What If The ABM Treaty Was Never Signed?

The Actual History

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty stands as one of the landmark arms control agreements of the Cold War era. Signed on May 26, 1972, by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the treaty was part of the broader Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). Its primary purpose was to limit anti-ballistic missile systems that could defend against nuclear weapons delivered by strategic ballistic missiles.

The road to the treaty began in the late 1960s when both superpowers were developing and deploying ABM systems. The United States had begun work on the Sentinel ABM system, later reconfigured as the Safeguard program, while the Soviet Union had deployed an ABM system around Moscow. Defense analysts and strategists from both nations gradually recognized a problematic paradox: effective defensive systems might actually destabilize the nuclear balance by undermining mutual deterrence—the concept that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Under the MAD doctrine, peace was maintained because each side knew that a nuclear first strike would inevitably trigger devastating retaliation. If one side developed effective defenses against nuclear missiles, it might be tempted to launch a first strike, believing it could intercept any retaliatory strike. This would force the other side to build more offensive weapons to overwhelm these defenses, triggering a new and potentially uncontrollable arms race.

The ABM Treaty addressed this concern by severely restricting ABM systems. Initially, each country was permitted two ABM deployment areas: one protecting its capital and another protecting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. A 1974 protocol further reduced this to one site each. The United States chose to protect its ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota, while the Soviet Union maintained its Moscow defense system.

The treaty prohibited the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems. It also limited each site to 100 interceptor missiles and restricted radar systems. Importantly, the treaty established a framework for verification and consultation through the Standing Consultative Commission.

The United States actually abandoned its single permitted ABM site in 1976, just months after it became operational, due to cost concerns and questions about its effectiveness. The Soviet Union (and later Russia) maintained its Moscow system, upgrading it over the decades.

For nearly 30 years, the ABM Treaty remained a cornerstone of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, on December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush gave Russia notice that the United States would withdraw from the treaty, citing the need to develop defenses against potential missile attacks from "rogue states" like North Korea and Iran. The U.S. withdrawal took effect on June 13, 2002.

In the years since, the United States has developed and deployed limited missile defense systems, including Ground-Based Midcourse Defense in Alaska and California, and various regional systems like THAAD and Aegis. Russia has continued to modernize its Moscow ABM system and has developed new strategic weapons specifically designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses. The collapse of the ABM Treaty has been followed by the gradual erosion of other arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and, most recently, challenges to the New START Treaty.

The Point of Divergence

What if the ABM Treaty was never signed in 1972? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks failed to produce an agreement limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, fundamentally altering the strategic balance of the Cold War and beyond.

Several plausible scenarios could have prevented the treaty's signing:

First, the political dynamics in either country might have shifted against arms control. By 1972, President Nixon was pursuing his policy of détente with the Soviet Union, partly to isolate China and extract the U.S. from Vietnam. Had domestic political pressures—perhaps from hardline defense hawks like Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson who were skeptical of arms control—intensified, Nixon might have calculated that the political costs of signing the treaty outweighed the benefits.

Alternatively, the Soviet leadership might have rejected the treaty. While General Secretary Brezhnev favored arms control, defense hardliners like Defense Minister Andrei Grechko were deeply suspicious of American intentions. If Soviet military leaders had convinced the Politburo that their ABM technology provided a decisive advantage worth pursuing, Moscow might have walked away from the negotiating table.

Technical disputes also could have derailed the treaty. The negotiations involved complex definitions of radar capabilities, missile interceptors, and verification procedures. Insurmountable disagreements over technical specifications—such as the characteristics that distinguished permitted early warning radars from prohibited ABM radars—might have prevented consensus.

Finally, external events could have poisoned the negotiating environment. The Vietnam War was still ongoing, and Soviet support for North Vietnam created tensions. Had there been a significant escalation in Vietnam, or a new crisis elsewhere (perhaps involving Soviet ally Egypt or in Berlin), the diplomatic climate might have deteriorated beyond repair.

