What If Saddam Hussein Was Removed in 1991?

The Actual History

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces under the command of President Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, quickly overwhelming the small nation's defenses and declaring it Iraq's "19th province." The invasion came after tensions over oil production, allegations of slant drilling, and Iraq's massive war debt from its eight-year conflict with Iran. Saddam miscalculated the international response, believing the United States and other powers would accept the fait accompli of Kuwait's annexation.

Instead, the United Nations Security Council immediately condemned the invasion through Resolution 660 and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions via Resolution 661. U.S. President George H.W. Bush, declaring "this will not stand," assembled an unprecedented international coalition of 35 nations to confront Iraq. After diplomatic efforts failed and the January 15, 1991 UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal passed, Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 17, 1991.

The Gulf War began with a 42-day air campaign that devastated Iraq's military infrastructure, command and control capabilities, and air defenses. On February 24, coalition ground forces launched a massive attack that outflanked Iraqi defensive positions. Within 100 hours, Kuwait was liberated, and Iraqi forces were in full retreat along the infamous "Highway of Death" between Kuwait City and Basra.

On February 28, 1991, President Bush declared a unilateral ceasefire. Iraq accepted formal ceasefire terms through UN Resolution 687 in April 1991, which included the dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, destruction of existing chemical and biological weapons, acceptance of weapons inspectors, and recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty.

Significantly, the coalition forces stopped short of marching to Baghdad or removing Saddam Hussein from power. This decision was based on several factors: the UN mandate only authorized liberating Kuwait, not regime change in Iraq; concerns about a power vacuum and regional instability; fears of high casualties in urban warfare; and worries about the U.S. becoming mired in a lengthy occupation without clear exit parameters.

In the wake of the Gulf War, Kurdish regions in northern Iraq and Shia populations in the south rose up against Saddam's regime, encouraged by rhetoric from Western leaders about Iraqis "taking matters into their own hands." However, with the coalition unwilling to intervene further, Saddam's remaining Republican Guard forces brutally suppressed these uprisings.

Saddam Hussein remained in power for another twelve years, defying UN weapons inspectors and sanctions while his people suffered under the economic embargo. The ambiguity surrounding Iraq's WMD programs, combined with the post-9/11 security environment, eventually led the George W. Bush administration to launch the 2003 Iraq War, which finally deposed Saddam but plunged Iraq into years of sectarian violence, insurgency, and instability. The power vacuum created by Saddam's removal in 2003 contributed to the rise of ISIS years later and fundamentally altered the geopolitical balance of the Middle East.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Coalition forces had continued their advance and removed Saddam Hussein from power in 1991? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the decisive military victory over Iraq culminated not just in Kuwait's liberation but in regime change in Baghdad itself.

Several plausible variations could have produced this divergence:

First, President George H.W. Bush might have authorized an expanded military objective after witnessing the unexpectedly swift collapse of Iraqi resistance. The lopsided nature of the victory—with coalition forces suffering fewer than 300 combat deaths compared to tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties—could have emboldened military planners to advocate for a quick push to Baghdad while Iraq's military remained in disarray. General Norman Schwarzkopf and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, who in our timeline advocated ending the conflict after Kuwait's liberation, might have seen an opportunity to finish the job with minimal additional risk.

Alternatively, the divergence could have occurred if intelligence had confirmed that Saddam was actively moving to massacre Kurdish and Shia civilians who were beginning to rebel. Faced with evidence of impending genocide, the coalition might have extended operations to create "safe zones" that eventually expanded into full regime change.

A third possibility involves Saddam's own actions. If he had ordered the use of chemical weapons against coalition forces or launched more effective Scud missile attacks against Israel (perhaps causing Israel to enter the war), the calculus regarding his removal would have shifted dramatically. The red line of WMD use would likely have triggered an immediate drive to Baghdad.

