific contours of these challenges differ in ways that potentially allow for more constructive approaches to regional stability and development.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Mohammed Al-Jabouri, Professor of Security Studies at King's College London and former advisor to Iraq's National Security Council, offers this perspective: "The non-emergence of ISIS would have fundamentally altered the security trajectory of Iraq, but wouldn't have resolved the underlying governance challenges. Without ISIS capturing Mosul in 2014, Iraq would have continued its troubled political evolution with less dramatic disruption. The reduced sectarian polarization might have created space for more moderate political forces to emerge. Most significantly, the absence of ISIS would have limited the militarization of Iraqi politics through the Popular Mobilization Forces, potentially allowing civilian institutions to develop more effectively. However, we should be careful not to assume that all would have been well—corruption, sectarianism, and Iranian influence would have remained significant challenges, just in different forms."

Dr. Sarah Montgomery, Director of the Center for Middle East Security at the Brookings Institution, provides an alternative analysis: "The absence of ISIS would have most profoundly affected Syria's civil war dynamics. Without ISIS controlling eastern Syria, the international intervention would have maintained its initial focus on the Assad regime rather than pivoting to counterterrorism. This likely would have meant continued pressure on Assad and potentially a different negotiated outcome in some regions. The refugee crisis would have unfolded differently as well—still massive in scale, but driven by different patterns of violence. What's particularly interesting is how the Kurdish question would have evolved without the opportunity that ISIS inadvertently created for Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The PYD would likely have remained a more marginal actor without becoming America's key partner against ISIS."

Ahmed Hassan, former UN Special Envoy for Counterterrorism and author of "Beyond Terror: Rebuilding After Extremism," presents a global perspective: "We often forget that ISIS fundamentally reshaped the global conversation about terrorism and extremism. Without ISIS, Al-Qaeda's more strategically patient approach would have remained the dominant model for global jihadism—focused on targeting Western interests rather than controlling territory and populations. The foreign fighter phenomenon would have been drastically smaller in scale. Perhaps most consequentially, without ISIS's sophisticated use of social media and digital propaganda, online radicalization would have evolved more slowly, giving security services and technology companies more time to develop effective countermeasures. We would likely have seen fewer but potentially more sophisticated terrorist plots in Western countries, following Al-Qaeda's traditional emphasis on spectacular attacks rather than the inspired lone-wolf model that ISIS promoted."