What If The Economic Community of West African States Integrated Further?

The Actual History

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on May 28, 1975, with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. The organization was created as a regional economic union of fifteen West African countries, with the primary goals of promoting economic integration, fostering collective self-sufficiency, and creating a single large trading bloc through economic cooperation among member states. The founding members included Benin, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape Verde joined in 1977, while Mauritania withdrew in 2000.

The formation of ECOWAS came during a period when many African nations were seeking to overcome the economic fragmentation resulting from colonial rule. The founders envisioned an organization that would help West African nations build economic resilience, reduce dependency on former colonial powers, and create a unified market large enough to compete globally. The Treaty of Lagos outlined ambitious goals, including the elimination of customs duties, establishment of a common external tariff, harmonization of economic and financial policies, and creation of a single monetary zone.

Despite these aspirations, ECOWAS's progress toward deep integration has been inconsistent and often hampered by numerous challenges. The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 expanded the organization's mandate beyond economic integration to include political cooperation and security matters, reflecting the recognition that economic development required political stability. This revision established institutions including the ECOWAS Commission, the Community Parliament, the Community Court of Justice, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

On the security front, ECOWAS has achieved some notable successes. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. These interventions, while imperfect, demonstrated the organization's commitment to regional stability. More recently, ECOWAS has taken strong stances against military coups in member states, including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger, imposing sanctions and demanding returns to constitutional order.

Economic integration efforts have progressed more slowly. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), adopted in 1979, aimed to establish a free trade area, but implementation has been inconsistent. While official protocols allow for the free movement of people across borders—a significant achievement—the free movement of goods faces persistent non-tariff barriers, including informal checkpoints and bureaucratic obstacles.

The organization's most ambitious economic project, the creation of a single currency called the Eco, has faced repeated delays. Originally planned for launch in 2000, the Eco has been postponed multiple times due to member states' difficulties in meeting convergence criteria related to inflation rates, fiscal deficits, and foreign reserves. The current eight francophone member states already share the West African CFA franc, a currency that maintains a fixed exchange rate with the euro and has historical ties to France, complicating monetary integration efforts.

Politics has often interfered with ECOWAS's integration agenda. Member states have been reluctant to cede sovereignty to supranational institutions, and national interests frequently override regional commitments. The organization remains heavily dependent on a few member states—particularly Nigeria, which accounts for approximately 70% of the region's GDP and contributes the largest share to the ECOWAS budget.

As of 2025, ECOWAS has made significant strides in establishing mechanisms for regional cooperation, but falls short of its original vision of deep integration. The organization represents a community of nations with some coordinated policies rather than a truly integrated economic bloc. While protocols exist for free movement and trade, implementation remains inconsistent, and economic policies continue to be determined primarily at the national level. The dream of a West African monetary union remains unrealized, and the ECOWAS Parliament lacks substantive legislative powers.

The Point of Divergence

What if ECOWAS had pursued a more aggressive path toward regional integration, similar to the European Union? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where West African leaders, recognizing the limitations of post-colonial national boundaries and the economic vulnerability of small, disconnected economies, embraced a more federalist vision for ECOWAS from the 1990s onward.

The point of divergence occurs in July 1993 at the ECOWAS summit in Cotonou, Benin. In our timeline, this summit produced the revised ECOWAS Treaty, which expanded the organization's mandate to include political cooperation but maintained the fundamentally intergovernmental nature of the organization. In this alternate timeline, however, the summit takes a dramatically different turn when Nigerian President Moshood Abiola—who in our timeline was prevented from taking office after winning the 1993 election—spearheads a more ambitious reform agenda.

Several plausible mechanisms could have facilitated this divergence:

First, the political landscape in Nigeria—ECOWAS's most powerful member—might have evolved differently. If the June 12, 1993, presidential election had been honored and Moshood Abiola had assumed the presidency, Nigeria might have experienced democratic consolidation earlier. As a successful businessman with pan-African views, Abiola could have championed regional integration as a cornerstone of his foreign policy, providing the political capital and economic resources needed to advance the integration agenda.

Second, the timing coincided with a period of renewed optimism about Africa's future. The early 1990s saw the end of apartheid in South Africa and a wave of democratization across the continent. This "African Renaissance" created conditions where bold visions for the continent's future found receptive audiences. If key West African leaders had channeled this optimism toward regional integration rather than national consolidation, the trajectory of ECOWAS might have changed significantly.