Finally, the uprising that began in southern Iraq immediately following the ceasefire might have gained unexpected momentum, creating a situation where coalition forces felt compelled to support the rebels to prevent mass slaughter. This support could have incrementally expanded into direct intervention and ultimately regime change.

In this alternate timeline, we assume that President Bush, with the backing of key coalition partners including Britain, France, and Arab allies, made the fateful decision on March 1, 1991, to continue the ground offensive toward Baghdad with the explicit goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

Immediate Aftermath

The Fall of Baghdad

In this alternate timeline, Coalition forces redirected their advance toward Baghdad in early March 1991. The Iraqi military, already devastated by the 42-day air campaign and the 100-hour ground war, offered minimal coordinated resistance. Republican Guard units that had escaped the initial attack attempted to form defensive positions around Baghdad, but their combat effectiveness had been severely compromised.

By March 10, coalition forces had surrounded Baghdad. Unlike the 2003 invasion, Iraqi military morale in 1991 was already broken after their decisive defeat in Kuwait. Many units surrendered en masse or simply deserted. Saddam Hussein, recognizing the imminent fall of his regime, attempted to flee Baghdad on March 12, but his convoy was identified by coalition air surveillance and captured by U.S. Special Forces near Tikrit.

The fall of Baghdad occurred with considerably less urban fighting than military planners had feared. By March 15, the city was under coalition control. The iconic scenes of Saddam's statues being toppled that would occur in 2003 instead took place in 1991, but with Iraqi citizens alongside coalition soldiers rather than U.S. forces alone.

Initial Governance and International Response

President Bush immediately established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to oversee Iraq's transition. Unlike 2003, this administration included substantial participation from Arab coalition partners, giving it greater legitimacy in Iraqi eyes. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria—all of whom had participated in the coalition against Saddam—contributed personnel and resources to the stabilization effort.

The United Nations quickly authorized the occupation through a new Security Council resolution, providing international legitimacy that the 2003 occupation lacked. The Soviet Union, in its final months of existence and eager to demonstrate continued global relevance, supported the resolution in exchange for guarantees about Iraq's territorial integrity and future sovereignty.

Within Iraq, the Kurdish rebellion in the north and Shia uprising in the south transformed from desperate resistance movements into political organizations with coalition support. However, the CPA maintained central authority to prevent the fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian lines.

Military Demobilization and De-Baathification

One crucial difference from our timeline's 2003 invasion concerned the handling of Iraq's military and Baath Party. Rather than the wholesale dismissal of Baath Party members and dissolution of the Iraqi army (which in 2003 created a massive population of unemployed, armed men), the 1991 CPA implemented a more targeted approach.

Only high-ranking Baath officials and those directly implicated in atrocities were removed from positions of authority. Mid-level bureaucrats, necessary for continued governance, remained in place. Similarly, while the Republican Guard was disbanded, regular army units were maintained under new leadership, providing both security and continued employment for hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

WMD Programs and Sanctions Relief

UN weapons inspectors entered Iraq unopposed in April 1991, discovering and dismantling the chemical weapons program that indeed existed at that time. The biological weapons program was also identified and eliminated. Notably, inspectors confirmed what later became clear in our timeline: Iraq's nuclear weapons program was less advanced than Western intelligence had estimated.

With Saddam removed and WMD programs verifiably dismantled, the UN began gradually lifting economic sanctions by late 1991. This allowed Iraq to resume oil exports under international supervision, generating revenue for reconstruction rather than funding the luxury of Saddam's regime while ordinary Iraqis suffered under sanctions as occurred in our timeline.

Regional Reactions

Iran viewed Saddam's removal with mixed emotions—satisfaction at the fall of their hated enemy but concern about American military presence on their border. The Iranian regime increased support for Shia factions in Iraq but stopped short of direct confrontation with coalition forces.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, though nervous about the implications of regime change, were generally supportive, particularly as coalition forces maintained stability and prevented Iran from gaining excessive influence in Iraq.

