What If Putin Never Came to Power?

The Actual History

The rise of Vladimir Putin to become Russia's dominant political figure began amid the chaos and uncertainty of late 1990s Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia under President Boris Yeltsin experienced a tumultuous transition to a market economy. This period was characterized by economic hardship, rampant corruption, the rise of powerful oligarchs, and a general breakdown of state authority.

By 1999, Yeltsin's presidency was in crisis. His health was failing, his popularity had plummeted to single digits, and Russia had defaulted on its debt in August 1998, triggering a severe economic crisis. The Yeltsin "Family" – his inner circle of relatives and close associates – was concerned about potential prosecution after Yeltsin's departure and sought a loyal successor who would protect their interests.

In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin, then the little-known head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), as his Prime Minister. Soon after Putin's appointment, a series of apartment bombings in Russian cities killed hundreds of civilians. These attacks, attributed to Chechen terrorists, created a climate of fear and provided Putin with the opportunity to project strength. He launched the Second Chechen War, promising to crush the separatist movement with an "iron fist." His tough stance and decisive image resonated with a Russian population yearning for stability and strong leadership.

On December 31, 1999, in a surprise move, Yeltsin resigned, making Putin the acting president. This timing gave Putin the advantage of incumbency heading into the March 2000 presidential election, which he won in the first round with 53% of the vote. Putin's rise was meteoric – from a relatively obscure intelligence official to president in less than a year.

Once in power, Putin systematically consolidated his authority. He brought the oligarchs to heel, making it clear they could keep their wealth as long as they stayed out of politics. Those who challenged him, like media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky and oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, faced prosecution and exile or imprisonment.

Putin rebuilt the "power vertical," strengthening central government control over Russia's regions. He reformed the Federation Council, Russia's upper house of parliament, and established federal districts overseen by presidential appointees. Media freedom was curtailed as major television networks came under state control or ownership by Kremlin-friendly businesses.

Between 2000 and 2008, Putin served two terms as president, presiding over economic growth fueled by high oil prices. In 2008, constitutionally barred from a third consecutive term, he orchestrated a transition where his protégé Dmitry Medvedev became president while Putin served as prime minister. In 2012, Putin returned to the presidency, and in 2020, constitutional amendments enabled him to potentially remain in power until 2036.

Under Putin's leadership, Russia adopted an increasingly assertive foreign policy, including military interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014 and 2022), and Syria (2015). Relations with the West deteriorated sharply, particularly after Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. By 2023, Russia was engaged in the largest land war in Europe since World War II, facing unprecedented Western sanctions, and had pivoted toward deeper partnerships with China and other non-Western powers.

Domestically, Putin's Russia evolved into an authoritarian system characterized by managed elections, limited political pluralism, and the marginalization or elimination of genuine opposition. Critics and opponents faced harassment, imprisonment, or, in some cases, suspicious deaths. Despite these authoritarian tendencies, Putin maintained significant popular support for much of his tenure, bolstered by state control of media, appeals to Russian nationalism, and the delivery of economic stability compared to the chaotic 1990s.

The Point of Divergence

What if Vladimir Putin never came to power in Russia? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the trajectory of post-Soviet Russia takes a dramatically different turn due to Putin's absence from its leadership.

The most plausible point of divergence would occur in August 1999, when Boris Yeltsin was selecting his fifth prime minister in less than eighteen months. In our timeline, Yeltsin and his inner circle chose Putin, then the head of the FSB, largely on the recommendation of oligarch Boris Berezovsky and Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko. Putin was seen as a loyal, competent administrator who would protect the interests of the "Family" after Yeltsin's departure.

In this alternate timeline, several plausible variations could have prevented Putin's appointment:

First, Yeltsin might have selected a different candidate from his security apparatus, such as Nikolai Patrushev, another senior FSB official, or Sergei Stepashin, who had briefly served as prime minister earlier in 1999. Both were seen as potential successors at various points.

Second, the oligarchs who wielded enormous influence might have united behind a different candidate who they believed would better protect their interests while allowing them to maintain their political influence. Someone like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, then one of Russia's most powerful businessmen, might have positioned himself or a proxy for leadership.

Third, Yeltsin's deteriorating health might have forced him to resign earlier than December 1999, triggering a different succession dynamic before Putin could be positioned as the heir apparent.

Fourth, and perhaps most intriguingly, the apartment bombings that helped catapult Putin to popularity might never have occurred or might have been handled differently. These bombings, which some controversial theories attribute to the FSB itself rather than Chechen terrorists, created the security crisis that allowed Putin to demonstrate decisive leadership. Without this catalyst, his path to power might have been blocked.

