What If Sana'a Avoided Civil War Through Different Policies?

The Actual History

Yemen's descent into civil war represents one of the most devastating humanitarian crises of the 21st century. The roots of this conflict can be traced to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa. After 33 years of autocratic rule, President Ali Abdullah Saleh faced mounting protests demanding his resignation amid accusations of corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses.

In November 2011, Saleh signed a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative that transferred power to his vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The agreement offered Saleh immunity from prosecution in exchange for stepping down. In February 2012, Hadi was formally elected president in a single-candidate election intended to guide Yemen through a two-year transitional period culminating in a new constitution and democratic elections.

The National Dialogue Conference (NDC), launched in March 2013, brought together various political factions to chart Yemen's future. When the NDC concluded in January 2014, it proposed a federal system dividing Yemen into six regions. This proposal critically alienated the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), a Zaidi Shia group from northern Yemen, who viewed the arrangement as undermining their political and economic interests.

Throughout 2014, the Houthis strengthened their position militarily while Hadi's government struggled with economic challenges, southern separatism, and Al-Qaeda insurgency. In September 2014, the Houthis seized control of Sana'a with surprising ease, capitalizing on popular discontent over fuel subsidy cuts. By January 2015, they had placed President Hadi under house arrest, leading to his resignation under duress. Hadi later fled to Aden, then to Saudi Arabia, rescinding his resignation.

The conflict escalated dramatically in March 2015 when Saudi Arabia, perceiving the Houthis as Iranian proxies, launched Operation Decisive Storm – a military intervention supported by a coalition of nine countries with logistical and intelligence support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The intervention marked the internationalization of Yemen's civil war.

Adding another layer of complexity, former president Saleh initially allied with the Houthis against Hadi, despite having fought six wars against them during his presidency. This alliance collapsed in December 2017 when Saleh called for dialogue with Saudi Arabia, leading to his assassination by Houthi forces.

The war created a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. By 2022, an estimated 377,000 Yemenis had died – 60% from indirect causes like lack of food, water, and healthcare. Nearly 70% of the population required humanitarian assistance, with millions facing acute food insecurity and the country experiencing the world's worst cholera outbreak in modern history.

Despite multiple UN-brokered peace attempts, the conflict has persisted, fragmenting into multiple overlapping struggles involving southern separatists, tribal militias, terrorist groups, and regional powers using Yemen as a proxy battleground. The destruction of vital infrastructure, blockades, and economic collapse have left Yemen the poorest country in the Middle East, with its development set back decades and generational trauma that will reverberate for years to come.

The Point of Divergence

What if Yemen's political leadership had made different decisions during the critical 2013-2014 period, averting the catastrophic civil war? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where a combination of more inclusive policies, better governance, and international support created a different path for Yemen.

The point of divergence occurs during the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013-2014. In our timeline, the NDC's conclusions—particularly the six-region federal proposal—failed to adequately address Houthi concerns and alienated key stakeholders. In this alternate history, several plausible changes create a different outcome:

First, President Hadi and his advisors recognize the explosive potential of excluding the Houthis from meaningful participation in Yemen's future. Rather than marginalizing the group, they engage in substantive negotiations with Houthi representatives, acknowledging their legitimate grievances while requiring concrete commitments to disarmament and political integration.

Second, instead of the rigid six-region federal system that divided the historically Zaidi areas and separated the resource-rich regions from the Houthi heartland, the NDC proposes a more flexible federal arrangement that balances regional autonomy with resource-sharing mechanisms. This compromise acknowledges Yemen's complex regional identities while ensuring economic viability for all areas.

Third, the transitional government implements tangible anti-corruption measures that demonstrate a genuine break from Saleh's nepotistic regime. These reforms quickly channel resources to basic services and address the economic grievances fueling popular discontent, particularly focusing on youth unemployment and accessibility of essential resources.

The divergence might have occurred through several mechanisms: more effective international mediation that identified the red lines for various factions; pressure from tribal leaders recognizing the catastrophic consequences of conflict; or simply more astute political calculations by Hadi's government about the relative strength of the Houthis and the fragility of state institutions.