Third, external factors could have played a role. The European Union was advancing rapidly toward deeper integration following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. If European partners had prioritized supporting regional integration in West Africa—perhaps seeing it as a stabilizing force that would reduce migration pressures and create new markets—technical and financial assistance might have accelerated ECOWAS integration.

In this alternate timeline, the 1993 Cotonou summit produces not just a revised treaty but a "Cotonou Declaration" that explicitly commits member states to a federal vision for West Africa. The declaration establishes a roadmap for gradually transferring significant powers to community institutions, creating a customs union by 1995, a common market by 2000, a monetary union by 2005, and political federation with directly elected community institutions by 2015.

This bold vision, championed by a democratic Nigeria and supported by key francophone states seeking to reduce French influence, sets ECOWAS on a fundamentally different trajectory—one that prioritizes deepening integration over the more cautious, sovereignty-preserving approach that has characterized the actual ECOWAS.

Immediate Aftermath

Institutional Transformation (1993-1995)

The immediate consequence of the Cotonou Declaration is a comprehensive restructuring of ECOWAS institutions. Rather than maintaining the Executive Secretariat structure, member states agree to establish a more powerful ECOWAS Commission with executive powers in designated areas of community competence, including trade, customs, and monetary affairs.

Nigeria, under President Abiola, makes a crucial strategic decision that alters the organization's trajectory: it commits to using its oil wealth to fund an expanded "ECOWAS Integration and Development Fund." This fund, amounting to 1% of Nigeria's oil revenues, provides approximately $100-150 million annually to support infrastructure projects connecting member states and technical assistance for harmonizing regulations and policies.

The ECOWAS Parliament, which in our timeline remained largely consultative, is granted co-legislative powers in specific areas, particularly those related to market integration and freedom of movement. This empowers regional parliamentarians and creates a constituency for further integration, as elected officials begin to see political advantages in championing regional solutions.

France, initially concerned about diminishing influence in its former colonies, attempts to slow the integration process. However, leaders like Côte d'Ivoire's Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Senegal's Abdou Diouf recognize the potential of a stronger ECOWAS to enhance their countries' economic prospects and counterbalance French influence. They broker a compromise: the CFA franc mechanism would be gradually incorporated into an ECOWAS-wide monetary framework rather than abolished outright.

Accelerated Economic Integration (1995-2000)

By 1995, ECOWAS successfully establishes a functioning customs union—a significant departure from our timeline where non-tariff barriers persist despite official free trade protocols. A common external tariff is implemented, with revenues shared according to a formula that ensures smaller economies are not disadvantaged. While smuggling and informal trade continue, the official elimination of internal customs creates immediate benefits for formal businesses operating across borders.

The customs union produces early economic dividends. Intra-ECOWAS trade increases from approximately 10% of total trade to 15% by 1997, creating new opportunities for West African manufacturers and agricultural producers. Nigerian companies, in particular, expand rapidly into neighboring markets, while Senegalese and Ivorian firms find new customers in the populous Nigerian market.

The ECOWAS Commission takes an active role in competition policy, preventing the formation of regional monopolies and ensuring that market integration benefits consumers. This development creates tensions with well-connected business elites in several member states, but the Commission's independence—bolstered by the personal support of influential leaders like Abiola—allows it to withstand political pressure.

Political and Security Coordination (1996-2002)

The Second Liberian Civil War breaks out in 1999, as in our timeline, but the response differs significantly. Rather than ad-hoc interventions, ECOWAS deploys a more organized ECOMOG force with clear command structures and better coordination. Nigeria remains the largest contributor, but other member states provide more substantial contingents due to the stronger sense of shared regional responsibility fostered by deeper integration.

The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, adopted in 1999, establishes a sophisticated early warning system and mediation capabilities. These institutions successfully prevent potential conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, which in our timeline descended into civil war. The organization's strong stance against unconstitutional changes of government—backed by credible sanctions mechanisms—deters several potential coups.

By 2000, ECOWAS has established a functioning common market with substantially free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The ECOWAS passport, which in our timeline existed but was not widely implemented, becomes the standard travel document for West Africans. Border crossings are streamlined, reducing opportunities for corruption and harassment that had previously hindered intraregional trade and travel.

Monetary Integration Challenges (2000-2003)

The path toward monetary union proves more challenging than anticipated. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 and its global repercussions lead to fiscal strains in several member states. Nigeria experiences particular difficulties as oil prices collapse, temporarily limiting its ability to fund regional initiatives.

