What If Riyadh Implemented Different Social Reforms Earlier?

The Actual History

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, established in 1932 by King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, has historically maintained one of the most conservative social systems in the world. This conservatism was rooted in the kingdom's unique relationship with Wahhabism, an austere interpretation of Sunni Islam that became the state's founding ideology through an 18th-century pact between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud.

For most of its modern history, Saudi Arabia enforced strict gender segregation, religious police patrolled public spaces enforcing Islamic dress codes and prayer times, women were forbidden from driving, and public entertainment including cinemas and concerts were prohibited. The country's legal system was based entirely on Sharia law as interpreted through the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, with few written statutes.

The massive oil wealth that began flowing into Saudi coffers following the 1973 oil crisis enabled the royal family to establish a social contract with citizens: political acquiescence in exchange for generous welfare benefits. This arrangement, coupled with religious conservatism, largely insulated the kingdom from the political liberalization pressures that affected other Middle Eastern nations.

The first significant attempt at reform came under King Abdullah (ruled 2005-2015), who cautiously introduced modest changes. He established the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) in 2009 as a co-educational institution—a revolutionary concept in the kingdom. In 2011, he granted women the right to vote in municipal elections and be appointed to the Shura Council (advisory body). However, these changes were incremental and carefully balanced against conservative resistance.

The pace of social reform dramatically accelerated after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) emerged as the kingdom's de facto ruler in 2017. His Vision 2030 economic diversification plan recognized that social liberalization was necessary to attract foreign investment, develop tourism, and reduce economic dependence on oil. In rapid succession, the government curbed the powers of the religious police, lifted the ban on women driving (June 2018), allowed public entertainment including cinemas and concerts, permitted women to travel without male guardian permission (2019), and relaxed gender segregation rules in restaurants and public spaces.

These reforms occurred alongside troubling developments including increased political repression, detention of activists, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and the continuation of the brutal war in Yemen. Critics noted that the reforms were primarily economic in motivation rather than based on recognition of individual rights, and that the kingdom remained an absolute monarchy with severe restrictions on political freedoms, religious expression, and human rights.

By 2025, the reforms had significantly changed the visible social landscape of Saudi Arabia, particularly in major cities, though the kingdom remained far more conservative than most countries and continued to enforce many restrictions on personal freedoms that were inconsistent with international human rights standards.

The Point of Divergence

What if Riyadh had implemented meaningful social reforms decades earlier? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where Saudi Arabia began a gradual but deliberate process of social liberalization in the mid-1990s rather than waiting until 2017.

The most plausible point of divergence centers on the aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War. In our timeline, the presence of American troops on Saudi soil—including female soldiers—created significant tension within the kingdom. The war's end saw increased pressure from religious conservatives to reinforce traditional values, which King Fahd accommodated. However, the war also exposed many Saudis to different cultural perspectives and highlighted the kingdom's dependence on Western military protection despite its professed moral superiority.

In this alternate timeline, King Fahd makes a different calculation following the liberation of Kuwait. Rather than reinforcing conservative power to placate religious hardliners upset by the American military presence, he instead seizes the opportunity to incrementally modernize Saudi society. This divergence could have occurred through several mechanisms:

First, King Fahd might have experienced a personal epiphany about the kingdom's future sustainability, perhaps influenced by health concerns (he suffered a debilitating stroke in 1995 in our timeline) and a desire to secure his legacy.

Second, influential members of the royal family—particularly the more Western-educated princes—might have formed a coalition advocating for controlled modernization as essential for the kingdom's long-term stability and economic diversification.

Third, the Gulf War experience might have convinced key security and economic advisors that Saudi Arabia's extreme social conservatism was becoming a liability to national security and prosperity, requiring gradual adjustment to maintain stability.

Whatever the specific mechanism, in this alternate timeline, the Saudi leadership concludes in 1992-93 that gradual social liberalization—carefully framed within Islamic principles—would strengthen rather than weaken the kingdom's position, leading to a deliberate reform agenda beginning nearly 25 years before our timeline's Vision 2030.

Immediate Aftermath

Early Reform Package (1993-1996)

In this alternate timeline, King Fahd announces what he terms the "National Renewal Initiative" in late 1993, a carefully calibrated reform package framed as strengthening the kingdom's Islamic character while adapting to contemporary realities. The initial changes are modest but symbolically significant:

Education Reform: The curriculum is cautiously revised to increase emphasis on science, technology, and international languages while maintaining Islamic studies. More importantly, women's universities receive substantial additional funding and expanded course offerings beyond traditional fields.
Religious Police Limitations: Rather than immediately curtailing the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (the mutawa), their powers are subtly redefined, with new oversight mechanisms and prohibitions against physical enforcement.
Economic Participation: Regulations are modified to permit women to work in a wider range of sectors, initially in healthcare, education, and certain retail environments, while maintaining gender segregation.
International Positioning: The kingdom launches a diplomatic initiative presenting these reforms as evidence of Islam's compatibility with modernity, attempting to position Saudi Arabia as a model of "authentic Islamic development."