Syria, having participated in the coalition, initially cooperated with post-Saddam arrangements, though President Hafez al-Assad harbored concerns about the precedent of external regime change.

Israel welcomed Saddam's removal but maintained a low profile to avoid complicating the coalition's relationships with Arab partners.

Long-term Impact

Iraq's Political Evolution (1991-2000)

Under coalition supervision, Iraq held its first genuinely democratic elections in late 1992. The resulting government was a carefully balanced coalition representing Iraq's three major groups: Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who would later play a controversial role in our timeline's 2003 invasion, emerged as a transitional prime minister with the backing of both the U.S. and neighboring Arab states.

The transition faced significant challenges. Baathist remnants conducted a low-level insurgency between 1991-1994, but without the leadership of Saddam's sons (who were captured alongside their father) and lacking external support, these efforts failed to seriously destabilize the new government.

By 1995, coalition combat forces had largely withdrawn, leaving behind military advisors and economic support teams. Iraq's reconstituted but reformed military, with U.S. training, effectively maintained internal security. The Kurdish regions received significant autonomy within a federal Iraq, a compromise that prevented both Kurdish independence (which would have alarmed Turkey) and renewed Arab-Kurdish conflict.

Iraq's oil industry recovered more rapidly than in our timeline, where sanctions continued until 2003. By 1997, Iraq had resumed its position as one of the world's major oil exporters, generating revenue for reconstruction and development. However, disputes over resource distribution between regions remained a source of political tension.

Global War on Terror in a Different Context

Without the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. response to the September 11, 2001 attacks took a dramatically different course. The Bush administration (George W. Bush still won the presidency in 2000, though with a different foreign policy focus) concentrated military efforts exclusively on Afghanistan and the hunt for al-Qaeda.

Without Iraq as a distraction, coalition forces committed more resources to stabilizing Afghanistan after the Taliban's fall. The NATO mission expanded beyond Kabul earlier and with greater strength. Pakistan, lacking the opportunity to play a double game while U.S. attention was divided between two wars, faced greater pressure to cooperate genuinely in counter-terrorism efforts.

Al-Qaeda, lacking the recruiting tool of the Iraq occupation and with more consistent pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, never experienced the resurgence that occurred in our timeline. While terrorist attacks still occurred globally, the organization did not evolve into the franchised model that emerged by the mid-2000s in our timeline.

Regional Geopolitics Reshaped

Iran's regional position developed very differently in this timeline. Without the removal of its traditional enemy (Saddam) by the U.S. in 2003 and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shia political parties, Iran did not experience the dramatic expansion of influence across Iraq that occurred in our timeline. However, Iran still pursued nuclear technology, creating tensions with the West throughout the 2000s.

Syria under Bashar al-Assad (who still succeeded his father in 2000) pursued a more cautious foreign policy without the opportunity to position itself as an opponent of the 2003 Iraq invasion. The relationship between Syria and Iraq in this timeline became one of uneasy cooperation rather than the pipeline for jihadists entering Iraq that developed in our timeline.

The Arab Spring movements of 2011 still occurred in this timeline, driven by the same underlying factors of economic stagnation, youthful populations, and frustration with authoritarian governance. However, the U.S. approach to these movements was less shaped by the experience of Iraq. Without the Iraq War's legacy of costly regime change, the Obama administration (assuming similar election outcomes) might have been more willing to support democratic transitions, particularly in Egypt and Libya.

No ISIS, Different Extremism Trajectories

The most striking difference in this alternate timeline is the absence of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). The group's rise depended on specific conditions created by the 2003 invasion: the dissolution of Iraq's army, de-Baathification, sectarian governance under Nouri al-Maliki, and the Syrian civil war. Without these factors, ISIS never emerged as the territorial caliphate that controlled large portions of Iraq and Syria from 2014-2017.