This scenario doesn't require implausible assumptions—just marginally better decision-making at key junctures and a recognition that Yemen's challenges required genuine power-sharing rather than winner-takes-all politics. In this alternate timeline, Yemen still faces enormous challenges, but avoids the catastrophic warfare that has devastated the country for nearly a decade.

Immediate Aftermath

Political Reconfiguration

The immediate consequence of a more inclusive NDC process is a reconfigured political landscape in Yemen. Instead of the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in September 2014, the alternate timeline sees the formation of a national unity government that, while fragile, maintains a baseline of legitimacy across Yemen's diverse factions.

President Hadi, recognizing his limited personal popularity, makes the pivotal decision to serve as a transitional figure rather than consolidating power. He appoints a cabinet that includes Houthi representatives in positions overseeing northern governorates, prominent southern leaders in ministries crucial to the south, and technocrats in key economic positions. This power-sharing arrangement, while unwieldy, prevents any single faction from feeling existentially threatened.

The Houthi movement, having secured concrete concessions through negotiation rather than military action, faces internal debates about its strategic direction. Military hardliners argue for continuing expansion, but political pragmatists gain the upper hand, recognizing that participation in governance offers more sustainable benefits than armed confrontation with potential Saudi intervention.

Former president Saleh, denied his opportunity to ally with the Houthis against Hadi, continues maneuvering for influence through his General People's Congress party and tribal networks. However, his ability to destabilize the new arrangements is constrained by targeted sanctions and careful coalition-building that isolates his most disruptive elements.

Economic Stabilization Measures

The avoidance of civil war allows Yemen's transitional government to focus on economic stabilization rather than conflict management. With Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states seeing the inclusive approach as preferable to Houthi dominance, financial support continues flowing to Yemen's Central Bank. This prevents the complete collapse of the riyal and maintains basic salary payments to civil servants.

The government still implements subsidy reforms to address budget deficits, but does so gradually with targeted cash transfers to vulnerable populations rather than the abrupt cuts that sparked protests in our timeline. International donors, seeing genuine reform efforts, increase development assistance focused on infrastructure rehabilitation and job creation.

Yemen's energy sector sees modest revival, with oil exports from Marib and Hadramawt continuing to provide essential government revenue. Without the destruction of infrastructure and security collapse, production maintains approximately 250,000 barrels per day—not enough for prosperity but sufficient to prevent complete state failure.

Security Sector Reform

The alternate pathway involves difficult but essential security sector reforms. Rather than being captured by warring factions, Yemen's military undergoes a careful restructuring process that gradually reduces Saleh family control while integrating elements of various armed groups, including Houthi fighters, into a more representative national force.

A innovative approach to disarmament begins in less contested areas, with tribal leaders agreeing to security arrangements that limit heavy weapons while respecting Yemen's deeply-rooted gun culture. This incremental approach doesn't achieve complete disarmament but reduces the concentration of military-grade weapons among non-state actors.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains a significant challenge, but faces a more coordinated counterterrorism approach. Without the chaos of civil war creating ungoverned spaces, AQAP's ability to capture territory is significantly constrained, though it continues conducting terrorist attacks against government targets.

Humanitarian Conditions

The most dramatic difference in this alternate timeline is the avoidance of Yemen's catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Without airstrikes destroying critical infrastructure, without blockades preventing commercial imports, and without the collapse of healthcare systems, millions of Yemenis who faced starvation and preventable diseases in our timeline instead experience continuing poverty but not acute humanitarian emergency.

The cholera outbreaks that affected over two million people in our timeline are limited to smaller, manageable clusters that the health system, while strained, can respond to effectively. International humanitarian organizations focus on development rather than emergency response, strengthening institutions rather than substituting for their collapse.

Regional Dynamics

Saudi Arabia and Iran continue their regional competition, but Yemen avoids becoming a primary proxy battlefield. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who in our timeline used the Yemen intervention partially to establish his national security credentials, focuses his reform energies and consolidation of power through different means.

Without the massive military spending of the Yemen campaign (estimated at $100 million daily in the early phases of our timeline's conflict), Saudi Arabia directs more resources toward its economic diversification plans. Iran maintains ties with Houthi elements but doesn't secure the level of influence it achieved during the war in our timeline.