In our alternate timeline, we'll explore a scenario where a combination of these factors—primarily stronger opposition from military establishments in both countries and technical disagreements over radar limitations—prevented agreement at the May 1972 Moscow Summit. Nixon and Brezhnev announced progress on other aspects of SALT I, including the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms, but acknowledged an impasse on defensive systems. Without constraints on ABM systems, both superpowers committed to developing and deploying nationwide missile defenses, setting the stage for a dramatically different strategic environment.

Immediate Aftermath

Accelerated Defense Deployments (1972-1975)

The failure to limit ABM systems triggered immediate programmatic responses in both superpowers. In the United States, the Nixon administration moved quickly to expand the Safeguard ABM program beyond its initial limited deployment.

By late 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced plans for ABM sites protecting major population centers including Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles, in addition to the ICBM fields. Congress, though divided, ultimately approved expanded funding for ABM deployment, particularly as intelligence reports indicated the Soviets were accelerating their own systems.

The Soviet Union, for its part, rapidly expanded its ABM deployments beyond Moscow. Within months of the failed treaty negotiations, Soviet engineers broke ground on ABM complexes to protect Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), the Ukrainian missile fields, and key military-industrial centers in the Urals. The Soviet A-35 ABM system, already operational around Moscow, became the template for wider deployment.

Budgetary Impacts and Economic Strains (1973-1976)

The expanded ABM deployments placed enormous pressure on defense budgets in both countries. In the United States, the comprehensive ABM program required significant resources at a time when the economy was suffering from inflation and the oil shock of 1973-74. President Nixon, and later President Ford after Nixon's resignation due to Watergate, faced difficult tradeoffs between ABM deployment and other military priorities.

For the Soviet Union, the economic burden was even more severe. The Soviet economy, already inefficient and struggling to maintain military parity with the United States, was forced to divert even more resources to strategic defense. This exacerbated existing shortages of consumer goods and further degraded civilian economic performance. Yet the Soviet leadership, concerned about falling behind in the strategic balance, accepted these costs as necessary.

Nuclear Force Structure Changes (1973-1977)

Without ABM limitations, both superpowers recognized that their offensive nuclear forces needed to be expanded and modified to maintain deterrence. The ability to overwhelm enemy defenses became the driving factor in force planning.

The United States accelerated development of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) for its ICBM and SLBM forces, placing more warheads on each missile to saturate Soviet defenses. Defense planners also pushed for the B-1 bomber program and development of air-launched cruise missiles specifically designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Soviet Union responded with a massive buildup of its heavy ICBMs, particularly the SS-18 Satan, which could carry up to 10 warheads. Soviet engineers also accelerated work on maneuverable reentry vehicles and decoys to confuse American ABM systems. This offensive-defensive arms race significantly increased the number of nuclear warheads in both arsenals beyond what occurred in our timeline.

Deterioration of Détente (1974-1978)

The failure of the ABM negotiations had poisonous effects on broader U.S.-Soviet relations. Without the confidence-building success of the ABM Treaty, other areas of détente suffered. Arms control negotiations continued, but with diminished expectations and results.

President Ford, after succeeding Nixon, attempted to revive strategic arms talks at the Vladivostok Summit in November 1974. However, the absence of ABM limitations complicated efforts to set meaningful ceilings on offensive forces. The talks became bogged down in technical disputes about how to account for weapons designed to penetrate ABM systems.

By 1976, with both sides deploying nationwide ABM systems and expanding their offensive arsenals, Cold War tensions had noticeably increased. The rhetoric from both Washington and Moscow became harsher, with each side accusing the other of seeking strategic superiority. These tensions spilled over into regional conflicts, with proxy wars in Angola and Ethiopia taking on greater strategic significance.

Technological Acceleration (1975-1979)

Without treaty restrictions, both superpowers poured resources into advanced ABM technologies. The United States revived concepts for space-based missile defense systems that had previously been considered but shelved due to technical challenges and cost.

By 1975, the Ford administration had initiated exploratory programs for space-based sensors and directed energy weapons. The Soviets, alarmed by American space-based initiatives, accelerated their own counterspace programs and anti-satellite weapons development.