The original timeline for introducing the Eco by 2000 proves too ambitious. Instead, a revised approach is adopted: a "hub and spoke" model where the existing CFA franc zone forms the core of the monetary union, with other countries joining as they meet convergence criteria. Ghana is the first non-CFA country to join in 2003, followed by The Gambia in 2004.

Despite these challenges, the momentum toward deeper integration continues. The ECOWAS Commission gains additional competencies in energy policy, leading to the acceleration of the West African Power Pool and the West African Gas Pipeline projects. These interconnection initiatives reduce electricity costs and improve reliability throughout the region, addressing one of the key constraints on economic development.

Long-term Impact

A Unified Monetary System (2005-2010)

The introduction of the Eco as a common currency for ECOWAS represents a watershed moment in African economic integration. Unlike the partial implementation that has been repeatedly delayed in our timeline, this alternate ECOWAS successfully launches the currency in phases, beginning with the former CFA franc countries plus Ghana and The Gambia in 2005.

The new West African Central Bank (WACB) is established with headquarters in Accra, Ghana—a compromise location that balances Nigerian influence with francophone concerns. The bank adopts an inflation-targeting framework with operational independence modeled on the European Central Bank, but with greater emphasis on development objectives alongside price stability.

Nigeria initially remains outside the Eco zone, concerned about surrendering monetary sovereignty. However, as the new currency demonstrates stability and attracts investment to member states, Nigeria joins in 2008 after a referendum narrowly approves participation. This marks the completion of the Eco zone, creating a monetary union of over 300 million people.

The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 provides an unexpected test for the new currency. The WACB responds effectively, implementing countercyclical policies that help the region weather the crisis better than many other emerging markets. This success bolsters confidence in both the currency and ECOWAS institutions more broadly.

Infrastructure and Productive Integration (2008-2015)

The deeper integration enables ECOWAS to coordinate regional infrastructure development more effectively than in our timeline. The West African railway network, largely fragmented since colonial times, sees significant reconstruction and new connections. By 2015, continuous standard-gauge rail lines connect Dakar to Lagos and Abidjan to Kano, dramatically reducing transportation costs and times for goods and people.

Energy integration advances rapidly through the completed West African Power Pool. Solar resources in the Sahel are harnessed through large-scale projects funded by the ECOWAS Development Bank (the successor to EBID), with transmission lines carrying electricity to coastal urban centers. This integration helps address West Africa's persistent energy deficit, with per capita electricity consumption doubling between 2005 and 2015.

Industrial policy is coordinated at the regional level, allowing for the development of regional value chains. Instead of competing to attract the same industries, member states specialize based on comparative advantages: Côte d'Ivoire in agricultural processing, Ghana in intermediate manufacturing, Senegal in services and logistics, and Nigeria in petrochemicals and heavy industry. This specialization increases productivity and enables West African firms to achieve economies of scale previously impossible in fragmented national markets.

Political Federation and Democratic Consolidation (2015-2020)

The 2015 ECOWAS Treaty of Abuja marks the transition from an economic community to a political federation. Direct elections to the ECOWAS Parliament are held for the first time, with seats allocated proportionally to population but with guaranteed minimums for smaller states. The Parliament gains expanded legislative powers, particularly in areas related to the single market, environmental protection, and consumer rights.

The ECOWAS Commission is transformed into the ECOWAS Authority, with Commissioners (now called Ministers) selected based on merit rather than national quotas. The Authority gains exclusive competence in trade, competition, and monetary policy, while sharing authority with member states in areas such as energy, agriculture, and migration.

This political integration coincides with a wave of democratic consolidation across the region. The community's democratic requirements for membership—more rigorously enforced than in our timeline—create powerful incentives for maintaining constitutional rule. When coups occur in Mali (2012) and Burkina Faso (2014), ECOWAS responds decisively, suspending both countries from the community and imposing targeted sanctions that quickly force returns to civilian rule.

Global Position and External Relations (2020-2025)

By 2025, the integrated ECOWAS has transformed West Africa's global position. With a combined GDP of approximately $1.5 trillion (compared to about $700 billion in our timeline), the region negotiates with external partners from a position of greater strength. Trade agreements with the European Union, China, and the United States include more favorable terms than those secured by individual African countries in our timeline.

