What If The Iran-Iraq War Never Happened?

The Actual History

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was one of the longest and bloodiest conventional interstate conflicts of the 20th century. The war began on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces launched a large-scale invasion of Iran across their shared border. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had multiple motivations for initiating the conflict: exploiting the perceived weakness and disorganization of post-revolutionary Iran, resolving the long-standing border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, countering the threat of Shi'a revolutionary ideology to his Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime, and positioning Iraq as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region.

The timing of Saddam's invasion was strategic. Iran had recently undergone its 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Western-backed Shah and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. The Iranian military had been purged of many experienced officers loyal to the Shah, and Iran was experiencing significant internal disorder while establishing its new Islamic Republic. Iraq sought to capitalize on this moment of Iranian vulnerability.

Initially, Iraqi forces made significant territorial gains, particularly in Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan province. However, by mid-1981, the Iranian military and Revolutionary Guards halted the Iraqi advance. What followed was years of brutal trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, with massive human wave attacks, extensive use of chemical weapons by Iraq, attacks on civilian population centers, and the "War of the Cities" involving missile strikes on urban areas. The conflict also expanded to include attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, drawing in international naval forces.

The war proved enormously costly for both sides. Casualty estimates range from 500,000 to 1.5 million dead, with millions more wounded and displaced. Both economies were devastated, with infrastructure damage in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Iraq accumulated massive debts to Gulf Arab states, while Iran suffered under international isolation.

The conflict finally ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in August 1988, with borders returning essentially to their pre-war status. Despite eight years of fighting, neither side achieved its primary objectives. Iraq failed to overthrow the Iranian revolutionary government or secure permanent territorial gains, while Iran failed to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.

The war's legacy was profound. Iraq's war debts contributed to Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990, triggering the Gulf War. Iran became further isolated internationally and doubled down on its revolutionary ideology. Both countries saw increased militarization and authoritarianism. The conflict also reshaped regional alliances, with Gulf Arab states supporting Iraq while Syria and Libya backed Iran. Western powers, particularly the United States, provided intelligence and tacit support to Iraq despite its use of chemical weapons, a policy that would later complicate U.S.-Iraq relations.

Globally, the war affected oil markets, sparked interventions by major powers, and contributed to the growing perception of the Middle East as a volatile region. The human and economic costs of this "forgotten war" continue to impact both societies to this day, while setting the stage for much of the subsequent geopolitical turmoil in the region.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Iran-Iraq War never happened? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where Saddam Hussein chose diplomatic means rather than military invasion to address his concerns with revolutionary Iran.

The most plausible point of divergence would occur in the summer of 1980, as Saddam Hussein and his inner circle deliberated on how to respond to the perceived threats and opportunities presented by the Iranian Revolution. Several plausible mechanisms could have prevented the war:

First, Saddam might have received more cautionary intelligence about Iran's military capabilities despite the post-revolutionary purges. In our timeline, Saddam seriously underestimated Iran's ability to resist and believed in a quick victory. More accurate assessments from Iraqi military intelligence or foreign advisors could have convinced him that invasion would lead to a protracted conflict rather than easy territorial gains.

Second, diplomatic intervention by a major power could have occurred. The Soviet Union, then Iraq's primary arms supplier, might have more forcefully discouraged Saddam from invasion, fearing regional instability that could threaten Soviet interests. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states might have successfully mediated the Iran-Iraq border disputes, particularly over the Shatt al-Arab waterway.

Third, internal Iraqi political dynamics could have played a role. Key figures in the Ba'ath Party military leadership, such as General Adnan Khairallah (Saddam's brother-in-law and Defense Minister), might have more effectively argued against war, convincing Saddam that internal consolidation of power was more urgent than external adventurism.

Fourth, Iran's diplomatic approach could have differed. Although revolutionary Iran under Khomeini was largely hostile to the secular Ba'athist regime, a more conciliatory stance on border issues or reassurances about non-interference in Iraq's internal affairs might have reduced Saddam's sense of threat.

