What If The INF Treaty Never Happened?

The Actual History

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty stands as one of the landmark arms control agreements of the Cold War era. The origins of the treaty can be traced to the so-called "Euromissile Crisis" of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1977, the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 Pionyer (Pioneer) intermediate-range ballistic missiles in its western territories, significantly upgrading its nuclear capabilities in Europe. Each SS-20 carried three independently targetable nuclear warheads and posed a direct threat to Western European nations with its range of approximately 5,000 kilometers.

NATO responded in December 1979 with the "Dual-Track Decision," which called for the deployment of 572 American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe (108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles) while simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. This decision triggered massive anti-nuclear protests across Western Europe, particularly in West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, where American missiles were scheduled for deployment.

The initial deployment of Pershing II missiles to West Germany began in November 1983, further escalating Cold War tensions. That same month, the Soviet delegation walked out of arms control talks in Geneva following the deployments. This period marked one of the most dangerous phases of the Cold War, with some historians comparing the tension levels to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The diplomatic breakthrough began after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985. Gorbachev, implementing his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), sought to reduce international tensions and ease the economic burden of the arms race on the struggling Soviet economy. President Ronald Reagan, despite his strong anti-communist rhetoric, proved willing to engage in serious arms control negotiations.

After a series of high-level meetings, including the Reykjavík Summit in October 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987, in Washington, D.C. The agreement was revolutionary in arms control history for several reasons:

It eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons—ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers
It established an unprecedented verification regime, including on-site inspections
It marked the first time the superpowers agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals rather than merely limiting their growth

By May 1991, the United States had eliminated 846 missiles and the Soviet Union had eliminated 1,846 missiles in compliance with the treaty. The verification measures continued until 2001, with each side conducting hundreds of on-site inspections.

The INF Treaty survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the successor states (particularly Russia) assuming the treaty obligations. However, in 2014, the Obama administration publicly accused Russia of violating the treaty by testing a new ground-launched cruise missile. After years of accusations and counter-accusations, the United States formally withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, with Russia following suit.

Despite its eventual collapse, the INF Treaty is widely credited with helping to end the Cold War, reducing nuclear tensions in Europe, and establishing a framework for future arms control agreements. It demonstrated that even bitter adversaries could reach meaningful agreements on nuclear weapons control when political will existed on both sides.

The Point of Divergence

What if the INF Treaty never happened? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the United States and Soviet Union failed to reach the groundbreaking 1987 agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces, dramatically altering the trajectory of the Cold War and nuclear proliferation into the 21st century.

The failure of the INF Treaty could have occurred through several plausible mechanisms:

One possibility centers on the pivotal Reykjavík Summit of October 1986. In our timeline, while this summit did not produce an immediate agreement, it laid crucial groundwork for the eventual INF Treaty by demonstrating both leaders' willingness to consider radical reductions in nuclear forces. In the alternate timeline, this summit might have ended in more profound disagreement, perhaps over Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars"). Gorbachev insisted that any arms control agreement be contingent on limiting SDI development. If Reagan had been more adamant about proceeding with SDI or if Gorbachev had taken a harder line on this issue, the summit could have collapsed more dramatically, poisoning the well for future negotiations.

Alternatively, domestic political factors could have derailed the treaty. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev faced significant opposition from military hardliners who viewed his concessions as dangerous to Soviet security. In an alternate scenario, a failed coup attempt or stronger institutional resistance might have forced Gorbachev to abandon his pursuit of the treaty to preserve his political position. Similarly, in the United States, Reagan faced criticism from defense hawks within his own Republican Party. Had influential figures like Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger or key Republican senators mounted more effective opposition, the political costs for Reagan might have become prohibitive.

A third possibility involves the verification regime. The INF Treaty's unprecedented on-site inspection provisions were controversial in both countries. If negotiators had reached an impasse on verification procedures—perhaps with Soviet negotiators rejecting certain inspection protocols as too intrusive or American negotiators demanding even more stringent measures—the entire agreement could have collapsed over these technical but critically important details.

In this alternate timeline, we assume that by early 1987, both sides had essentially abandoned hopes for an INF Treaty. The Pershing II and cruise missile deployments in Western Europe continued according to NATO's schedule, while the Soviet Union maintained and expanded its SS-20 force, potentially developing new variants with enhanced capabilities. The dangerous balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe—a hair-trigger situation that military strategists recognized increased the risk of nuclear conflict—became a permanent feature of the Cold War landscape.