Both sides also pushed computer technology development to create more sophisticated battle management systems for their ABM networks. Ironically, this massive investment in computer technology for military purposes had significant spillover effects for civilian computing development, accelerating the digitization of both economies beyond what occurred in our timeline.

Long-term Impact

Strategic Instability and Crisis Dynamics (1980s)

By the early 1980s, the combination of extensive ABM deployments and massive offensive nuclear arsenals had created a dangerous strategic environment. Military planners on both sides became increasingly concerned about the "use it or lose it" pressure during crises, as each side feared its retaliatory forces might be neutralized by a combination of first strike and defensive systems.

This dynamic came to a head during several Cold War crises that were far more dangerous than their counterparts in our timeline:

The Soviet war in Afghanistan, beginning in 1979, took on greater strategic significance, with the United States viewing it as an attempt to position Soviet forces closer to the Persian Gulf oil supplies.
The Korean Air Lines Flight 007 incident in 1983, when the Soviets shot down a civilian airliner that strayed into their airspace, triggered a more severe diplomatic crisis, as it occurred against the backdrop of heightened nuclear tensions.
The NATO exercise Able Archer 83, which in our timeline already caused serious Soviet concerns about a potential U.S. first strike, created an even more dangerous situation in this alternate timeline. With ABM systems deployed, Soviet leaders genuinely feared that the United States might believe it could win a nuclear exchange.

Nuclear strategists from both countries later acknowledged that the lack of ABM limitations had significantly increased the risk of inadvertent nuclear war during this period. The extensive ABM deployments, rather than increasing security, had created what became known as the "crisis instability paradox."

Technological Evolution of Strategic Defense (1980s-1990s)

The unlimited competition in ABM systems drove rapid technological innovation. By the mid-1980s, both superpowers had moved beyond the ground-based interceptor model of early ABM systems.

The United States, under President Reagan's administration, integrated its terrestrial ABM sites with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which in this timeline received far greater funding and political support. By 1988, the first experimental space-based interceptors were deployed, although their effectiveness remained questionable.

The Soviet Union, despite growing economic difficulties, maintained competitive ABM capabilities through asymmetric approaches. Rather than matching the American space-based systems component-for-component, Soviet engineers developed more advanced directed energy weapons for ground-based ABM applications and invested heavily in counter-space capabilities to neutralize American space-based assets.

By the 1990s, both sides had developed multi-layered defense systems integrating ground-based interceptors, space-based sensors and weapons, and advanced battle management computers. However, strategic analysts on both sides continued to believe that offensive forces maintained the advantage, as they developed increasingly sophisticated penetration aids and tactics.

Economic and Political Consequences for the Soviet Union (1980s-1991)

The unbounded ABM competition proved particularly devastating for the Soviet economy. The requirement to maintain both expanded offensive forces and nationwide ABM systems drained resources from an already inefficient economic system.

By the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union was allocating over 20% of its GDP to military spending—significantly higher than in our timeline. This unsustainable burden accelerated the economic crisis that ultimately contributed to the Soviet collapse.

Gorbachev's reform efforts were hampered by the strategic situation. His attempts at perestroika (economic restructuring) were undermined by the inability to significantly reduce military spending due to the ongoing defensive arms race. His glasnost (openness) policies revealed to the Soviet people just how much the ABM competition had cost them in terms of living standards.

The Soviet collapse, when it came in 1991, was even more chaotic than in our timeline due to the greater economic distortions caused by the excessive military spending. The transition to market economies in the post-Soviet states was more difficult, and economic recovery took longer to achieve.

Post-Cold War Proliferation Challenges (1990s-2000s)

The legacy of unrestricted ABM development created significant challenges for nuclear nonproliferation efforts after the Cold War. Emerging nuclear powers viewed ABM technology as an essential component of their strategic forces.

China, observing the U.S.-Soviet ABM race, allocated substantial resources to developing both a more robust nuclear arsenal and its own ABM capabilities. By the early 2000s, China had deployed limited ABM systems protecting Beijing and its strategic rocket forces.

Other nuclear powers, including India and Pakistan, incorporated ABM dimensions into their strategic planning from the outset of their nuclear programs. This complicated regional security dynamics and increased the risk of arms races beyond the original U.S.-Soviet competition.