The United Arab Emirates, which in our timeline deployed significant forces to southern Yemen and built a network of proxy militias, maintains economic interests but doesn't establish the same military footprint. This prevents the proliferation of UAE-backed militias that further complicated the conflict in our timeline.

Long-term Impact

Constitutional Process and Political Evolution

By 2017-2018 in this alternate timeline, Yemen successfully drafts and ratifies a new constitution through a contentious but largely peaceful process. The constitution establishes a federal system with five regions having substantial autonomy but maintaining national unity. Revenue-sharing provisions ensure that resource-rich areas contribute to national development while retaining incentives for local economic growth.

The Houthi movement gradually transforms from an armed resistance movement into a political party with a militia wing, following a trajectory somewhat similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine. While maintaining significant independent military capabilities, they invest increasingly in political legitimacy, social services, and governance structures that transition their role from opposition to establishing stakeholder.

Southern separatism remains a powerful force but finds expression through greater autonomy rather than full independence. The Southern Transitional Council, which in our timeline emerged as a UAE-backed separatist force, instead functions as a regional government with extensive self-governance powers but functioning within a federal Yemeni state.

By 2022, Yemen holds imperfect but meaningful parliamentary elections that produce a fragmented legislature requiring coalition governance. While marred by security challenges in some regions and boycotts by some factions, these elections represent the first genuine democratic transition since the Arab Spring and establish a pattern of constitutional transfers of power.

Economic Recovery and Development

Yemen's economy in this alternate timeline achieves modest but significant recovery. Without the estimated $126 billion in economic damage from the actual war, Yemen maintains baseline economic functionality that, while still making it the poorest Arab nation, prevents the complete collapse seen in our timeline.

By 2020, several key developments catalyze gradual improvement:

Energy sector rehabilitation: Foreign investment returns to Yemen's oil and gas sectors, with production increasing to approximately 400,000 barrels per day by 2023. New exploration in the Marib basin identifies additional reserves that improve Yemen's long-term economic outlook.
Port development: Without the destruction and blockade of Hodeidah port, Yemen's main import facility undergoes modernization with Chinese investment, increasing capacity and reducing costs for essential imports. Similar developments at Aden port create a more balanced trading infrastructure.
Remittance growth: The Yemeni diaspora, not forced to flee war, expands in Gulf countries, increasing remittance flows from approximately $3.5 billion in 2014 to over $7 billion by 2024, providing crucial foreign exchange and supporting domestic consumption.
Agricultural revitalization: Targeted development programs address water management for agriculture, gradually shifting cultivation from water-intensive qat to higher-value food crops and specialty products like Yemeni coffee that command premium prices in international markets.

Yemen still faces profound economic challenges, including water scarcity, population growth, and climate vulnerability. However, without the devastating destruction of war, the country maintains a functioning economic foundation that can gradually improve rather than requiring total reconstruction.

Security Landscape Transformation

The security situation in this alternate Yemen follows a different trajectory from our timeline's catastrophic militarization. By 2025, several key developments reshape the security landscape:

Military professionalization: With international support, particularly from Jordan and European nations, Yemen's military gradually develops greater professionalism and national identity rather than factional loyalty. While not fully integrated, the armed forces achieve sufficient cohesion to maintain territorial integrity and counter non-state threats.
Counterterrorism success: Without the chaos of civil war providing operational space, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula experiences significant degradation of capabilities. By 2022, the group loses territorial control entirely and fragments into smaller cells capable of periodic attacks but lacking the governance capacity demonstrated during the actual conflict.
Tribal security arrangements: Rather than becoming militarized proxies for warring factions, tribal structures evolve into local security providers operating in coordination with federal and regional authorities. These arrangements formalize traditional conflict resolution mechanisms while gradually increasing state oversight.
Regional security cooperation: Yemen develops more functional security relationships with Gulf neighbors, including maritime security cooperation that reduces piracy and smuggling in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This cooperation extends to counterterrorism intelligence sharing and border security.

Yemen remains heavily armed at the societal level, and periodic violent incidents continue occurring. However, the absence of international intervention and massive weapons transfers prevents the devastating escalation seen in our timeline.