Conservative Backlash and Management (1994-1997)

The immediate reaction from religious conservatives is predictably negative. Senior Wahhabi clerics issue condemnatory fatwas, while religious students organize protests at major mosques in Riyadh and Mecca.

In this alternate timeline, the House of Saud responds with a sophisticated combination of cooptation and controlled repression:

Key religious leaders are privately offered expanded funding for Islamic universities and dawah (proselytizing) activities abroad in exchange for muted criticism.
More vocal opponents are marginalized through administrative reassignments or, in some cases, placed under house arrest.
The royal family emphasizes that reforms are entirely compatible with Islamic principles, commissioning scholarly works from moderate clerics justifying the changes through Islamic jurisprudence.

A significant moment occurs in 1995 when several armed militants attempt to storm a government building in Riyadh. Unlike our timeline, where similar incidents led to policy retrenchment, King Fahd uses this incident to demonstrate the dangers of extremism, accelerating rather than retreating from the reform agenda.

Crown Prince Abdullah's Expansion (1996-2001)

When King Fahd suffers his debilitating stroke in 1995 (as in our timeline), Crown Prince Abdullah becomes the kingdom's de facto ruler. Rather than representing continuity, in this alternate timeline Abdullah—seeing the initial reforms' success in maintaining stability—expands the program:

Women's Driving Committee: Instead of an outright reversal of the driving ban, Abdullah establishes a committee to study implementation of women's driving "in accordance with Islamic principles," with a pilot program allowing women to drive in certain areas under specific conditions.
Educational Integration: The first mixed-gender professional programs are permitted in specific fields including medicine and certain sciences, justified as preventing unnecessary contact between female patients and male doctors.
Judicial Reforms: Abdullah initiates the codification of certain aspects of Saudi law, reducing the arbitrary nature of judicial decisions while maintaining the framework of Sharia.
Tourism Development: The kingdom begins limited development of heritage tourism focused on Islamic historical sites, requiring adjustments to visa policies and public conduct regulations.

Regional Implications (1997-2001)

Saudi Arabia's reform path creates significant ripple effects throughout the Middle East:

Iran-Saudi Relations: The Iranian reformist movement under President Mohammad Khatami (elected 1997) finds a surprising potential partner in Saudi Arabia, leading to tentative diplomatic openings between the traditional rivals.
Influence on Gulf States: Other Gulf monarchies, particularly Bahrain and Qatar, accelerate their own modernization programs, creating a regional competition for controlled liberalization.
Islamist Movements: Moderate Islamist parties across the region point to Saudi reforms as evidence that Islamic governance can evolve, while hardline groups like the emerging al-Qaeda view the changes as apostasy, intensifying their anti-Saudi rhetoric.

By the turn of the millennium, Saudi Arabia has established a different trajectory—still deeply conservative by global standards, but with clear momentum toward incremental liberalization and a significantly different reputation in the international community.

Long-term Impact

Transformed Political Economy (2001-2010)

The early implementation of social reforms fundamentally alters Saudi Arabia's development trajectory during the crucial first decade of the 21st century:

Economic Diversification: With women's increased workforce participation and a more attractive environment for international business, Saudi Arabia begins meaningful economic diversification efforts fifteen years earlier than in our timeline. By 2005, non-oil sectors account for 42% of GDP compared to 33% in our timeline.
Educational Outcomes: Universities produce more employment-ready graduates in both genders. The kingdom sends fewer students abroad for education, instead developing domestic institutions of higher quality, reducing brain drain and cultural discontinuity.
Tourism Development: Religious tourism expands beyond the Hajj to include year-round visitors to Islamic heritage sites. By 2008, controlled openings for non-religious tourism begin in specific development zones along the Red Sea.
Foreign Investment: The kingdom attracts significantly higher levels of foreign direct investment throughout the 2000s, as international companies view Saudi Arabia as a more predictable and less reputationally risky market.

Response to the War on Terror (2001-2008)

The September 11, 2001 attacks still occur in this timeline, and Saudi citizens remain among the perpetrators. However, the kingdom's response and international position differ significantly:

Internal Security: Having already begun addressing religious extremism through educational reforms and monitoring of hardline clerics, Saudi security services are better positioned to identify and neutralize terrorist networks.
International Relations: With momentum behind genuine reform efforts, Western allies (particularly the United States) view Saudi Arabia more as a partner in combating extremism rather than a problematic source of it.
Regional Leadership: Saudi Arabia positions itself as a model of how Islamic societies can modernize without Westernization, enhancing its soft power throughout the Muslim world and helping counteract al-Qaeda's narrative.
Counterterrorism Cooperation: More effective domestic intelligence efforts, combined with greater international legitimacy, make Saudi counterterrorism operations more successful, potentially preventing several attacks that occurred in our timeline.