Let us consider a scenario where, instead of appointing Putin in August 1999, Yeltsin selected Sergei Stepashin to continue as prime minister. In this alternate timeline, Stepashin convinces Yeltsin that he can protect the Family's interests while beginning to restore Russia's international standing. Without Putin's influence at the FSB, the apartment bombings either don't occur or are handled differently, removing the opportunity for a swift military response to demonstrate strong leadership. When Yeltsin resigns on December 31, 1999, Stepashin becomes acting president, but without the security crisis and war popularity boost that benefited Putin, the March 2000 presidential election becomes a genuine contest with multiple viable candidates.

Immediate Aftermath

The 2000 Presidential Election

In this alternate timeline, the March 2000 Russian presidential election unfolds very differently from our reality. Without Putin's wartime popularity boost and lacking the full support of the Kremlin's administrative resources, acting President Stepashin struggles to distinguish himself from the unpopular Yeltsin legacy.

The election becomes a genuine multi-candidate contest. Yevgeny Primakov, former foreign minister and prime minister who represented a more statist, independent foreign policy approach, emerges as a strong contender with support from regional governors and parts of the security establishment. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, who nearly defeated Yeltsin in 1996, maintains his solid base of support among older Russians nostalgic for Soviet stability. Liberal economist Grigory Yavlinsky attracts reform-minded voters, while nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky secures his usual provocateur vote share.

After a competitive campaign that includes actual televised debates (which Putin avoided in our timeline), no candidate secures an outright majority in the first round. A runoff election pits Primakov against Zyuganov, with Primakov ultimately prevailing with support from Stepashin voters and moderate liberals fearful of a Communist restoration.

Primakov's Presidency: A Different Path for Russia

As President, Yevgeny Primakov, with his background as intelligence chief, foreign minister, and prime minister, charts a pragmatic course for Russia that differs significantly from Putin's approach:

Oligarch Relations: Rather than Putin's binary "stay out of politics or lose everything" approach, Primakov pursues a more nuanced strategy. He implements limited anti-corruption measures targeting the most egregious cases while working to gradually reduce oligarchic influence through institutional reforms rather than selective prosecution.
Chechnya Policy: Without the apartment bombings as catalyst, Primakov pursues a mixed strategy in Chechnya that combines targeted military operations against identified terrorist groups with renewed attempts at political negotiation with moderate Chechen leaders. While violence continues, the full-scale war and complete destruction of Grozny witnessed under Putin is avoided.
Media and Civil Society: Unlike Putin's systematic dismantling of independent television and media, Primakov allows greater pluralism while still seeking to exert influence over the narrative. NTV and other independent outlets remain operational, though they face pressure to moderate their most critical coverage of the government.
State Structure: Primakov maintains more of Russia's federal character rather than implementing Putin's centralized "power vertical." Regional governors continue to be elected rather than appointed, though federal oversight increases to address corruption and separatist tendencies.

Economic Reforms and Recovery

The Russian economy still benefits from rising global oil prices during the early 2000s, but Primakov's approach to economic management differs from Putin's:

Economic Team: Instead of relying heavily on the "St. Petersburg liberals" like German Gref and Alexei Kudrin who shaped Putin's early economic policies, Primakov builds a more ideologically diverse economic team that pursues a hybrid approach.
State Role: Primakov implements a more gradual reassertion of state control in strategic industries compared to Putin's dramatic moves against Khodorkovsky and Yukos. State companies like Gazprom still expand their influence, but through market-based acquisitions rather than legal expropriation.
Sovereign Wealth Strategy: Recognizing the volatility of oil prices, Primakov's government still creates stabilization funds similar to Putin's, but with more transparent governance structures and clearer investment mandates.

International Relations

Primakov, the architect of Russia's "multipolar world" concept during the 1990s, pursues a foreign policy that balances cooperation with the West against protection of Russian interests:

NATO Relations: While still opposing NATO expansion, Primakov adopts a less confrontational approach, seeking to negotiate special partnership arrangements for Russia and formal consultative mechanisms regarding NATO's eastern policy.
European Integration: Russia under Primakov pursues deeper economic integration with the European Union, including modernized partnership agreements and energy cooperation frameworks that provide better mutual guarantees.
U.S. Relations: The relationship with Washington remains complex but avoids the dramatic deterioration seen under Putin. Primakov maintains cooperation on counter-terrorism after 9/11 while firmly opposing the 2003 Iraq invasion, positioning Russia as part of a diplomatic counterweight alongside France and Germany.

