What If Rio de Janeiro Implemented Different Security Strategies?

The Actual History

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's iconic coastal metropolis, has long been characterized by its paradoxical nature—breathtaking natural beauty juxtaposed against entrenched urban violence. Since the 1980s, the city has struggled with endemic crime, largely stemming from profound social inequality, with wealthy neighborhoods existing in close proximity to favelas (informal settlements) where approximately 22% of the city's population resides.

The 1980s marked a turning point as cocaine trafficking routes shifted through Brazil, transforming Rio's favelas into contested territories for rival criminal organizations. The Comando Vermelho (Red Command), established in the 1970s within the prison system, evolved from a prisoner protection group into Rio's first major drug faction. By the 1990s, fragmentation led to the emergence of rival organizations, notably the Terceiro Comando (Third Command) and Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends), creating a volatile landscape of territorial disputes.

The traditional security response from the 1980s through the early 2000s primarily relied on confrontational policing characterized by militarized incursions into favelas. The Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), Rio's special police operations battalion dramatized in the 2007 film "Elite Squad," exemplified this approach with their black uniforms, armored vehicles, and high-caliber weapons. These operations, while temporarily disrupting criminal activities, typically resulted in significant civilian casualties and human rights violations without creating lasting security improvements.

In 2008, facing preparations to host both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, Rio's government launched the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP, or Police Pacification Unit) program. This initiative represented a strategic shift toward "proximity policing," beginning with the Dona Marta favela in Botafogo. The UPP model involved a sequence of: announcing operations in advance, clearing areas of heavily armed criminals, establishing a permanent police presence, and introducing social services.

By 2014, 38 UPPs covered approximately 264 favelas with 9,543 officers, impacting 1.5 million residents. Initial results showed promise—homicide rates in pacified areas declined by 65% between 2008 and 2012. However, the program began deteriorating around 2013 due to several factors:

Insufficient resources: The economic downturn following the 2014 World Cup left the state government unable to maintain promised funding levels.
Incomplete social integration: The social services component never materialized at the scale intended, leaving security without accompanying development.
Police misconduct: Despite reforms, incidents of corruption and excessive force undermined community trust.
Resilient criminal networks: Drug trafficking organizations adapted rather than disappeared, regrouping in non-pacified areas.
Political shifts: Following the Olympics, political will to maintain the program waned significantly.

By 2018, Rio's security situation had deteriorated dramatically. In February 2018, Brazil's federal government took the unprecedented step of placing Rio's security under military control. This federal intervention lasted until December 2018, with mixed results and continued high levels of violence. The election of Wilson Witzel as Rio state governor in 2018 marked a return to hardline policies, including his infamous directive endorsing "shoot-to-kill" approaches for suspects carrying rifles.

The UPP program officially continued but was effectively hollowed out, with many units withdrawn or severely understaffed. By 2021, Rio recorded 1,204 police killings, among the highest rates in Brazil, while organized crime remained entrenched. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated social inequalities, with criminal groups sometimes providing services and enforcing lockdowns where the state was absent.

As of 2025, Rio de Janeiro continues to face significant security challenges, with periodic crackdowns yielding temporary improvements followed by resurgent violence. The cycle of militarized approaches followed by community-oriented reforms, neither fully resourced nor sustained, has left Rio still searching for a sustainable security model that can address both immediate violence and its underlying social causes.

The Point of Divergence

What if Rio de Janeiro had implemented fundamentally different security strategies beginning in 2008, rather than the flawed execution of the UPP program? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where Rio's leadership, facing the pressure of upcoming mega-events but also recognizing the failures of past approaches, committed to a more comprehensive, evidence-based, and sustained security transformation.

The divergence could have manifested in several plausible ways:

First, Governor Sérgio Cabral might have appointed a different security secretary than José Mariano Beltrame. Perhaps a figure with stronger credentials in both community policing and institutional reform could have designed a more sustainable program. A candidate like Luiz Eduardo Soares, a respected anthropologist and former National Secretary of Public Security who briefly served in Rio's state government in 1999, might have brought both academic rigor and practical experience to the role.

