What If The Biological Weapons Convention Never Happened?

The Actual History

The development and potential use of biological weapons cast a long shadow over 20th century international relations. While chemical weapons saw widespread deployment in World War I, biological weapons—despite their development—were not used on a large scale during World War II by major powers, though Japan's notorious Unit 731 conducted horrific human experiments with biological agents in occupied China.

After World War II, several nations including the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom maintained active biological weapons programs. The U.S. program, formalized in 1943, continued through the 1950s and 1960s, developing agents such as anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q fever, VEE, and botulism, along with various delivery systems. By the mid-1960s, Fort Detrick in Maryland had become the center of U.S. biological weapons research, while large-scale production occurred at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas.

The Soviets also pursued an extensive program, with facilities like Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) focusing on weaponizing agents such as anthrax, smallpox, plague, and tularemia. The UK similarly maintained capabilities at Porton Down, although on a smaller scale than the superpowers.

A pivotal change in policy occurred on November 25, 1969, when President Richard Nixon made a unilateral declaration renouncing U.S. offensive biological weapons development. This unexpected announcement came after a comprehensive review conducted by the National Security Council. Nixon stated: "The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare." This policy shift included a commitment to destroy existing stockpiles and convert facilities to peaceful purposes.

Following this unilateral U.S. action, international momentum built toward formalizing a global ban. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975, after ratification by 22 nations, including the U.S., UK, and Soviet Union. It became the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents for offensive purposes, while allowing defensive research.

Despite the treaty, the Soviet Union maintained a massive clandestine biological weapons program called Biopreparat until the early 1990s. This violation only came to light after the defection of Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik in 1989 and subsequent revelations by Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov (Ken Alibek). The program had employed thousands of scientists working on weaponizing agents including anthrax, smallpox, plague, and Marburg virus.

Other BWC compliance concerns emerged with Iraq's 1980s biological weapons program (discovered after the 1991 Gulf War) and suspicions regarding other states like North Korea and Syria. The treaty's effectiveness has been hampered by its lack of verification mechanisms—a protocol to add verification measures failed to achieve consensus in 2001 when the U.S. rejected the draft.

Today, the BWC remains in force with 184 states parties, serving as a crucial international norm against biological weapons development. However, technological advancements in synthetic biology, gene editing, and bioinformatics have raised new concerns about potential novel biological threats that weren't envisioned when the treaty was drafted. The COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted vulnerabilities to biological threats and renewed discussions about strengthening international biosecurity frameworks.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Biological Weapons Convention never materialized? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons development and stockpiling never came to fruition, leaving nations free to continue developing these weapons of mass destruction throughout the remainder of the Cold War and beyond.

Several plausible scenarios could have prevented the BWC from becoming reality:

First, President Nixon might never have made his pivotal 1969 unilateral declaration renouncing U.S. biological weapons. The actual decision emerged from a National Security Council review initiated early in Nixon's presidency. Had influential voices like Defense Secretary Melvin Laird or national security figures emphasized the strategic value of maintaining a biological arsenal against the Soviet threat, Nixon might have continued the U.S. program. Internal documents indicate the decision was not inevitable—military leaders initially resisted abandoning these capabilities before ultimately accepting Nixon's decision.

Alternatively, even with Nixon's declaration, the subsequent diplomatic process could have collapsed. The negotiations took place within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, where disagreements between the U.S., UK, and USSR over verification protocols almost derailed the process multiple times. The Soviets had initially insisted on simultaneously banning both chemical and biological weapons, while Western powers preferred addressing biological weapons first due to their limited military utility and verification challenges. Had the Soviets maintained their position, the negotiations might have deadlocked indefinitely.

A third possibility involves the United Kingdom. The UK played a crucial mediating role by proposing a compromise draft that ultimately broke the impasse between U.S. and Soviet positions. Without this diplomatic initiative, or had British officials been less invested in reaching an agreement, the convention might never have progressed beyond preliminary discussions.

In our alternate timeline, we'll focus on the second scenario: Nixon makes his 1969 declaration, but subsequent diplomatic efforts fail when the Soviet Union, suspicious of Western intentions and unwilling to accept any on-site verification measures, breaks off negotiations in late 1971. The BWC draft collapses, and the international legal prohibition against biological weapons never materializes.