Domestic Politics

By 2003-2004, Russia's political landscape shows significant differences from our timeline:

Party Development: Rather than the creation of Putin's "party of power" (United Russia), Russian party politics develops along more competitive lines. Primakov's supporters form a centrist-statist bloc, while liberal, communist, and nationalist factions maintain distinct identities in the Duma.
Succession Planning: As Primakov ages (he was already 70 when elected in this scenario), questions about succession arise earlier than in Putin's Russia. Without the constitutional manipulation seen in our timeline, the expectation of regular leadership transitions becomes normalized in Russian political culture.
Security Services: Without Putin's KGB/FSB colleagues ascending to key positions throughout government (the "siloviki"), the security services maintain significant influence but do not become the dominant faction within the Russian elite.

Long-term Impact

Russia's Political Evolution (2004-2015)

Without Putin's two-decade dominance, Russian politics evolves along a significantly different trajectory:

Political Competition and Institutions

In our timeline, Putin systematically dismantled checks and balances while creating a "managed democracy" where elections occurred but real competition was eliminated. In this alternate Russia:

Electoral Politics: Presidential elections in 2004, 2008, and 2012 feature genuine competition between multiple viable candidates. While the Kremlin's administrative resources still advantage incumbents or favored successors, opposition candidates can campaign nationally and access media.
Term Limits: The constitutional two-term limit remains sacrosanct, with Primakov stepping down in 2008. His successor (possibly someone like Sergei Ivanov, Sergei Shoigu, or a moderate technocrat) serves one or two terms before another transition.
Judicial Independence: The court system, while still subject to political pressure, retains greater independence than in Putin's Russia. The Constitutional Court occasionally rules against the government on significant issues, establishing important precedents.
Regional Governance: Russia maintains its federal character, with elected governors and regional parliaments exercising meaningful authority. This creates laboratories for different governance approaches and allows new political talent to emerge from regional success stories.

Media and Civil Society

The alternate Russia avoids the systematic crackdown on independent media and NGOs that characterized Putin's rule:

Television Landscape: Multiple ownership of television networks creates competition and diverse viewpoints rather than the unified state propaganda machine of our timeline. While state channels promote official perspectives, independent channels like NTV and TV Rain provide alternative coverage.
Internet Freedom: Without the extensive internet censorship laws and surveillance systems implemented under Putin, Russia's internet space remains relatively open. International platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube continue operating normally, creating space for civic activism and political debate.
NGO Development: Civil society organizations develop more robustly, with both domestic and international NGOs operating throughout Russia. Government relations with these groups remain tense at times, but without the "foreign agent" laws that effectively criminalized much of civil society in our timeline.

Economic Development (2004-2015)

Russia's economic trajectory takes a different path without Putin's specific approach to state capitalism:

Diversification Efforts

Beyond Oil and Gas: Without Putin's reliance on energy exports as the cornerstone of state power, there are stronger efforts to diversify the Russian economy. Technology sectors receive greater investment, with tax incentives for non-resource industries and special economic zones that actually deliver on their promise.
Privatization vs. Nationalization: Instead of the creeping nationalization that saw state ownership grow from 35% to 70% of the economy under Putin, this alternate Russia maintains a more balanced approach. Strategic industries have significant state presence, but with professional management and without the extreme corruption of Putin's circle of friends controlling major corporations.
Oligarch Evolution: Rather than the Putin model (politically loyal oligarchs allowed to enrich themselves through state contracts), Russia's wealthy business class gradually transitions toward more legitimate, globally integrated business practices. Some become genuine entrepreneurs running competitive companies rather than simply extracting rent from political connections.

International Economic Integration

WTO and Global Integration: Russia joins the World Trade Organization earlier than 2012 (when it finally joined in our timeline), and more meaningfully implements its provisions. Russian companies become more integrated into global supply chains and business practices.
Foreign Investment: Without the geopolitical tensions and sanctions of Putin's later rule, foreign direct investment in Russia continues growing throughout the 2000s and 2010s. Joint ventures with Western technology companies accelerate knowledge transfer and modernization.
Economic Resilience: With more diverse revenue sources and better institutional quality, this Russia is better positioned to weather the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and subsequent oil price fluctuations.

Foreign Policy and International Relations (2004-2025)

The absence of Putin's particular brand of grievance-based revanchism fundamentally alters Russia's place in the world:

Relations with Former Soviet States

Ukraine Relations: Without Putin's obsession with controlling Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian relations evolve more pragmatically. Trade relations remain important, and while Russia still seeks influence, it works through economic and soft power rather than military intervention. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas never occur, and the catastrophic 2022 full-scale invasion is averted entirely.
"Near Abroad" Approach: Russia still considers the post-Soviet space its sphere of special interest, but pursues integration through more legitimate multilateral institutions rather than coercion. The Eurasian Economic Union develops as a more balanced organization with greater respect for member sovereignty.
Georgia Scenario: The 2008 Russia-Georgia war either doesn't occur or unfolds with more limited Russian objectives and international diplomacy playing a larger role in resolution.