Alternatively, the same leadership might have made substantially different policy choices when designing the pacification strategy. Rather than rushing to expand UPPs to showcase areas before the World Cup and Olympics, they might have prioritized depth over breadth, focusing on fewer communities but implementing the full spectrum of promised interventions—not just police occupation but genuine social services integration and economic development.

A third possibility involves international cooperation. At this crucial moment, Rio could have more thoroughly incorporated lessons from successful urban security transformations elsewhere. The city might have established deeper partnerships with Medellín, Colombia, which had demonstrated remarkable success reducing violence through a combination of innovative urban planning, social inclusion, and targeted law enforcement under mayors Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar between 2004 and 2011.

The most compelling divergence scenario combines elements of all three: new leadership implementing a more focused strategy informed by international best practices. In this timeline, beginning in early 2008, Rio's government performs a fundamental reset of its security approach, developing what becomes known as the "Rio Integrated Security Model" (RISM). Unlike the real-timeline UPP program that emphasized police occupation with promises of social services that never fully materialized, RISM commits from the outset to a genuinely holistic approach with equally weighted security, social, and economic components operating in coordinated fashion.

Crucially, in this alternate timeline, Rio's leadership secures constitutional guarantees and multi-partisan support for stable, long-term funding for the initiative, insulating it from the economic and political volatility that would later emerge. This watershed decision set Rio on a dramatically different trajectory in addressing its decades-long security crisis.

Immediate Aftermath

A Measured Launch and Proof of Concept (2008-2010)

In this alternate timeline, rather than announcing an ambitious citywide program immediately, Rio's government began with a carefully designed two-year pilot phase. The RISM initiative launched in three carefully selected communities: Santa Marta (a small, geographically contained favela), Complexo do Alemão (one of the most violent large favela complexes), and Rocinha (the largest favela with significant economic activity). This deliberate selection allowed testing the model across different scales and contexts.

Unlike the actual UPP program, which prioritized areas near tourist zones and Olympic venues, the alternate strategy focused on demonstrating viability in both showcase and truly challenging environments. Each location received a comprehensive intervention package:

Security Component: Rather than the standard UPP approach of removing and replacing criminal actors, the alternate strategy employed a more sophisticated model of gradually reducing violence while targeting the most violent actors first. Police were deployed in substantial numbers but with clear operational guidelines emphasizing minimal force and maximum community engagement.
Social Integration: Within weeks of security stabilization, significant investments arrived in education, healthcare, and public space improvements. The alternate timeline saw the immediate establishment of "Citizen Centers" in each community, one-stop facilities housing representatives from all government services, creating accessibility previously unknown to residents.
Economic Development: The third pillar introduced formal banking services, microfinance programs, vocational training aligned with labor market demands, and targeted tax incentives for businesses hiring locally. These economic interventions addressed the void left by removing illicit income sources.

The pilot phase demonstrated promising results. By mid-2010, homicide rates in the three target communities had decreased by 70%, significantly outperforming the actual timeline's UPP results. Even more remarkably, police-involved killings dropped by 85%, challenging the prevailing belief that violence was necessary for security gains.

Governor Cabral and Security Secretary Soares (in this alternate timeline) presented these results to the federal government and international observers, securing expanded funding commitments. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, impressed by the data-driven approach and early outcomes, pledged $2 billion in low-interest loans specifically for RISM expansion over the next decade.

Community Response and Criminal Adaptation (2010-2012)

Community reception to the alternate security approach differed significantly from the mixed response to the actual UPPs. Initial skepticism remained, particularly in Complexo do Alemão, where decades of abusive police practices had created deep distrust. However, the consistent delivery of promised services—functioning water systems, reliable electricity, waste collection, and new health clinics—began shifting perceptions.

A key innovation in the alternate timeline was the establishment of Community Oversight Councils with real authority. These elected bodies comprised residents who reviewed security operations, monitored service delivery, and had direct communication channels to program leadership. This accountability mechanism proved crucial for building legitimacy and addressing misconduct early.

Criminal organizations did not disappear but adapted differently than in our actual timeline. With security forces maintaining a persistent but less confrontational presence, and legitimate economic opportunities expanding, the drug trafficking groups faced more complex choices. Some mid-level traffickers sought amnesty through a controversial but effective program offering reduced sentences in exchange for leaving criminal organizations and participating in community rehabilitation.