The ECOWAS Authority represents member states in international forums like the World Trade Organization and climate negotiations. This unified voice increases West Africa's influence in global governance, particularly on issues like agricultural subsidies and climate finance that directly affect the region's interests.

The deeper integration also changes migration patterns. With expanded economic opportunities within West Africa, fewer young people attempt the dangerous Mediterranean crossing to Europe. Instead, internal migration flows primarily toward regional economic hubs like Lagos, Abidjan, Accra, and Dakar. These cities develop into global centers for technology, finance, and culture, attracting talent from across Africa and beyond.

Economic and Social Outcomes

The economic impacts of deeper integration are substantial. Regional GDP growth averages 6.5% annually between 2005 and 2025, compared to the 4% average in our timeline. Intra-ECOWAS trade reaches 35% of total trade by 2025, still below the EU's internal trade levels but more than triple the 10% seen in our timeline.

Poverty reduction accelerates, with the extreme poverty rate falling from approximately 50% in 2000 to 20% by 2025 (compared to about 35% in our timeline). Income inequality between member states diminishes as productive integration creates opportunities throughout the region, though inequality within countries remains a challenge.

The integrated labor market increases economic resilience. When droughts affect Sahelian countries or oil price shocks hit Nigeria, affected workers can more easily find employment in other parts of the community. This mobility, combined with coordinated social policies, reduces the impact of localized economic shocks.

Not all outcomes are positive, however. Language barriers persist despite expanded language education programs, creating advantages for elites with international education. Some traditional industries unable to compete in the larger market decline, causing localized economic distress. And while the overall security situation improves, organized crime networks exploit the reduced border controls to expand trafficking in drugs and other illicit goods.

Nevertheless, by 2025, this alternate ECOWAS has achieved what many considered impossible: a functioning economic and political union that significantly improves living standards and global influence for West Africa. The region, once fragmented into post-colonial states too small to achieve economies of scale, has transformed into an emerging global power with increasing control over its economic destiny.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Adama Gaye, former Director of Information at ECOWAS and author of "West African Integration: The Missing Links," offers this perspective: "What we see in this alternate timeline is the realization of what Kwame Nkrumah called for decades ago—meaningful African unity beyond symbolic gestures. The key difference was Nigeria embracing rather than fearing integration. In our actual timeline, Nigeria has been reluctant to fully commit to ECOWAS integration because its elites feared losing control over oil revenues and having to share economic benefits with poorer neighbors. A democratic Nigeria under Abiola might have had the confidence to see that a prosperous West African neighborhood would ultimately benefit Nigeria more than a collection of impoverished neighbors. The spillover effects would have been dramatic—reduced migration pressures on Europe, less fertile ground for extremist groups, and a stronger negotiating position with China, the EU, and other global powers."

Professor Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou, Senior Research Associate at the Global Economic Governance Programme at the University of Oxford, provides a more cautious assessment: "This alternate ECOWAS represents a fascinating counterfactual, but we should be careful not to idealize integration as a panacea. Many of West Africa's structural challenges—climate vulnerability, demographic pressures, colonial economic legacies—would persist even with deeper integration. What would likely change is the capacity to address these challenges. A unified West Africa would have significantly more agency in international affairs and more tools for economic transformation. The community would still face external pressures, particularly from former colonial powers and new actors like China, but would negotiate from a position of greater strength. I'm particularly intrigued by how the relationship with France might have evolved—would the CFA franc's integration into the Eco have truly reduced French influence, or simply transformed it into less visible forms?"

Dr. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Distinguished Professor of Comparative Literature and renowned political analyst, remarks: "The most profound implications of this alternate West African integration would be psychological and cultural. The artificial boundaries imposed by colonialism have constrained not just economic development but imagination itself. A generation of West Africans growing up with meaningful regional citizenship would develop different conceptions of identity and possibility. We would likely see a renaissance in cultural production and intellectual thought as artists and thinkers engage with a larger, more diverse public sphere. This cultural integration might ultimately prove more transformative than the economic benefits, creating new hybrid identities that transcend the colonial inheritances that have divided populations with shared histories and traditions. The question remains whether this integration would extend beyond ECOWAS to create the continental unity envisioned by pan-Africanists. Would a successful ECOWAS model have accelerated integration in East Africa, Southern Africa, and across the continent? Or would it have created a new regionalism that replicated some of the problems of nationalism on a larger scale?"