What If The Boeing 737 MAX Issues Were Caught Earlier?

The Actual History

The Boeing 737 MAX saga represents one of the most significant aviation safety crises in modern history. Boeing began developing the 737 MAX in 2011 as a competitive response to the fuel-efficient Airbus A320neo. The company sought to update its successful 737 Next Generation series with more efficient engines while minimizing design changes to expedite regulatory approval and reduce training requirements for pilots already certified on earlier 737 models.

A critical engineering challenge emerged during development. The MAX's larger, more fuel-efficient CFM LEAP-1B engines needed to be mounted higher and more forward on the wings than previous 737 models. This altered the aircraft's aerodynamics, creating a tendency for the nose to pitch upward in certain flight conditions, potentially risking a dangerous aerodynamic stall.

Rather than implementing more substantial design changes that would have required additional pilot training and certification, Boeing developed a software solution called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). This automated system would detect excessive pitch and activate the horizontal stabilizer to push the nose down, countering the aerodynamic tendency. Critically, MCAS relied on input from only a single angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor, creating a single point of failure. Boeing also failed to adequately document MCAS in pilot training materials and manuals, considering it simply part of the existing flight control system.

The FAA's certification process for the 737 MAX involved delegating significant portions of the safety assessment to Boeing itself, through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program. This self-certification approach, combined with competitive pressures and schedule constraints, resulted in inadequate scrutiny of the MCAS system. The FAA certified the 737 MAX in March 2017, and commercial service began in May 2017.

On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia, killing all 189 people aboard. On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed near Bishoftu, Ethiopia, killing all 157 people aboard. Investigations revealed that in both cases, faulty AOA sensor readings triggered MCAS repeatedly, forcing the aircraft into nosedives that the pilots could not overcome.

Following the second crash, aviation authorities worldwide grounded the entire 737 MAX fleet by March 13, 2019. The aircraft remained grounded for 20 months while Boeing redesigned MCAS to use data from both AOA sensors, implement a disagreement alert, limit the system's authority, and allow pilots to override it more easily. Additional pilot training was also mandated. The FAA recertified the 737 MAX in November 2020, with other regulators following suit over subsequent months.

The crisis cost Boeing over $20 billion, severely damaged its reputation, led to the resignation of CEO Dennis Muilenburg, resulted in a $2.5 billion settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice, and triggered fundamental reassessments of aviation certification processes globally. Boeing's production practices and corporate culture faced intense scrutiny, especially after internal communications revealed employees had expressed concerns about the 737 MAX's safety during its development.

The Point of Divergence

What if the critical flaws in the 737 MAX's MCAS system had been caught and addressed before any crashes occurred? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where Boeing's dangerous design decisions and the regulatory oversights that allowed them were identified and corrected before resulting in tragedy.

Several plausible paths could have led to this earlier intervention:

First, Boeing's internal testing process might have been more thorough, perhaps due to different leadership decisions or a stronger safety culture. Engineers who had expressed concerns about MCAS might have been heard rather than sidelined. In this scenario, Boeing's own engineering reviews could have identified the single-point failure risk of relying on one AOA sensor and the excessive authority given to the MCAS system before the aircraft entered service.

Alternatively, the FAA might have maintained stricter oversight despite the ODA program. Regulators could have scrutinized the MCAS system more thoroughly, recognized its potential dangers, and required Boeing to implement a more robust design. This might have occurred if different personnel had been assigned to the certification team or if the FAA had maintained more independence from the industry it regulated.

A third possibility involves earlier feedback from test pilots or airline pilots during the development and initial deployment phases. If pilots had been fully informed about MCAS and its capabilities during training, they might have raised concerns about the system's design and authority before it led to catastrophic failures.

In this alternate timeline, we'll explore a scenario where a combination of these factors led to the discovery and remediation of the MCAS flaws in late 2017, several months after the 737 MAX entered commercial service but well before the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines disasters. Perhaps a near-miss incident occurred—not resulting in casualties but serious enough to trigger a thorough investigation—or a particularly attentive pilot or engineer connected previously unreported anomalies and raised an alarm that couldn't be ignored.

Immediate Aftermath

Initial Response and Technical Investigation

In this alternate timeline, by December 2017, Boeing and the FAA initiated a joint review of the 737 MAX's flight control systems following concerning reports from airline pilots about unexpected nose-down movements during certain flight phases. Unlike our timeline, where similar early reports were largely dismissed, here a senior FAA official with a strong technical background pushed for a comprehensive investigation despite Boeing's initial resistance.

The review quickly identified MCAS as the culprit. Boeing engineers acknowledged that the system relied on a single AOA sensor, could activate repeatedly, and had been given more authority than originally planned during the certification process. More disturbingly, documentation about MCAS had been minimized in pilot materials specifically to avoid triggering requirements for additional pilot training, a competitive consideration when marketing the aircraft against the Airbus A320neo.

