What If The Chemical Weapons Convention Never Existed?

The Actual History

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) represents one of humanity's most significant achievements in arms control. Opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993, and entering into force on April 29, 1997, the CWC stands as the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universal international control.

The road to the CWC was long and fraught with setbacks. Early attempts to control chemical weapons began after World War I, during which chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas caused approximately 100,000 deaths and over one million casualties. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical weapons in warfare but did not ban their development, production, or stockpiling. This limitation became painfully evident during the Cold War, when both the United States and Soviet Union amassed enormous chemical weapons arsenals, estimated at approximately 40,000 and 50,000 tons of chemical agents, respectively.

Several events in the 1980s accelerated international momentum toward a comprehensive ban. Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), particularly against Iranian forces and Kurdish civilians, shocked the global conscience. The 1988 Halabja chemical attack killed an estimated 5,000 civilians and injured thousands more. Additionally, growing environmental awareness, concerns about chemical weapons proliferation to additional states, and the easing of Cold War tensions created a diplomatic opening.

Negotiations intensified in the late 1980s within the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. After years of complex diplomatic work, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was finalized in September 1992 and opened for signature in January 1993.

The CWC's scope is unprecedented. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Significantly, it mandates the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities under strict international verification. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague, was established to implement the Convention's provisions.

By 2025, 193 states have joined the CWC, representing over 98% of the global population. The OPCW, which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, has verified the destruction of 99% of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. The United States completed destruction of its chemical weapons in July 2023, while Russia reported completing its elimination in 2017.

Despite these successes, several challenges remain. Syria, which joined the CWC in 2013 under international pressure following chemical attacks during its civil war, has faced allegations of continued chemical weapons use. The 2018 Salisbury poisonings in the UK using Novichok agents and the 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny demonstrated that chemical weapons threats persist. Non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations, have also sought and used chemical weapons, as evidenced by sarin attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan in 1995 and ISIS's use of sulfur mustard in Syria and Iraq between 2015 and 2017.

Nevertheless, the CWC stands as one of the most successful disarmament treaties in history, having dramatically reduced the threat of chemical warfare and established a powerful norm against these particularly inhumane weapons.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Chemical Weapons Convention had never materialized? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the diplomatic momentum of the early 1990s to ban chemical weapons entirely collapsed, preventing the creation and implementation of this landmark treaty.

Several plausible paths could have led to this divergence:

First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union could have proceeded more chaotically than it did in our timeline. With greater political instability across the former Soviet republics, concerns about the security of the massive Soviet chemical weapons stockpile might have overwhelmed cooperative instincts. Western nations, particularly the United States, could have prioritized emergency security measures over long-term disarmament, focusing on preventing proliferation rather than elimination.

Second, the 1991 Gulf War might have unfolded differently. In our timeline, Iraq's possession of chemical weapons (though ultimately not used against Coalition forces) heightened international determination to strengthen chemical weapons prohibition. If Saddam Hussein had successfully employed chemical weapons against Coalition forces, causing significant casualties, the United States might have chosen to maintain a robust chemical deterrent rather than pursuing elimination, viewing the weapons as necessary for strategic parity.

Third, domestic politics in key states could have derailed the treaty. In the United States, more vigorous opposition from the chemical industry or military establishment might have prevented ratification. The Senate barely ratified the CWC in 1997 with a vote of 74-26, just slightly above the two-thirds majority required. A small shift in the Senate composition or heightened partisan tensions could have blocked U.S. participation, potentially causing the entire treaty to collapse.

Finally, a major chemical terrorism incident during the negotiation period (1989-1993) might have paradoxically undermined the treaty. Such an incident could have convinced major powers that chemical weapons threats were primarily from non-state actors rather than other nations, potentially leading them to maintain their arsenals for counterterrorism purposes while pursuing other counter-proliferation measures.

The most likely pathway involves a combination of these factors—perhaps beginning with the chemical industry successfully lobbying for treaty provisions that Russia and several developing nations found unacceptable, followed by a more partisan U.S. ratification debate that ultimately failed. Without the world's chemical weapons superpowers committed to elimination, the entire treaty framework would have collapsed, leaving the outdated 1925 Geneva Protocol as the primary legal instrument governing chemical weapons.