Arab Spring and Regional Stability (2011-2015)

When the Arab Spring eruptions begin in late 2010, Saudi Arabia occupies a fundamentally different position:

Domestic Response: Having already established a pattern of gradual reform, the Saudi government can more credibly promise continued liberalization rather than resorting to purely repressive measures or rushed concessions.
Regional Influence: Rather than opposing democratic movements throughout the region, Saudi Arabia advocates for gradual, controlled reform processes in allied states, positioning itself as a model of stability through managed change.
Sectarian Tensions: The reduced Saudi-Iran rivalry (a consequence of both countries following reform paths) lowers the temperature of Sunni-Shia conflicts throughout the region. While tensions remain, they are less likely to escalate into proxy conflicts.
Yemen Situation: With greater focus on soft power and reduced sectarian antagonism, Saudi policy toward Yemen emphasizes economic development and political mediation rather than military intervention, potentially avoiding the catastrophic war that began in 2015 in our timeline.

Vision 2025: Accelerated Modernization (2015-2025)

By 2015, when King Salman ascends to the throne, Saudi Arabia has already implemented many of the reforms that would become part of Vision 2030 in our timeline. This creates a fundamentally different starting point:

Political Evolution: Decades of social liberalization create expectations for political participation. The government introduces limited reforms to municipal councils and the Shura Council, increasing their power while maintaining the monarchy's ultimate authority.
Women's Status: Women's integration into public life has progressed steadily for over two decades. By 2020, legal gender discrimination has been significantly reduced, though not eliminated. Women participate in all economic sectors and hold senior government positions.
Religious Establishment: The religious establishment has undergone generational change, with younger clerics accommodating to the new reality. Religious police exist but with strictly limited powers and professional training requirements.
Economic Position: Less dependent on oil revenues, Saudi Arabia weathers oil price fluctuations more effectively. The sovereign wealth fund began strategic diversification earlier, resulting in a stronger financial position.

Global Position in 2025

By 2025, Saudi Arabia in this alternate timeline occupies a substantially different position in global affairs:

International Reputation: Rather than being viewed as a rapidly changing but still problematic actor, Saudi Arabia is seen as a success story of managed transition and a stabilizing regional influence.
Cultural Influence: Saudi cultural products—film, literature, art—have emerged as significant regional exports, as creative industries benefited from earlier liberalization.
Geopolitical Alignment: While maintaining its alliance with the United States, Saudi Arabia has developed more balanced international relationships, including deeper economic ties with Asian powers.
Regional Leadership: The kingdom serves as a bridge between traditional and reformist forces across the Middle East, using its religious legitimacy and economic power to mediate conflicts rather than exacerbate them.

Most significantly, this alternate Saudi Arabia offers a different model for Islamic governance—one that demonstrates the possibility of reconciling religious values with gradual modernization through indigenous rather than imposed processes.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Madawi Al-Rasheed, Professor of Middle East Studies at King's College London, offers this perspective: "The counterfactual of earlier Saudi reforms reveals how much timing matters in political transitions. Had the reform process begun in the 1990s, it would have unfolded in a completely different regional context—before the Iraq War fractured the region's sectarian balance, before social media created new forms of public space, and before oil prices underwent their dramatic fluctuations. This alternate Saudi Arabia might have become a genuine laboratory for Islamic reformation rather than simply a top-down modernization project driven by economic necessity. The gradual nature of change would have allowed religious and cultural adaptations to occur organically, potentially creating more durable social transformations with deeper roots in the population."

Dr. Gregory Gause, Professor of International Affairs and Saudi specialist, suggests: "The fascinating aspect of this scenario is how it might have reconfigured regional power dynamics. A reforming Saudi Arabia in the 1990s and 2000s would have fundamentally altered the narrative of the 'War on Terror' era. Without the acute tensions between the kingdom's official religious ideology and its Western alliances, both al-Qaeda's recruitment narrative and Western anxieties about Saudi influence would have been substantially weakened. This might have created space for more productive security partnerships and potentially different Western policy choices in the region. The Iran-Saudi rivalry, which became the defining axis of regional politics after 2003, might have evolved into a more manageable competition or even limited cooperation between differentially reforming Islamic states."

Sarah Leah Whitson, former Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, presents a more critical view: "We should be careful not to romanticize what earlier Saudi reforms might have achieved. Even in this alternate timeline, we're discussing a monarchy making calculated concessions to maintain power, not embracing human rights principles out of conviction. While women's rights and religious restrictions might have evolved more organically with less social backlash, other fundamental issues—political participation, freedom of expression, rights of migrant workers, and the treatment of Shia minorities—would likely remain problematic. The regime's core interest in maintaining absolute control would not have changed, though its methods and international image might have. This reminds us that reform without accountability or democratic participation has inherent limitations, regardless of its timing."