In this alternate timeline, we propose that a combination of these factors led Saddam Hussein to pursue a different strategy: containment of and competitive coexistence with revolutionary Iran rather than direct military confrontation. Instead of launching a full-scale invasion on September 22, 1980, Iraq engaged in a series of border negotiations, limited its support for Iranian separatist groups, and focused on internal security and economic development while waiting for Iran's revolutionary fervor to subside naturally.

This decision—to contain rather than confront Iran—represents our point of divergence, avoiding a conflict that would otherwise claim over a million lives and reshape the Middle East for decades to come.

Immediate Aftermath

Regional Diplomatic Realignment

Without the outbreak of war, the immediate Middle Eastern diplomatic landscape would have evolved significantly differently throughout the early 1980s:

Iraq-Iran Relations: While remaining tense, diplomatic channels would have stayed open between Baghdad and Tehran. Border skirmishes and rhetorical hostility would continue, but contained below the threshold of open warfare. The disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway might have remained under a modified version of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, possibly with international monitoring.
Gulf Cooperation Council Formation: The GCC was formed in 1981 partly in response to fears of the Iran-Iraq War spreading throughout the Gulf. Without this catalyst, the formal alliance might have developed more slowly or taken a different form, though shared concerns about Iranian revolutionary influence would still have driven some cooperation among Gulf monarchies.
Syria-Iraq Dynamics: In our timeline, Syria aligned with Iran during the war, creating a deep rift with Iraq. Without the war, Ba'athist solidarity between Syria and Iraq, despite ideological differences between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, might have been cautiously maintained, creating a more unified Arab position in the Levant.

Economic Trajectories

The economic consequences of avoiding such a devastating conflict would have been immediate and substantial:

Iraqi Development: Iraq entered the 1980s with approximately $35 billion in foreign reserves and was embarking on ambitious development projects. Without war expenditures—estimated at $14.2 billion annually during the actual conflict—Iraq would have continued its development path. Baghdad's infrastructure modernization, industrial development, and education initiatives would have progressed, potentially creating a more diversified economy less dependent on oil exports.
Iranian Post-Revolutionary Consolidation: Revolutionary Iran faced economic challenges following the Shah's overthrow, exacerbated by Western sanctions and war damage. Without the war, Khomeini's regime would still have struggled with economic restructuring and isolation, but would have avoided the estimated $627 billion in war costs and damages. Resources could have been directed toward addressing the revolution's promises of economic justice and development.
Global Oil Markets: The war had significant effects on oil production and prices. Iraq's oil exports fell from 3.5 million barrels per day in 1979 to virtually zero by 1981. Iran's production decreased from 5.5 million barrels daily before the revolution to 1.5 million during the war. Without these disruptions, global oil supply would have been higher, potentially resulting in lower and more stable oil prices throughout the 1980s, affecting both producing and consuming nations worldwide.

Internal Political Developments

The absence of war would have substantially altered the domestic political trajectories of both nations:

Consolidation of Saddam's Rule: The war helped Saddam Hussein consolidate his authority in Iraq, eliminating potential rivals under the guise of military necessity and fostering nationalist sentiment. Without this conflict, his grip on power might have been less absolute, potentially allowing for greater internal Ba'ath Party pluralism or even challenges to his leadership. Alternatively, Saddam might have found different pretexts to eliminate rivals, but would have lacked the unifying effect of an existential national struggle.
Evolution of the Iranian Revolution: The war served as a rallying point for the Islamic Republic, allowing Khomeini to mobilize nationalist sentiment alongside religious fervor and crack down on internal opposition as "enemies within" during a national emergency. Without this external threat, the revolutionary government would have faced greater pressure to deliver on economic and social promises. The pragmatic versus ideological debate within the Iranian leadership might have come to the fore earlier, potentially accelerating the moderate trends that only emerged in the late 1980s after the war's conclusion.
Kurdish and Shi'a Dynamics: Both regimes used the war to suppress ethnic and sectarian challenges. Iraq's Kurdish population and Iran's minorities might have had more political space without the national security imperative the war provided. However, both regimes would likely have continued policies of centralization and authoritarian control, if perhaps with less extreme measures than during wartime.