This divergence would have immediate consequences, beginning with the continued maintenance of massive chemical arsenals by the United States and Russia, and rippling outward to affect proliferation dynamics, military planning, and international humanitarian law for decades to come.

Immediate Aftermath

Continued Chemical Weapons Production and Modernization

Without the CWC's prohibition, the immediate aftermath would have seen major powers maintaining and potentially upgrading their chemical arsenals throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s:

U.S. Modernization Programs: Rather than destroying its stockpile, the United States likely would have continued modernizing its chemical weapons. The binary chemical munitions program, which combined two relatively harmless precursors to create lethal agents upon deployment, would have continued and expanded. New delivery systems would have been developed to replace aging chemical artillery shells and bombs.
Russian Chemical Complex Preservation: Instead of converting or dismantling chemical weapons facilities with international assistance, Russia would have maintained its extensive production infrastructure. Financial pressures in post-Soviet Russia might have led to deteriorating safety conditions at these facilities, creating environmental hazards and security risks.
Dual-Use Research Expansion: Research into chemical compounds with both civilian and military applications would have accelerated. Major powers would have pursued more sophisticated agents designed to penetrate protective gear or defeat medical countermeasures.

Proliferation Concerns

The absence of the CWC would have significantly affected proliferation dynamics:

Increased State Proliferation: Without the strong international norm and verification regime established by the CWC, more states would have pursued chemical weapons capabilities. Countries like Libya, which relinquished its chemical weapons program in 2004 in our timeline, would have maintained and potentially expanded their arsenals.
Chemical Arms Race in Volatile Regions: Regional tensions could have spawned chemical arms races, particularly in the Middle East. If Iraq was perceived to maintain chemical capabilities post-Gulf War, neighboring states including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt might have developed or expanded their own programs as a deterrent.
Brain Drain Concerns: Unemployed chemical weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union might have been more aggressively recruited by states seeking to develop chemical capabilities, similar to nuclear proliferation concerns of the period.

Military Planning and Civil Defense

The persistent chemical weapons threat would have shaped military planning and civil defense measures:

Enhanced Chemical Defense Preparations: NATO and other military alliances would have invested more heavily in chemical detection, protection, and decontamination technologies. Chemical protection would have remained a major training priority rather than becoming a specialized capability.
Civil Defense Revival: Countries facing chemical threats might have revitalized civil defense programs, including public education about chemical attacks and distribution of protective equipment to civilian populations in high-risk areas.
Chemical Testing Controversies: Without the CWC's prohibitions, some nations might have continued or resumed testing chemical agents on ranges or in controlled environments, raising environmental and safety concerns.

Diplomatic and Humanitarian Consequences

The diplomatic landscape would have evolved differently without this major arms control achievement:

Weakened International Arms Control Momentum: Failure to achieve the CWC would have undermined confidence in multilateral disarmament efforts more broadly. The comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, negotiated shortly after the CWC, might have faced even greater hurdles to completion.
United Nations Institutional Changes: Instead of creating the OPCW as an independent implementing body, chemical weapons control efforts might have remained fragmented across various UN agencies, reducing effectiveness and focus.
NGO Mobilization: Humanitarian organizations would have mounted sustained campaigns against chemical weapons, similar to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which achieved the Ottawa Treaty in 1997 despite initial major power reluctance.

Responding to Chemical Terrorism

The 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo would have occurred in this alternate timeline as well, but responses would differ:

Military vs. Law Enforcement Approaches: Without the CWC's clear criminal prohibition of all chemical weapons activities, the boundary between military and law enforcement responses to chemical terrorism might have blurred, with some states asserting a right to military action against foreign chemical threats.
Dual-Use Chemical Controls: Lacking the CWC's comprehensive approach to controlling precursor chemicals, states would have developed a patchwork of export control regimes focused narrowly on preventing terrorist acquisition rather than comprehensive prohibition.
Continued Chemical Terrorism: The relatively successful acquisition of chemical capabilities by Aum Shinrikyo might have inspired more terrorist groups to pursue similar weapons, particularly as internet accessibility increased information sharing in the late 1990s.

By the early 2000s, a world without the CWC would have featured more states with chemical weapons capabilities, less transparency about these programs, continued modernization of chemical arsenals by major powers, and heightened international tensions around chemical weapons proliferation—creating a significantly more dangerous security environment as the century progressed.