Western Relations

NATO Expansion: While Russia still opposes NATO expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine and Georgia, the issue is handled through diplomatic channels rather than military threats. A potential compromise emerges involving security guarantees and partnership frameworks for buffer states.
European Energy Relations: Russia remains Europe's primary energy supplier, but the relationship develops along more commercial lines rather than as a geopolitical weapon. Infrastructure projects like Nord Stream still proceed but with greater transparency and regulatory compliance.
United States Relations: U.S.-Russia relations experience ups and downs but avoid the complete breakdown seen in our timeline. Areas of cooperation (arms control, counter-terrorism, space exploration) continue alongside areas of competition. The alternate Russia has no motivation to interfere in U.S. elections as occurred in 2016.

Global Positioning

China Relationship: Without Western sanctions pushing Russia into China's arms, Russia maintains a more balanced position between East and West. While Sino-Russian cooperation grows naturally based on complementary economies, Russia preserves greater independence and avoids becoming the junior partner it has become in our timeline.
Middle East Influence: Russia still seeks influence in the Middle East, but its approach in Syria and other conflicts emphasizes diplomatic solutions over military intervention. Russia positions itself as a mediator rather than backing specific regimes unconditionally.
Democracy and Authoritarianism: Without Putin's Russia providing an influential model of "sovereign democracy" (authoritarian rule with democratic façade), the global democratic recession might unfold differently, with fewer nations explicitly emulating the Russian approach to controlling civil society and media.

Russia in 2025: A Different Present

By our present day, this alternate Russia presents a fundamentally different country and international actor:

Political System: A flawed but functioning democracy with regular power transitions, competitive elections, and ongoing institutional development. Problems with corruption and state capture persist, but without the systematic authoritarian consolidation of our timeline.
Economy: A more diverse, globally integrated economy less dominated by state corporations and energy exports. While natural resources remain important, technology, services, and manufacturing play larger roles. Living standards have improved more evenly across the population.
Society: A more open society with genuine media plurality, active civil society, and greater integration with global cultural and intellectual trends. Brain drain has been reduced, with more Russian talents staying to build careers at home.
International Standing: Russia remains a significant global power but one that works more within international rules and institutions. It competes for influence but primarily through diplomatic, economic, and soft power rather than military threats and disruption.
Military and Security: Russia maintains a strong military focused primarily on defensive capabilities and regional influence rather than global power projection. Defense spending claims a smaller portion of the national budget, allowing greater investment in infrastructure and human development.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former National Security Council official, offers this perspective: "Putin's absence from Russia's leadership would have created space for a more institutionalized, less personalized system to develop. The fundamental challenges of post-Soviet transition would have remained—corruption, weak institutions, economic restructuring—but they might have been addressed through more democratic processes rather than authoritarian shortcuts. The key difference would be in Russia's international behavior. Without Putin's particular worldview shaped by perceived humiliation and zero-sum thinking, Russia might have found a more constructive, if still assertive, role in the international order. Ukraine would almost certainly have been spared the devastating war we're witnessing today."

Professor Stephen Kotkin, Princeton University historian and biographer of Stalin, suggests: "Counterfactuals are always tricky, but Russia's trajectory wasn't predetermined to be what Putin made it. An alternate leadership might still have pursued a strong state and international respect, but through different means. Russia's structural problems—resource dependence, demographic decline, institutional weakness—would have remained challenging under any leadership. However, without Putin's specific approach of state capture by former KGB networks and aggressive foreign policy as legitimation strategy, Russia might have evolved along a path more similar to other post-communist states that maintained democratic systems while addressing their challenges. The personalization of power we've seen under Putin was a choice, not an inevitability."

Dr. Maria Lipman, Russian political analyst and journalist, provides this assessment: "Without Putin, Russia would likely still have experienced authoritarian tendencies given the weakness of democratic institutions in the 1990s, but the specific form would have differed significantly. Putin's system was built on the unique restoration of security service dominance throughout all sectors of governance. Alternative leadership might have produced a more pluralistic authoritarianism with competing power centers—oligarchs, regional leaders, parliament—rather than the centralized pyramid we've seen. For ordinary Russians, the difference might have been most noticeable in civil liberties and political expression, where greater space for independent voices could have persisted even within a non-Western political model."