This doesn't mean Islamic extremism disappeared. Al-Qaeda continued to operate, and local jihadist groups emerged in areas of weak governance. However, these groups lacked the capacity to capture and hold significant territory or to inspire the wave of international terror attacks that ISIS orchestrated or inspired between 2014-2018.

U.S. Military and Foreign Policy Evolution

Without the Iraq War's enormous drain on resources (estimated at over $2 trillion and nearly 4,500 American lives in our timeline), U.S. military and foreign policy developed along a different trajectory. The military maintained its focus on high-intensity conflict capabilities rather than the counterinsurgency emphasis that dominated the 2000s.

The "Bush Doctrine" of preventive war never fully materialized, and concepts like "the axis of evil" didn't enter the political lexicon. U.S. foreign policy maintained a more multilateral approach, with stronger NATO alliances and greater emphasis on international institutions.

The domestic political division caused by the Iraq War also never materialized. While partisan divides certainly existed over other issues, American politics didn't experience the deep fracturing that the prolonged Iraq conflict contributed to in our timeline.

Iraq in 2025

By our present day (2025), Iraq in this alternate timeline has developed into a functioning, if imperfect, federal democracy. Oil wealth, more equitably distributed than under Saddam, has funded infrastructure development and economic diversification. While sectarian tensions persist, they manifest primarily through political competition rather than armed conflict.

Baghdad has re-emerged as a significant regional capital, with Iraqi diplomats playing mediating roles in regional disputes. The country maintains balanced relationships with both the United States and Iran, though tensions fluctuate depending on regional developments.

The Kurdish regions enjoy substantial autonomy while remaining part of Iraq, a compromise that has largely satisfied Kurdish aspirations without triggering Turkish intervention. Iraqi Kurdistan has developed its own energy sector and trade relationships, becoming a relatively prosperous region.

This Iraq stands in stark contrast to the Iraq of our timeline, which experienced over a decade of insurgency, sectarian civil war, and ISIS occupation before achieving a fragile stability still threatened by militia groups, corruption, and regional proxy conflicts.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Maryam Jamali, Professor of Middle Eastern Politics at Georgetown University, offers this perspective: "Removing Saddam Hussein in 1991 rather than 2003 would have fundamentally altered the trajectory of Iraq and the broader Middle East. The key difference lies in international legitimacy and regional buy-in. The 1991 coalition included Arab states and operated under clear UN mandates. Any regime change would have occurred with broad international support rather than through the controversial unilateralism of 2003. Additionally, Iraq's institutions, while damaged by Saddam's rule, had not yet suffered through a decade of crippling sanctions. They would have been more capable of supporting a transition toward a new government system."

General Anthony Reynolds (Ret.), former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, suggests: "The military calculus of removing Saddam in 1991 versus 2003 can't be overstated. In 1991, Iraqi forces had just experienced a devastating conventional defeat, coalition forces were already deployed in theater in overwhelming numbers, and neighboring states were actively participating. The prospects for a successful regime change operation were substantially higher than in 2003. Perhaps more importantly, the broader strategic context would have been entirely different. Without the Iraq War, U.S. military focus on Afghanistan after 9/11 would have been undivided, potentially altering the trajectory of that conflict as well. The resources expended in Iraq from 2003-2011—human, financial, and diplomatic—could have been directed toward other security challenges."

Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi, Iraqi-American historian and author, contemplates: "The societal impact of removing Saddam in 1991 versus 2003 would have been profound. In 1991, Ba'athist ideology was less entrenched, sectarian identities were less hardened, and civil society organizations still existed to some degree. The social fabric of Iraq, while damaged by the Iran-Iraq War, had not yet endured the comprehensive collapse that sanctions and then occupation produced. Additionally, the Iraqi exile community that returned to Iraq after 2003 would have been less disconnected from Iraqi society. Many had only recently fled after the Gulf War, rather than having spent decades abroad. This would have facilitated a smoother political transition and perhaps avoided the perception of an externally imposed government that plagued post-2003 Iraq."