Long-term Impact

Chemical Weapons in 21st Century Conflicts

Without the CWC's norm-setting power and verification regime, chemical weapons would have featured more prominently in conflicts throughout the 2000s and beyond:

Iraq War Dynamics: The 2003 invasion of Iraq would have unfolded differently. Chemical weapons concerns would have been even more central to the justification, and U.S. forces would have prepared extensively for chemical attacks. Iraqi forces, seeing NATO's overwhelming conventional superiority, might have employed chemical weapons if they still possessed them, potentially causing mass casualties among coalition forces and Iraqi civilians.
Syrian Civil War: The Syrian conflict, beginning in 2011, would have occurred in an environment where chemical weapons use carried less international stigma. The Assad regime, which used chemical weapons despite being a CWC member in our timeline, would have employed them more extensively without fear of crossing a "red line." Rebel groups might have also acquired and used chemical agents through captured stockpiles or external support.
Non-State Actors: Terrorist organizations like ISIS would have more aggressively pursued chemical capabilities, potentially succeeding in deploying them in attacks against civilian targets in the Middle East and possibly Europe. The absence of the CWC's control regime for precursor chemicals would have made acquisition easier.

Technological Developments

The continued development of chemical weapons would have evolved alongside advances in related fields:

Fourth and Fifth Generation Agents: Major powers would have developed increasingly sophisticated chemical weapons, including novel agents designed to defeat existing medical countermeasures and protective equipment. These might include "fourth-generation" agents like the Novichoks (which Russia developed despite CWC commitments) and even more advanced "fifth-generation" compounds with precisely targeted effects.
Precision Delivery Systems: Advancements in drone technology, precision guidance, and miniaturization would have been applied to chemical weapons delivery, creating more targeted capabilities that could limit collateral damage while still achieving military objectives.
Biochemical Hybrid Threats: The line between chemical and biological weapons might have blurred, with development of agents that combine characteristics of both. These could include chemically synthesized bioregulators or toxins engineered to affect specific biological pathways.
Pharmaceutical Shield: Advanced nations would have developed more effective medical countermeasures, including broad-spectrum treatments that could protect against multiple chemical agents. This pharmaceutical shield would have created further inequalities in vulnerability between developed and developing nations.

Geopolitical and Military Transformations

The persistent chemical weapons threat would have reshaped global security arrangements:

Chemical Deterrence Doctrines: Similar to nuclear deterrence, formal and informal chemical deterrence relationships would have emerged. Nations with chemical capabilities would have developed explicit or implicit "no first use" or "flexible response" doctrines regarding their chemical arsenals.
Alliances and Security Guarantees: Chemical weapons capabilities might have become a factor in security arrangements, with chemical-armed states extending deterrence guarantees to allies. This could have created "chemical umbrella" relationships similar to nuclear security guarantees.
Arms Control Alternative Path: With the CWC's comprehensive approach abandoned, states might have pursued more limited regional chemical weapons control agreements or bilateral reduction treaties between major possessors. These would likely focus on specific agent types or verification in particular regions rather than global elimination.
Military Planning and Structure: Armed forces worldwide would have maintained significant chemical defense capabilities, with specialized units devoted to chemical warfare. Chemical protection equipment would remain standard issue for frontline forces rather than specialized gear.

Environmental and Public Health Consequences

The continued production, storage, and occasional use of chemical weapons would have created significant environmental and health challenges:

Legacy Contamination: Without the CWC's destruction requirements, the environmental contamination from chemical weapons production, storage, and disposal would have accumulated. Aging stockpiles would pose increasing environmental and safety risks.
Testing and Development Impacts: Continued testing of chemical agents, even in controlled environments, would have generated contamination at test sites. Communities near these facilities would face elevated health risks.
Medical Research Priorities: Greater resources would have been directed toward developing treatments for chemical injuries, potentially yielding benefits for treating industrial chemical exposures as well. However, this research might have diverted funding from other public health priorities.