By February 2018, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive requiring temporary modifications to 737 MAX operating procedures while Boeing developed a software fix. Airlines were instructed to disable MCAS under certain conditions, and pilots received explicit training on the system and how to override it in case of malfunction.

Regulatory Recalibration

The early discovery of the MCAS issues triggered immediate scrutiny of the certification process that had allowed such a flawed system to be approved. By March 2018, the FAA administrator testified before Congress, acknowledging serious shortcomings in the agency's oversight:

"Our review indicates that we delegated too much authority to Boeing under the ODA program without maintaining appropriate technical oversight. This represented a fundamental breakdown in our safety mission."

The FAA quickly implemented changes to its certification procedures, particularly regarding software-controlled flight systems. The agency temporarily reassigned several officials who had overseen the 737 MAX certification and began rebuilding its technical staff, requesting additional congressional funding to reduce its reliance on manufacturers for technical evaluations.

Internationally, aviation authorities including EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) and CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China) conducted their own reviews of the 737 MAX. However, without actual crashes having occurred, these reviews were collaborative rather than confrontational, focusing on improving safety processes rather than assigning blame.

Boeing's Corporate Response

Boeing initially attempted to downplay the significance of the MCAS issues, characterizing them as minor adjustments to an otherwise sound system. However, as the technical investigation revealed the extent of the design flaws and the deliberate decisions to minimize pilot training, Boeing's position became untenable.

In April 2018, CEO Dennis Muilenburg announced a comprehensive safety review of Boeing's commercial aircraft division, acknowledging that competitive pressures had compromised the company's legendary safety culture:

"Boeing has always prioritized safety above all else. It's clear that in the case of the 737 MAX, we lost sight of that fundamental principle. Today, I'm announcing a complete restructuring of our design and certification processes to ensure this never happens again."

The company established an independent safety review board comprised of respected aviation safety experts from outside Boeing. Unlike our timeline where similar measures were implemented reactively after hundreds of deaths, these changes occurred proactively, preserving both lives and corporate credibility.

Financial and Market Impacts

Boeing's stock price initially fell approximately 15% in the weeks following the MCAS revelations, reflecting investor concern about potential design flaws in the company's newest aircraft. However, the market respected the proactive approach to addressing the problem before accidents occurred.

Airlines operating the 737 MAX faced schedule disruptions during the first half of 2018 as the initial emergency procedures and subsequent software updates were implemented. Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and other early MAX customers received compensation from Boeing for these disruptions, but the amounts were far less than what Boeing ultimately paid in our timeline after the crashes and prolonged grounding.

By mid-2018, Boeing had deployed a comprehensive MCAS software update that:

Required input from both AOA sensors
Limited the system's authority and frequency of activation
Included an AOA disagree alert as standard (not as an optional extra)
Could be fully deactivated by pilots through a clear procedure

This required a brief grounding of approximately three weeks for the global 737 MAX fleet, a minor inconvenience compared to the 20-month grounding in our timeline. The financial impact to Boeing was estimated at approximately $1-2 billion, primarily for software development, additional training, and airline compensation—roughly one-tenth of the actual costs incurred in our timeline.

Long-term Impact

Evolution of Aviation Safety Culture

By the mid-2020s, the early identification and resolution of the 737 MAX MCAS issues catalyzed a profound shift in aviation safety culture. The near-miss with the 737 MAX became a case study in how complex systems fail and how commercial pressures can undermine safety priorities.

In this timeline, the FAA underwent a significant transformation between 2018 and 2021. Congress passed the Aviation Safety Enhancement Act of 2019, providing the agency with additional funding specifically earmarked for rebuilding its technical expertise. The legislation also reformed the ODA program, requiring manufacturers to maintain strict separation between their certification employees and those responsible for production schedules and financial performance.

The "Boeing effect" rippled throughout the aerospace industry. Other manufacturers like Airbus, Embraer, and Bombardier conducted comprehensive reviews of their own certification procedures and automated flight control systems. This proactive approach identified and remediated several potential issues that might have otherwise gone undetected until incident or accident reports emerged.

By 2023, an industry-wide consensus emerged around principles for developing and certifying increasingly automated aircraft systems:

Redundancy in all flight-critical sensors and systems
Transparent documentation of all automated systems for pilots and regulators
Clear procedures for pilots to override automated systems
Independent technical review of software-controlled flight systems
Enhanced simulator training for edge cases and system failures

Boeing's Competitive Position

Without the catastrophic crashes and extended grounding that occurred in our timeline, Boeing maintained a stronger market position throughout the 2020s. The 737 MAX, after its brief grounding and MCAS modifications in 2018, continued to sell well against the Airbus A320neo family, though the European manufacturer maintained its market share advantage.

Boeing's decision to proactively address the MCAS issues, though costly in the short term, preserved the company's reputation for safety. In this alternate timeline, Boeing did not lose its position of trust with pilots, airlines, and regulators. By 2022, the manufacturer had delivered over 1,500 737 MAX aircraft, compared to approximately 900 in our timeline where the extended grounding and damaged reputation continued to impact deliveries years after recertification.