Immediate Aftermath

U.S. Policy Contradiction

The immediate aftermath of the failed biological weapons ban created a paradoxical situation for the Nixon administration. Having already publicly renounced America's offensive biological capabilities, the administration faced both domestic and international pressure to clarify its position.

By mid-1972, confronted with continued Soviet biological weapons development, the Nixon administration made a significant policy adjustment. While maintaining the closure of production facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal, the administration reclassified Fort Detrick's mission. Rather than fully converting to peaceful purposes as originally announced, approximately 30% of Detrick's resources were redirected toward "defensive research with potential dual-use applications." This carefully worded designation allowed continued research on dangerous pathogens while maintaining the public position that America had abandoned offensive capabilities.

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in a declassified memo from September 1972, wrote: "The President's position on unilateral disarmament must be balanced against the reality of continued Soviet development. Our research posture must maintain sufficient defensive capabilities that could, if necessary, be repurposed."

Soviet Bioweapons Expansion

Without the legal constraints and international pressure of the BWC, the Soviet biological weapons program expanded faster and more openly than in our timeline. Rather than operating entirely as the covert Biopreparat program, Soviet officials incorporated biological weapons more explicitly into their strategic doctrine.

By 1975, the Soviets had established three additional major research facilities beyond those in our timeline, focusing on manipulating viral hemorrhagic fevers, arboviral encephalitides, and genetically modified bacterial agents. The research organization maintained a higher profile, falling under direct military control rather than operating under civilian health ministry cover.

Defense intelligence estimates from this period suggest Soviet bioweapons employment doctrine evolved to include more tactical battlefield scenarios, not just strategic city-targeting options. Specialized delivery systems, including modified artillery shells and short-range missile warheads designed to create optimal aerosol dispersal patterns, entered production by the mid-1970s.

International Proliferation Begins

The absence of the BWC removed a key international norm against biological weapons proliferation. By the late 1970s, this created cascading effects as nations reassessed their security needs.

France, which had dismantled its offensive biological program in the 1960s, reestablished research facilities near Lyon by 1976. Unlike its nuclear force de frappe, this program remained classified, though its existence became an open secret in defense circles.

More concerning was the rapid expansion of biological research in states with regional power ambitions. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein's early leadership, began recruiting microbiologists from European universities in 1977, three years earlier than in our timeline. Egypt and South Africa both initiated programs by 1978, while Taiwan secretly established facilities to counter perceived mainland Chinese threats.

Commercial and Scientific Impacts

The continued development of biological weapons had significant repercussions for scientific research and the biotechnology industry, which was just beginning to emerge in the 1970s.

The absence of BWC-related export controls meant that high-containment laboratory equipment, fermenters, and aerosol testing technology moved more freely in international markets. Companies specializing in this equipment, particularly from Switzerland and West Germany, saw significant growth supplying dual-use technology to countries developing both legitimate pharmaceutical capabilities and clandestine bioweapons programs.

Scientific publication practices shifted as well. By 1977, major journals including Science and Nature implemented voluntary review procedures for articles with potential bioweapons applications, creating an informal censorship system that slowed the exchange of legitimate research. This particularly affected emerging fields like genetic engineering and viral mutation studies.

Arms Control Momentum Stalls

Perhaps the most significant immediate consequence was the chilling effect on other arms control initiatives. The failure to secure a biological weapons ban damaged confidence in the arms control process at a crucial moment.

The momentum toward Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations with the Soviets faltered as hawks in both Washington and Moscow cited the bioweapons negotiation failure as evidence that the other side couldn't be trusted. While SALT I had been concluded in 1972 in our timeline, in this alternate reality, the agreements were scaled back significantly and almost collapsed entirely.

Ambassador Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator for arms control, lamented in his memoirs: "The biological weapons treaty collapse cast a long shadow over our nuclear discussions. When you can't agree to ban weapons that offer little strategic advantage and enormous moral hazard, how can you reach consensus on limiting the weapons at the heart of your defense strategy?"