Humanitarian and Social Development

The most profound difference in this alternate timeline emerges in human development outcomes. Without the war that pushed millions into acute food insecurity and collapsed health systems, Yemen's social indicators follow a challenging but gradually improving trajectory:

Health systems: Yemen's healthcare infrastructure, while still underdeveloped, maintains functionality and even expands coverage. Vaccination rates reach 85% by 2023 (compared to below 50% during the actual conflict), and maternal mortality declines steadily.
Education continuation: Schools remain operational nationwide, preventing the lost generation phenomenon of our timeline where millions of children missed years of education. By 2025, literacy rates among youth reach 90%, establishing a foundation for future development.
Water security: International development partners implement targeted programs addressing Yemen's critical water scarcity. Modern irrigation systems, water harvesting techniques, and desalination projects create more sustainable management of this essential resource.
Urbanization management: Sana'a and other major cities implement limited but meaningful urban planning measures that manage growth more effectively than the chaotic expansion seen previously. Investments in solar energy reduce dependence on fossil fuels for electricity generation.

Yemen in this timeline still ranks low on human development indices, but follows a trajectory of gradual improvement rather than catastrophic regression. The difference represents millions of lives not cut short by violence, disease, and starvation.

Regional Geopolitical Implications

The absence of Yemen's civil war reshapes regional dynamics significantly by 2025:

Saudi Arabia's evolution: Without the draining Yemen conflict that cost hundreds of billions of dollars with few strategic gains, Saudi Arabia directs more resources toward economic diversification under Vision 2030. Mohammed bin Salman's leadership, while still controversial, develops without the international criticism of the Yemen campaign.
Iran's regional strategy: Denied an opportunity to establish a strong proxy presence on Saudi Arabia's southern border, Iran focuses its regional influence efforts more on Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iranian-Saudi competition continues but without the direct military dimension seen in our timeline.
Gulf Cooperation Council cohesion: The Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017 still occurs, but without the Yemen war as a complicating factor, resolution comes more quickly. By 2022, the GCC reestablishes functional unity with Yemen as an associate member receiving development support.
Maritime security: The Bab el-Mandeb strait, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, remains secure for international shipping without the Houthi attacks on vessels seen in our timeline. This stability benefits global trade and energy markets.

Without becoming a proxy battlefield, Yemen gradually reintegrates into regional diplomatic and economic structures. While still influenced by powerful neighbors, it maintains greater sovereignty and policy independence than the fragmented territories controlled by competing factions in our timeline.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Yamani, Professor of Middle Eastern Politics at the London School of Economics, offers this perspective: "The tragedy of Yemen wasn't inevitable. What we witnessed was a failure of imagination and compromise at critical junctures. Had President Hadi pursued genuine power-sharing rather than consolidation, had Saudi Arabia prioritized mediation over military intervention, and had the Houthis been willing to accept partial rather than total victory, Yemen could have followed a challenging but fundamentally different path. The lesson is that preventing civil wars requires addressing grievances before they become existential and recognizing that inclusive governance, while messy, is far preferable to the false clarity of military solutions."

Sarah Johnson, Senior Fellow at the International Crisis Group and former UN special advisor on Yemen, argues: "The international community bears significant responsibility for Yemen's fate. In 2014, diplomatic attention was focused on Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine while Yemen's crisis festered. With more sustained diplomatic engagement during the NDC process and targeted economic support during the transition, external actors could have helped Yemeni stakeholders build confidence in political processes rather than military alternatives. Today's conflict prevention efforts must learn from Yemen that the window between political crisis and armed conflict is shorter than we think, and requires immediate, coordinated international response."

Dr. Khaled Al-Madhaji, Director of the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, provides a Yemeni perspective: "We must understand that Yemen's conflict emerged from genuine governance failures and legitimate grievances. Any alternate path would have required addressing deep inequities in resource distribution, representation, and economic opportunity. The peace that might have been achieved in 2014 would still have been fragile and required constant nurturing. The key difference is that political struggles within functioning institutions, however imperfect, allow for non-violent evolution, while the militarization of politics creates cycles of suffering that last generations. Yemen's hypothetical peace would have been difficult and incomplete, but infinitely preferable to what we have experienced."