Immediate Aftermath

Escalation of the European Nuclear Arms Race (1987-1989)

In the absence of the INF Treaty, the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe would have accelerated through 1987 and beyond. The United States would have completed its planned deployment of 572 missiles (108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles) across Western Europe by late 1988. These missiles, capable of reaching Moscow in less than 10 minutes, represented a threat that Soviet military planners could not ignore.

The Soviet response would likely have been twofold. First, the existing SS-20 force would have been expanded beyond the approximately 405 missiles deployed by 1987, potentially reaching 500-600 missiles by 1989. Second, Soviet engineers would have accelerated development of the SS-23 Spider (Oka) and potentially new missile systems with improved accuracy and penetration capabilities.

This action-reaction cycle would have placed enormous pressure on both military establishments to develop countermeasures. The United States might have begun developing a Pershing III with enhanced range and multiple warheads, while the Soviet Union could have pursued more advanced decoys and penetration aids for their missiles.

Deterioration of US-Soviet Relations (1987-1988)

The collapse of INF negotiations would have cast a dark shadow over other areas of US-Soviet relations. The failure to reach agreement on intermediate-range forces would likely have undermined progress in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which in our timeline led to the 1991 START I Treaty reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

President Reagan's famous "Tear down this wall" speech at the Brandenburg Gate in June 1987 would have occurred in a much different context—instead of building on a positive trajectory in US-Soviet relations established by the INF breakthrough, it would have appeared more confrontational and less likely to find receptive ears in Moscow.

Gorbachev's domestic position would have been significantly weakened. Having invested considerable political capital in arms control as part of his broader reform agenda, the failure of these negotiations would have strengthened his critics within the Soviet establishment who opposed engagement with the West. This could have forced Gorbachev to take a harder line in foreign policy to protect his domestic flank.

Intensified Anti-Nuclear Movements and Political Polarization in Europe (1987-1990)

The continued deployment of American missiles on European soil would have fueled already powerful anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe. Countries like West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom would have experienced intensified protests and growing political pressure to reject the missiles.

In West Germany, where deployment of Pershing II missiles was particularly controversial, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government would have faced serious challenges maintaining public support for the NATO position. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which had already shifted toward opposition to the missile deployments, would have gained political momentum, potentially forcing early elections or a significant shift in German policy toward nuclear weapons.

In the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's firm support for the missile deployments would have encountered intensified opposition from the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock, potentially affecting the 1987 general election results by giving anti-nuclear voters a stronger motivation to turn out.

The political polarization in Western Europe would have complicated NATO decision-making and potentially created rifts within the alliance, with some nations possibly threatening to refuse missile deployments or even questioning their NATO membership altogether.

Economic Implications (1987-1991)

The continued nuclear arms race would have imposed significant economic costs on both superpowers. For the United States, the estimated cost of the full Pershing II and cruise missile deployment was approximately $4-5 billion in 1980s dollars, with ongoing operational costs of hundreds of millions annually.

For the Soviet Union, already struggling with economic stagnation, the financial burden would have been proportionally greater. The Soviet military-industrial complex absorbed approximately 15-17% of Soviet GDP during this period, a level of military spending that Gorbachev had hoped to reduce through arms control. The failure of INF negotiations would have made these reductions politically impossible, forcing continued high military spending at the expense of civilian economic needs.

This economic pressure might have accelerated the Soviet economic crisis, forcing more desperate reform measures or potentially more rapid economic collapse. Gorbachev's perestroika economic reforms, already challenging to implement, would have faced even greater headwinds without the prospect of savings from arms reductions.

Conventional Forces in Europe (1988-1991)

Without the diplomatic breakthrough represented by the INF Treaty, negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe would likely have stalled. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in 1990 in our timeline, might never have materialized.

This would have maintained the massive conventional force imbalance in Central Europe, with the Warsaw Pact maintaining significant numerical advantages in tanks, artillery, and troops. NATO strategy would have continued to rely heavily on the threat of nuclear escalation to offset this conventional disadvantage, making nuclear use in any potential European conflict more likely.

The continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces by both sides would have reinforced this dangerous escalatory dynamic, with military planners on both sides developing strategies that included early use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict.

Long-term Impact

The Fate of the Soviet Union (1991-1993)

Without the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s, including the INF Treaty, Gorbachev's position within the Soviet leadership would have been substantially weaker. The continued economic strain of the arms race would have exacerbated the Soviet Union's already severe economic problems, potentially accelerating its collapse or significantly altering how that collapse unfolded.

In this alternate timeline, the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev might have occurred earlier and with different results. Hardliners in the Soviet military and Communist Party, empowered by the continued confrontation with the West, might have successfully removed Gorbachev from power in late 1990 or early 1991, installing a more conservative leadership determined to reassert central control and reverse liberalizing reforms.

This alternative path could have led to:

A more violent dissolution of the Soviet Union, with armed conflicts beyond those that occurred in our timeline (which were largely limited to the Caucasus and Moldova)
A potentially more chaotic process for securing Soviet nuclear weapons during the breakup
A more authoritarian post-Soviet Russia that retained stronger elements of the Soviet system

Alternatively, if Gorbachev survived politically but in a weakened state, the Soviet transition might have proceeded more slowly and in a more controlled fashion, potentially preserving some form of reformed union among some of the Soviet republics.

Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (1991-2000)

The failure of the INF Treaty would have cast a long shadow over nuclear arms control for decades. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which in our timeline was signed in July 1991, would likely have been delayed or substantially modified in this alternate world.

Without the INF Treaty's precedent for intrusive verification measures, subsequent arms control agreements would have featured weaker verification provisions, undermining confidence in compliance. The entire post-Cold War arms control architecture would have been built on a shakier foundation.

More concerning would be the potential impact on nuclear proliferation beyond the former Soviet republics. In our timeline, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed to surrender the Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. In a world with higher tensions and less progress on disarmament between the superpowers, the incentives for these countries to retain nuclear weapons would have been stronger.

Ukraine in particular, with approximately 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads and hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet collapse, might have chosen a different path. A nuclear-armed Ukraine would have fundamentally altered European security dynamics and complicated relations with both Russia and NATO.

European Security Architecture (1991-2005)

The evolution of post-Cold War European security would have taken a significantly different path in this alternate timeline. NATO's eastward expansion, which began with the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, would likely have been delayed or limited in scope due to several factors:

Greater Russian opposition, potentially backed by a more substantial nuclear deterrent
Heightened concerns about provoking Russia during a more volatile transition period
More divided Western European attitudes toward expansion in a context of continued nuclear tensions

The European Union's expansion eastward might similarly have proceeded more cautiously. The continued presence of intermediate-range nuclear forces throughout Europe would have maintained a sharper division between Eastern and Western Europe, potentially slowing integration efforts.

Countries like Finland and Sweden, which in our timeline maintained military non-alignment while drawing closer to NATO through partnerships, might have more actively pursued formal security guarantees or even NATO membership earlier in this more threatening environment.

Technological Development of Missile Systems (1990-2010)

Without the prohibitions imposed by the INF Treaty, both the United States and Russia would have continued developing and deploying intermediate-range missile technologies throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

For the United States, this likely would have included:

Development of advanced Pershing III or successor systems
Integration of stealth technology into next-generation ground-launched cruise missiles
Potential deployment of these systems to new NATO members in Eastern Europe after NATO expansion

For Russia, continued development paths might have included:

Modernized versions of the SS-20 with improved accuracy and reliability
New classes of intermediate-range missiles incorporating technologies like hypersonic glide vehicles
Deployment of intermediate-range precision conventional missiles similar to the 9M729 (SSC-8) system that Russia developed in our timeline (and which the US claimed violated the INF Treaty)

The technological evolution of these weapons would have created additional complications for strategic stability, as improvements in accuracy, speed, and penetration capabilities would have reduced warning times and increased first-strike capabilities.

Impact on China and Asian Security (1995-2025)

The absence of the INF Treaty would have had profound implications for China's nuclear and missile development. In our timeline, China—not bound by the INF Treaty—developed a substantial arsenal of intermediate-range missiles. These systems form the backbone of China's regional military strategy, particularly regarding Taiwan and disputed territories in the South China Sea.