Long-term Impact

Bioweapons in Late Cold War Strategy

By the 1980s, the continued development of biological weapons fundamentally altered military doctrines on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Strategic Integration

The Reagan administration's military buildup included a significant biological component absent from our timeline. The "offset strategy" focusing on technological superiority expanded beyond stealth technology and precision munitions to include what declassified documents called "third-tier strategic deterrence assets"—a euphemism for advanced biological capabilities.

By 1983, the U.S. had established the Advanced Pathogens Research Command (APRC) with facilities distributed across three states. This organization, operating with an annual budget estimated at $1.2 billion (equivalent to approximately $3.5 billion in 2025 dollars), focused on developing "containable" biological agents with geographic limitations—pathogens engineered to lose virulence after specific generations of transmission or under certain environmental conditions.

The Soviet approach diverged significantly, focusing on overwhelming capacity rather than precise control. The Biopreparat program, operating openly rather than covertly as in our timeline, expanded to include 18 major facilities employing over 32,000 scientists and technicians by 1985. Their focus on agents like weaponized Marburg virus, specialized tularemia strains, and modified plague variants created what CIA analysts termed "a doomsday capability without launch warnings."

The Binary Biological Weapon Revolution

The mid-1980s saw a significant technological advancement: binary biological weapons. Similar to binary chemical weapons, these systems kept harmless precursors separated until deployment, addressing major storage and safety concerns. The U.S. pioneered this approach with "Project Chimera," which developed weaponized bacteria with plasmids containing virulence factors activated only under deployment conditions.

This technological leap complicated arms control discussions that had periodically resurfaced, as verification became even more challenging when facilities could quickly convert from seemingly legitimate pharmaceutical production to weapons manufacturing.

Regional Proliferation and Conflicts

The absence of BWC norms led to more widespread proliferation among regional powers, with several instances of limited deployment occurring by the 1990s.

The Iran-Iraq War Escalation

While chemical weapons were used extensively in the Iran-Iraq War in our timeline, the alternate history saw biological weapons deployed in 1987. Iraq's use of weaponized anthrax against Iranian troop concentrations near Basra caused approximately 8,000 casualties. Iran retaliated with crude but effective cholera weapons against Iraqi water supplies, leading to civilian outbreaks in southern Iraq.

These incidents, while locally devastating, provided real-world data that military planners globally incorporated into their doctrines. The limited international response—primarily expressions of concern without substantive action—established a troubling precedent.

The South Asian Bioweapons Race

India, responding to intelligence about Pakistani biological research, launched its own program in 1982. By the early 1990s, both nations had established sophisticated capabilities, creating a biological dimension to their nuclear rivalry. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, Indian forces discovered evidence of Pakistani preparation for anti-livestock attacks targeting India's agricultural economy, nearly triggering major escalation.

African Conflicts

The most disturbing developments occurred in Africa, where the Rhodesian-Zimbabwe conflict and later civil wars saw crude biological weapons used tactically. The Rhodesian Security Forces' Selous Scouts, known to have poisoned water sources in our timeline, developed more sophisticated biological capabilities in this alternate history. South Africa's Project Coast, led by Wouter Basson, expanded beyond its historical scope to include field testing in Angola and Mozambique, causing localized outbreaks of engineered pathogens.

Post-Cold War Challenges

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created unprecedented biosecurity challenges in this alternate timeline.

The Biosecurity Crisis

Without the BWC framework that in our timeline helped manage the post-Soviet biological weapons infrastructure, the early 1990s witnessed what became known as the "Great Biosecurity Crisis." Thousands of Soviet bioweapons scientists faced unemployment with their specialized knowledge unregulated by international frameworks.

Despite U.S.-led efforts through an expanded Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, significant expertise and materials disappeared into the global marketplace. Multiple instances of biological material theft occurred between 1992-1996, including a highly publicized case where freeze-dried smallpox samples were recovered in transit to the Middle East.

Non-State Actors and Bioterrorism

The proliferation of expertise and materials inevitably reached non-state actors. While our timeline saw limited bioterrorism like the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attempted anthrax attacks and 2001 anthrax letters, this alternate timeline experienced more frequent and sophisticated incidents.