The financial stability afforded by continued 737 MAX deliveries allowed Boeing to proceed more confidently with development of its next aircraft program. Rather than focusing entirely on resolving the 737 MAX crisis as in our timeline, Boeing announced its New Midsize Airplane (NMA) program in 2019, aiming to replace the 757 and 767 with a new clean-sheet design incorporating advanced technologies.

Regulatory Harmonization and Independence

The cooperative approach to resolving the 737 MAX issues in 2018 led to greater harmonization among global aviation regulators. Without the defensiveness that characterized the post-crash environment in our timeline, the FAA and its international counterparts established more consistent standards for certifying increasingly automated aircraft.

By 2024, a new framework for international certification validation was in place. While each regulatory authority maintained its independence, they established common technical standards and information-sharing protocols that increased efficiency without compromising safety oversight.

China's CAAC, which in our timeline was the first to ground the 737 MAX after the Ethiopian crash and the last major regulator to recertify it, maintained a more collaborative relationship with Western regulators and manufacturers in this alternate timeline. The absence of the MAX crisis as a geopolitical friction point allowed aviation safety to remain primarily a technical rather than political issue.

Implications for Future Aircraft Development

The early identification of the 737 MAX issues fundamentally altered how manufacturers approached the increasing automation of flight controls. Rather than viewing automation primarily as a means to maintain commonality with older aircraft generations (avoiding pilot training costs), the industry embraced a philosophy of "transparent automation" where pilots received comprehensive training on all automated systems.

When Boeing launched development of its next clean-sheet aircraft in 2020 (the NMA, later branded as the 797), the design incorporated lessons from the 737 MAX experience. The flight control system featured triple redundancy for critical sensors, clearer indications of automated system interventions, and more intuitive override mechanisms.

Airbus similarly evolved its approach to automated systems in its A320neo successors and other aircraft programs. The duopoly competition focused more on genuine safety innovations rather than minimizing training costs, a shift that airline customers ultimately rewarded with orders.

By 2025, the industry had largely moved beyond the minimum-change approach that had characterized the 737 MAX development. New aircraft incorporated significant advancements in both safety and efficiency, with manufacturers accepting that proper training was an essential component of introducing new technologies.

The Lives Not Lost

Perhaps the most profound difference in this alternate timeline is purely counterfactual—the 346 people who died in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes in our timeline continued their lives, their families spared the devastation of sudden, preventable loss.

Captain Yared Getachew, who piloted Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in our timeline, became an advocate for pilot involvement in aircraft certification after his experience with the early MCAS issues. In 2023, he was appointed to lead the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority, bringing his operational experience to regulatory oversight.

The families who in our timeline founded the "Boeing Crash Families" organization to seek justice never had reason to meet. The passengers—businesspeople, humanitarian workers, vacationers, and others—continued their journeys and their lives, unaware of the fate they would have met in a different timeline.

Beyond these individuals, thousands of passengers who might have hesitated to fly on the 737 MAX after the crashes never developed such fears in this timeline. The public maintained its general trust in aviation safety, without the specific anxiety about Boeing aircraft or automated flight control systems that emerged in our timeline.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Nancy Leveson, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT and expert in system safety engineering, offers this perspective: "The 737 MAX crisis in our timeline revealed how organizational factors can undermine engineering safety principles. In an alternate timeline where these issues were caught earlier, we would likely see a more evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in safety culture. Without the shock of hundreds of deaths, the changes might be less dramatic but potentially more sustainable, with safety improvements driven by professional pride rather than public outrage and regulatory mandate. The key would be whether Boeing and the FAA truly learned from the near-miss or simply patched the immediate problem without addressing the underlying systemic issues."

Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, renowned pilot and aviation safety expert, suggests: "Early identification of the MCAS flaws would have reinforced a crucial principle: pilots must be informed about and trained on all flight control systems that can significantly alter aircraft behavior. In this alternate timeline, we might have avoided the pendulum swing between too much delegation to manufacturers and overly prescriptive regulation. Instead, we could have developed a more balanced approach where pilots, engineers, and regulators collaborate effectively. The fundamental lesson—that automation must be transparent and pilots must remain the ultimate authority—would be learned without the terrible cost in human lives."

Dr. Judi Appelbaum, former FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, provides this analysis: "The relationship between regulators and the regulated is always delicate. With early correction of the 737 MAX issues, we might have avoided the complete breakdown of trust that occurred in our timeline. However, the regulatory capture that allowed the problems to develop in the first place would still need addressing. The counterfactual timeline would likely feature more gradual reforms to the certification process, perhaps less comprehensive than what emerged after the crashes but implemented with less resistance from industry. The question is whether these evolutionary changes would be sufficient to prevent the next novel safety threat—sometimes systems need a shock to prompt fundamental reform."