Institutional and Legal Framework

By 2025, the global institutional landscape around chemical weapons would look dramatically different:

Weaker Chemical Weapons Taboo: Without the CWC's norm-building effect, the taboo against chemical weapons use would have eroded. While still condemned, chemical attacks might be viewed more as an extreme but occasionally employed tool of warfare rather than a universally prohibited atrocity.
Different International Organizations: Rather than the OPCW, chemical weapons issues might be addressed by a patchwork of institutions, possibly including a less empowered monitoring body under UN auspices and various regional security organizations.
Impact on International Humanitarian Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, might have included different provisions regarding chemical weapons crimes, potentially focusing on use against civilians while leaving military use in a more ambiguous legal category.
Alternative Control Regimes: In place of the CWC's comprehensive approach, the Australia Group (an informal forum of countries that harmonize export controls) would have expanded to become the primary mechanism for preventing chemical proliferation, focusing on supply-side controls rather than universal prohibition.

Economic Dimensions

The absence of the CWC would have created economic effects across several sectors:

Chemical Industry Impacts: Without the CWC's reporting requirements and inspections, the international chemical industry would have faced a more fragmented regulatory environment. Some companies might have maintained dual-use capabilities for potential government contracts, while others would have self-regulated to avoid association with weapons.
Defense Spending Priorities: Nations would allocate significant resources to chemical defense capabilities, protective equipment, and detection systems, potentially at the expense of other military or civilian priorities.
Opportunity Costs of Arsenals: The financial burden of maintaining chemical stockpiles would have persisted, diverting resources that otherwise might have supported economic development, particularly in developing nations with chemical programs.

By 2025 in this alternate timeline, the world would be a fundamentally more dangerous place regarding chemical weapons threats. Instead of the near-elimination of declared stockpiles achieved under the CWC, dozens of nations would possess chemical weapons capabilities of varying sophistication. Chemical defense would remain a military priority, and the risk of chemical terrorism would be substantially higher. The absence of the CWC would stand as one of the great missed opportunities in arms control history, leaving humanity more vulnerable to one of warfare's most indiscriminate and horrific forms.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Jonathan Forman, former Science Policy Adviser at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, offers this perspective: "The absence of the Chemical Weapons Convention would represent one of the greatest missed opportunities in arms control history. By 2025, instead of celebrating the verified destruction of nearly all declared chemical stockpiles, we would be living in a world where dozens of states maintain active chemical weapons programs of varying sophistication. The scientific and technological developments of the past three decades—advances in synthetic chemistry, materials science, and delivery systems—would have been applied to creating more effective chemical weapons rather than exclusively beneficial purposes. The resulting security dilemma would have driven an expensive and dangerous chemical arms race, while simultaneously increasing the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors. Perhaps most tragically, without the CWC's norm-building effect, we might see chemical weapons used more frequently in regional conflicts, with combatants calculating that the military advantage outweighs the international condemnation."

Professor Elena Rodrigues, Chair of International Security Studies at Georgetown University, emphasizes the institutional dimensions: "The failure to establish the Chemical Weapons Convention would have fundamentally altered our international security architecture. The OPCW has served as a model of how an international organization can effectively implement a disarmament treaty with rigorous verification. Without this model, other arms control efforts would have faced greater skepticism about verification possibilities. Moreover, the absence of a dedicated international organization focused exclusively on chemical weapons would have left response capabilities fragmented across various UN bodies and national governments, reducing effectiveness and creating dangerous gaps in monitoring and enforcement. We would also have missed the opportunity to build the community of practice among chemists, diplomats, and military experts that has advanced both technical solutions and normative barriers against these weapons. In this alternate world, chemical weapons would be normalized as simply another category of weapons that major powers maintain but seldom use directly—a dangerous reality that would perpetually risk escalation during crises."

Ambassador Carlos Martínez, former chairperson of the UN Security Council's 1540 Committee on WMD non-proliferation, provides a perspective from the Global South: "Without the Chemical Weapons Convention, developing nations would have faced an impossible choice regarding chemical weapons—pursue expensive and dangerous programs to achieve deterrence parity, or accept strategic vulnerability. The CWC created a more equitable security environment by prohibiting these weapons for all states, strong and weak alike. Its absence would have maintained a steep hierarchy of chemical capabilities dominated by wealthy industrialized nations. Furthermore, the lack of international verification would have fostered suspicion and potentially triggered regional chemical arms races in volatile areas like the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa. Most concerning would be the probability of chemical weapons use in asymmetric conflicts, particularly civil wars where desperate regimes might employ them against their own populations with greater frequency and fewer consequences than we've witnessed in our timeline. The humanitarian impacts would have fallen disproportionately on civilians in conflict zones throughout the developing world—a steep price to pay for the failure of multilateral disarmament diplomacy."