The proliferation of ABM technology also affected diplomatic efforts to limit the spread of ballistic missile technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, was less effective in this timeline because more countries prioritized obtaining both offensive missile capability and defensive countermeasures.

Contemporary Strategic Balance (2010s-2025)

By the present day in our alternate timeline, strategic defense has become deeply integrated into the military planning of all major powers. The United States maintains the most technologically sophisticated multi-layered missile defense system, incorporating space-based, sea-based, and land-based components. Russia has maintained and modernized its nationwide system, focusing particularly on protecting its strategic forces and major urban centers.

The absence of the ABM Treaty from the beginning of the strategic arms control process created a fundamentally different nuclear order. Total warhead counts remain significantly higher than in our timeline, as offensive forces were continuously expanded to maintain the ability to penetrate evolving defenses.

Ironically, despite the enormous resources devoted to strategic defenses over five decades, the fundamental condition of mutual vulnerability remains largely intact. Neither the United States nor Russia (nor China) can reliably defend against a determined nuclear attack by another major power. The primary impact of the extensive ABM deployments has been to increase the size of arsenals needed to maintain deterrence and to complicate crisis stability.

The absence of ABM limitations also fundamentally altered space security. Without the treaty's prohibitions on space-based ABM components, the militarization of space proceeded much more rapidly and extensively. By 2025, low Earth orbit hosts numerous military satellites with direct defensive and offensive capabilities, creating a complex and potentially unstable strategic domain.

Impact on Arms Control Regimes

The failure of the ABM Treaty negotiations in 1972 cast a long shadow over subsequent arms control efforts. Without the foundation of this initial agreement, the architecture of bilateral arms control that developed in our timeline emerged in a much more limited and fragmented form.

The START process, which in our timeline produced significant reductions in deployed strategic weapons, was less successful in this alternate world. While some limitations were eventually negotiated, they set much higher ceilings for deployed forces due to the need to maintain the capability to penetrate missile defenses.

By 2025, the global arms control framework is significantly weaker. Non-strategic nuclear weapons were never effectively limited by formal agreements. Space arms control remains nonexistent, with orbit increasingly congested by military systems. The overall strategic environment features higher numbers of weapons, greater military use of space, and more complex nuclear planning—all tracing back to that fateful failure to limit ABM systems in 1972.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Robert Jervis, Professor Emeritus of International Politics at Columbia University, offers this perspective: "The ABM Treaty was fundamentally about accepting mutual vulnerability as the basis for strategic stability. In a world where that treaty never materialized, we would have seen the paradoxical outcome that greater defensive capabilities led to decreased security for both superpowers. The massive resources devoted to ABM systems would have yielded only marginal improvements in protection while driving offensive buildups that increased the severity of the threat. This dynamic, which I've called the 'spiral model' of arms racing, would have been enormously costly and dangerous, particularly during periods of high tension like the early 1980s."

General Kevin Chilton (Ret.), former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, provides a different analysis: "Without ABM limitations, the technological trajectory of strategic defense would have been dramatically different. The United States would have developed and deployed multiple generations of defense systems, likely achieving capabilities by the early 2000s that we're only beginning to contemplate today. While perfect defense against massive attacks might remain elusive, the ability to blunt limited strikes would be far more robust. This would have fundamentally altered deterrence equations with regional powers like North Korea and Iran, potentially providing more strategic options during crises. However, the economic and opportunity costs would have been enormous, and the impact on strategic stability with peer competitors remains an open question."

Dr. Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University, considers the normative implications: "The failure of the ABM Treaty would have undercut what became a crucial norm in nuclear politics—the idea that limitations on strategic capabilities could be codified through binding international agreements with verification provisions. Without this foundational agreement, the entire fabric of arms control might have unraveled much earlier. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime would have faced even greater challenges, as the superpowers' commitment to Article VI disarmament obligations would have appeared even less credible. We likely would have seen more nuclear proliferation and a weaker global taboo against nuclear use, creating a much more dangerous contemporary world."