The fragmentation of criminal groups occurred in both timelines, but in the alternate scenario, this process was more managed, with violence levels contained through targeted intelligence-led operations against the most violent actors. By 2012, many areas saw trafficking continue but with significantly reduced violence—an imperfect but meaningful improvement over constant territorial warfare.

Political and Institutional Reform (2010-2014)

A critical difference in the alternate timeline was the simultaneous implementation of deeper police reforms. Rather than simply creating specialized UPP units while leaving the broader police institutions unchanged, Rio's government undertook comprehensive institutional transformation:

Accountability Structures: An independent Police Ombudsman Office with investigative powers was established, partnering with public prosecutors to address misconduct.
Career Reform: Police salaries were substantially increased (nearly doubling for patrol officers) while promotion criteria shifted from arrest numbers to community satisfaction and violence reduction metrics.
Training Overhaul: The police academy curriculum was completely redesigned with international assistance, emphasizing conflict de-escalation, human rights, and community engagement skills.
Technological Integration: All officers received body cameras by 2012, dramatically reducing both use of force incidents and false accusations against police.

These reforms encountered significant resistance from police unions and conservative political factions. In mid-2012, a brief police strike threatened to derail the program, but Governor Cabral's administration held firm, using the crisis to remove the most resistant commanders while rewarding reform-minded officers with leadership positions.

The 2014 FIFA World Cup became a showcase for Rio's alternative security model. While other Brazilian host cities experienced security challenges, Rio demonstrated a remarkable balance of effective security and respect for civil liberties. International media coverage shifted from skeptical to cautiously optimistic, with The Economist running a cover story titled "Rio's Security Revolution: A Model for the Developing World?"

Long-term Impact

Weathering Economic and Political Storms (2014-2018)

In our actual timeline, Brazil's economic downturn and political crisis beginning in 2014 severely undermined Rio's security initiatives. UPP funding was slashed, promised social programs never materialized in many communities, and the program began visibly deteriorating. In the alternate timeline, the constitutional funding guarantees secured at the program's inception proved crucial.

When Brazil entered recession in 2014, RISM funding remained protected by these legislative safeguards. While some planned expansions were postponed, existing operations maintained their integrated approach. This continuity sent a powerful message to both communities and criminal organizations—this was not another temporary intervention but a genuine long-term transformation.

The political crisis surrounding Operation Car Wash and President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment still occurred, but Rio's security model had achieved sufficient cross-partisan support to survive. When Michel Temer became president in 2016, his administration maintained federal support for Rio's approach, recognizing its international prestige ahead of the Olympics.

The 2016 Olympic Games proved a watershed moment in the alternate timeline. Rather than the massive but temporary security presence seen in our actual timeline (with over 85,000 security personnel deployed), Rio demonstrated a more sustainable model. Olympic security integrated with existing community policing structures, and visitors experienced a city transformed not just in Olympic venues but across previously neglected areas.

Expanding Beyond Initial Communities (2016-2020)

By 2016, the RISM program had expanded to cover approximately 30% of Rio's favela population, focusing on depth rather than breadth of implementation. This strategic choice contrasted sharply with the actual timeline's rapid expansion to 38 UPPs without sufficient resources to sustain them all.

The post-Olympic period in the alternate timeline saw the program's most ambitious phase: expanding into Rio's Baixada Fluminense region, the sprawling, impoverished outskirts where much of the criminal activity had been displaced. This expansion required adapting the model to areas with different challenges—less dense communities, weaker state presence, and the growing influence of militia groups (irregular forces often composed of off-duty police).

A key innovation during this period was the development of the "Security Integration Corridors" concept—creating contiguous zones of improved security rather than isolated islands surrounded by areas of criminal control. This approach reduced the "balloon effect" of crime displacement seen in our actual timeline.

Technology played an increasingly important role in this phase. The alternate timeline saw Rio developing sophisticated predictive policing tools calibrated to minimize racial and social bias, combined with extensive community oversight to prevent abuse. The "Rio Security Data Collaborative," established in 2018, made anonymized crime data publicly available, enabling academic researchers and community organizations to independently verify official statistics.