The most significant occurred in 2004, when an al-Qaeda affiliate released a modified tularemia agent in the ventilation systems of three European transportation hubs, causing over 300 deaths and thousands of hospitalizations. This attack fundamentally altered public perception of terrorism and led to dramatic security changes globally, comparable to 9/11's impact in our timeline.

Technological Acceleration and Modern Implications

The continued investment in biological weapons capabilities accelerated certain fields of research while creating distinctive regulatory frameworks absent in our timeline.

The Synthetic Biology Revolution

The Human Genome Project, completed in 2003 as in our timeline, laid groundwork for advanced bioengineering. However, without BWC constraints, military applications emerged more rapidly. By 2010, multiple nations had developed capabilities to synthesize pathogenic organisms from scratch with modified characteristics—enhanced transmissibility, incubation period manipulation, and antibiotic resistance.

This accelerated synthetic biology development had paradoxical effects. Medical countermeasures, including rapid vaccine platforms and broad-spectrum antivirals, developed faster than in our timeline due to increased investment. However, the potential threat envelope expanded more rapidly than defensive capabilities.

Modern International Relations

By 2025, biological capabilities form a complex component of international relations. Major powers maintain what they term "defensive research" programs while accusing rivals of offensive development. China, Russia, and the United States all operate high-containment laboratories with ambiguous capabilities, while approximately 24 other nations maintain what intelligence agencies classify as "latent biological weapons capability"—ostensibly legitimate research infrastructure that could rapidly convert to weapons production.

The COVID-19 pandemic, occurring similarly to our timeline, fueled conspiracy theories about engineered pathogens but also prompted renewed calls for international controls. The resulting 2023 Biosecurity Framework Conference produced a limited verification protocol that critics describe as "too little, too late"—a partial measure establishing inspections regimes that would have been revolutionary in 1972 but seem inadequate to the advanced biological capabilities of 2025.

Societal and Ethical Dimensions

Perhaps the most profound long-term impact has been psychological and ethical. Public health has become increasingly securitized, with disease surveillance systems integrated into national security frameworks. Universities conducting advanced biological research operate under stringent security protocols that would seem foreign to academics in our timeline.

The ethical framework governing life sciences research has evolved differently, with "dual-use research of concern" governed by mandatory international oversight absent in our timeline. Scientific publication practices include pre-publication security review for methodologies with weapons applications, creating tensions between scientific openness and security concerns that remain unresolved.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Jonathan Steinberg, Professor of International Biodefense Studies at Georgetown University, offers this perspective:

"The absence of the Biological Weapons Convention represents one of history's great missed opportunities. What's most striking is not just the direct proliferation of biological weapons, but how their continued development distorted the entire field of biotechnology. The securitization of biological research created artificial barriers between scientists globally, slowing legitimate medical advances while simultaneously accelerating the most dangerous applications. The post-Soviet transition, managed imperfectly even in our timeline, became a catastrophic proliferation event without the BWC's normative framework. Today's biosecurity challenges are exponentially more complex than what an early 1970s treaty would have needed to address."

Dr. Elena Volkova, former Russian biodefense scientist and current UN Biosecurity Inspector, provides a contrasting analysis:

"The lack of a biological weapons ban paradoxically resulted in more transparent research environments than we might expect. Without the ability to hide programs behind claims of BWC compliance, nations developed more extensive biosafety protocols and verification technologies out of mutual self-interest. The 'trust but verify' approach that emerged by necessity in the 1990s created detection capabilities far more advanced than in your timeline. Yes, biological weapons proliferated, but so did the technologies to detect and counter them. The question remains whether this technological arms race has made anyone safer, or merely created more sophisticated threats."

Lieutenant General (Ret.) William Carpenter, former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, offers a military perspective:

"The decision to maintain biological weapons capabilities fundamentally changed military planning across the spectrum. What we learned was that these weapons, once viewed as 'poor man's nukes,' became increasingly sophisticated tools with calibrated effects that complicated every aspect of military operations. The binary biological weapons revolution of the 1980s created capabilities with selective pressures, incubation periods, and geographic limitations that strategic planners incorporated into both offensive and defensive scenarios. While actual deployment remained rare, the shadow of these capabilities influenced conventional conflicts in ways we're still trying to fully understand. The resources diverted to this biological arms race certainly came at the expense of conventional readiness and other national priorities."