In the alternate timeline, with both the United States and Russia continuing to develop and deploy intermediate-range systems, China would have faced stronger incentives to accelerate its own missile programs. This three-way missile competition would have heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States, unbound by INF restrictions, would likely have deployed intermediate-range conventional and potentially nuclear missiles to allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines by the early 2000s, especially as China's rise became more apparent. These deployments would have significantly altered regional security dynamics and potentially triggered new arms races.

Japan, facing both Chinese and Russian intermediate-range missile threats, might have reconsidered aspects of its pacifist security policy earlier and more dramatically than in our timeline. South Korea, confronting North Korea's missile program in addition to regional great power competition, might have pursued more independent defense capabilities, potentially including its own intermediate-range missiles.

Contemporary Global Security Landscape (2010-2025)

By 2025 in this alternate timeline, the global security landscape would be characterized by:

Multiple regional intermediate-range missile competitions, with various powers deploying these systems in Europe, Asia, and potentially the Middle East
Weaker arms control regimes, with fewer constraints on both nuclear and conventional forces due to the failure of the INF Treaty to establish successful precedents
More pronounced regional nuclear tensions, particularly in Europe and Asia, with multiple nuclear-armed states maintaining intermediate-range delivery systems
Advanced missile defense systems deployed more extensively by major powers attempting to counter the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles
Greater risk of miscalculation due to shortened warning times from forward-deployed intermediate-range systems
More militarized approaches to regional disputes, as countries would have less confidence in diplomatic solutions to security challenges

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, should it still occur in this timeline, would unfold in a context of both nations potentially possessing nuclear weapons, dramatically raising the stakes and international concerns. NATO's response would be complicated by the presence of intermediate-range nuclear forces throughout Europe and a history of more confrontational relations with Russia.

The emergence of new domains of competition such as cyber and space would occur against a backdrop of more intense nuclear competition, potentially leading to more aggressive development of counterspace and cyber capabilities as nations sought advantages in these areas to offset vulnerabilities in the nuclear domain.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Alexandra Petrovna, Professor of International Security Studies at Georgetown University and former Pentagon analyst, offers this perspective: "The INF Treaty represented more than just the elimination of a particularly destabilizing class of weapons—it marked a crucial psychological breakthrough in Cold War relations. Without this agreement, the mutual suspicion between Washington and Moscow would likely have persisted more strongly into the post-Soviet era. The verification regime established by the INF Treaty created human connections between American and Russian military officers and built confidence that agreements could be effectively verified. In an alternate timeline without this foundation, subsequent arms control would have faced even greater hurdles, potentially leading to a world with thousands more nuclear weapons deployed today. The INF Treaty's absence would have shaped not just military realities but the entire diplomatic atmosphere of the post-Cold War era."

General (Ret.) Thomas Harrington, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, provides a military assessment: "From an operational perspective, the continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe would have maintained what we called the 'use them or lose them' dilemma. These forward-deployed systems, vulnerable to preemptive strikes due to their proximity to adversary territory, create enormous pressure for early use in a crisis. Without the INF Treaty, NATO and Warsaw Pact war plans would have emphasized rapid escalation timelines, with decisions about nuclear use compressed into minutes rather than hours. The treaty's failure would have perpetuated a European security environment balanced on a knife's edge. While strategic nuclear forces create strategic stability through assured retaliation, intermediate-range forces in close proximity create instability through the premium they place on striking first. NATO's conventional force improvements in the 1990s and 2000s would have developed very differently if this nuclear shadow had remained."

Dr. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, presents a Russian perspective: "The INF Treaty represented both opportunity and sacrifice for the Soviet Union. In material terms, the Soviets gave up more missiles and warheads, but Gorbachev correctly recognized that the political benefits outweighed this numerical disadvantage. Without this agreement, I believe the Soviet transition would have occurred under conditions of much greater international tension. The military establishment would have maintained more political influence, potentially leading to a very different Russian Federation emerging from the Soviet collapse—one more militarized and suspicious of Western intentions. The economic burden of maintaining these forces would have further strained the struggling Soviet economy, potentially accelerating its collapse but in a more chaotic manner. The eventual Russian Federation, emerging from this more confrontational environment, would likely have pursued a more aggressive foreign policy from the outset rather than the brief period of Western orientation we saw in the early 1990s."