Social and Economic Transformation (2018-2025)

The most profound long-term impacts emerged in the social and economic realms. By 2020, favelas under the RISM program for at least five years showed remarkable transformations:

Educational outcomes: School attendance increased from 76% to 92%, while standardized test scores in these communities improved at twice the city average rate.
Health indicators: Infant mortality decreased by 45%, while access to preventive healthcare increased by 70%.
Economic formalization: The percentage of residents with formal employment increased from 38% to 65%, with a corresponding expansion of social security coverage.
Property values: Unlike gentrification patterns seen elsewhere, community land trusts established in the alternate timeline helped ensure property value increases benefited existing residents rather than displacing them.

The 2020-2022 COVID-19 pandemic tested the resilience of this alternative model. While Brazil still suffered severely, Rio's integrated community structures proved valuable for public health response. Community health workers, already established through RISM, facilitated testing and vaccination campaigns reaching populations typically underserved.

By 2025, in this alternate timeline, Rio de Janeiro has not eliminated crime or inequality, but the city has fundamentally transformed its security landscape. Homicide rates have decreased by approximately 80% compared to 2007 levels, placing Rio closer to Montevideo or Santiago than its former position as one of Latin America's most violent major cities. Police killings have declined by over 90%, and public confidence in law enforcement has more than doubled.

International Influence and Brazilian Politics (2020-2025)

Rio's alternative security model has significantly influenced approaches throughout Latin America and beyond. Cities facing similar challenges—from Johannesburg to Manila—have sent delegations to study the "Rio Model." The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime formally recognized the approach as a best practice for urban security in developing nations.

Within Brazil, the success has shaped national politics. The 2022 presidential election featured candidates from across the political spectrum claiming credit for aspects of Rio's transformation. The traditional right-left divide on security—with the right advocating harder crackdowns and the left focusing on social causes—has evolved toward a more evidence-based consensus acknowledging the necessity of both approaches working in coordination.

While challenges remain—particularly in addressing the root causes of inequality and the continuing demand for illegal drugs—Rio in this alternate 2025 demonstrates that seemingly intractable urban violence can be substantially reduced through sustained, integrated approaches. The city's transformation from international symbol of urban violence to case study in security innovation represents one of the most significant urban policy achievements of the early 21st century.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Clarice Oliveira, Professor of Public Security at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, offers this perspective: "The actual security approach implemented in Rio represented a missed opportunity of historic proportions. Had the city genuinely integrated security interventions with social and economic development—and crucially, maintained that integration through political and economic cycles—we might have witnessed a transformation similar to what Medellín achieved. The fundamental flaw was treating security as primarily a policing problem rather than a governance challenge requiring coordination across multiple domains and sustained political commitment beyond electoral cycles."

Robert Muggah, Co-founder of the Igarapé Institute and security specialist, provides this analysis: "What's fascinating about imagining an alternate security trajectory for Rio is recognizing how close the city actually came to implementing a more effective approach. The intellectual framework for integrated security existed, international partners were willing to provide support, and there were domestic examples of success like São Paulo's dramatic homicide reduction. The missing elements were primarily institutional architecture to ensure coordination across agencies and political mechanisms to guarantee continuity. In an alternate timeline where these governance challenges were addressed at the outset, Rio might have experienced a security transformation that would have profoundly altered Brazil's urban development trajectory."

Dr. Jacqueline Santos, Former Secretary of Social Development for the State of Rio de Janeiro (2020-2024) in our actual timeline, reflects: "Having worked within the constraints of our current reality, I often contemplate how different outcomes might have been with alternative approaches. The critical mistake in our actual timeline was the rapid expansion of UPPs without corresponding social investments. This created a security presence without addressing the void left by removing illegal economies. A more promising alternate path would have involved slower geographical expansion but deeper intervention in each area—essentially betting on quality over quantity and building legitimate models that communities themselves would defend when political winds shifted. The tragic irony is that the total resources expended on our failed approach likely exceeded what a more effective strategy would have cost."