Military Developments

Without eight years of conflict, military establishments in both countries would have evolved differently:

Iraqi Military Development: The Iraqi military would not have expanded to the same degree—it grew from 190,000 troops in 1979 to over one million by 1988. Without combat experience and the perceived need for massive military industrialization, Iraq's armed forces would have remained more modest in size, though still significant by regional standards. The chemical weapons program might have developed more slowly without the pressures of Iranian human wave attacks.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was strengthened enormously during the war, evolving from a ideological militia to a parallel military establishment. Without the war, the IRGC would have remained more focused on internal security and enforcing revolutionary values, rather than developing conventional military capabilities. Its eventual economic and political influence might have been significantly diminished.
Weapons Proliferation: Both nations accelerated weapons programs during the war. Iraq's missile capabilities, chemical weapons development, and nuclear ambitions were all spurred by the conflict. Iran's post-war military development likewise built on wartime experiences. A more modest arms race might still have occurred, but without the urgency and scale the actual conflict prompted.

In the immediate years following our point of divergence, the Middle East would thus have seen a tense but ultimately non-violent competitive relationship between two regional powers, rather than a devastating conflict that consumed resources, lives, and political attention throughout the region.

Long-term Impact

Geopolitical Reconfiguration of the Middle East

The absence of the Iran-Iraq War would have fundamentally altered the region's power dynamics through the late 1980s and beyond:

The First Gulf War Question

Without the crippling debt from the Iran-Iraq War (estimated at $80 billion to Gulf states alone), Saddam Hussein's economic motivations for invading Kuwait in 1990 would have been substantially diminished. Iraq's relatively healthy economy and continued oil exports would have made the desperate gamble of annexing Kuwait less appealing, though Saddam's territorial ambitions might have remained.

Several scenarios emerge:

No Kuwait Invasion: With stronger finances and military forces not depleted by the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam might have pursued regional hegemony through intimidation and diplomacy rather than outright annexation. This would have prevented the formation of the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, the subsequent 1991 Gulf War, devastating sanctions, and the eventual 2003 invasion.
Delayed Confrontation: Alternatively, a more economically robust and militarily confident Iraq might have pursued regional ambitions more gradually, potentially leading to a later confrontation with global powers under different circumstances.
Different U.S.-Iraq Relationship: Without the Iran-Iraq War's complicated legacy (including U.S. support for Iraq despite chemical weapons use), American diplomatic engagement with Baghdad might have continued differently throughout the 1990s, potentially focused on containing Iran rather than isolating Iraq.

Iran's International Position

Iran's international trajectory would have been dramatically altered:

Earlier Pragmatic Turn: The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 marked a turning point in Iranian politics. Without the war's radicalizing effect, pragmatic elements in Iranian politics (represented by figures like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) might have gained influence earlier, potentially accelerating Iran's attempts to reintegrate with the global economy.
Nuclear Program Development: Iran's nuclear program gained momentum partly as a response to Iraqi chemical weapons use during the war and subsequent insecurity. Without this catalyst, Iran's nuclear ambitions might have developed more slowly or taken a different path, potentially avoiding the international confrontation that developed in the 2000s.
Regional Influence Strategy: The export of revolution remained a pillar of Iranian foreign policy, but without the war experience and IRGC's military transformation, Iran might have relied more on cultural and religious soft power rather than proxy militias to extend influence throughout the region.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States

The Gulf monarchies' development would have followed a different trajectory:

Security Arrangements: Without the imminent threat posed by the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf states' security dependence on the United States might have evolved more gradually. The massive American military presence in the region might have been established later or in different circumstances.
Regional Integration: Economic integration among Gulf states might have progressed differently without the pressing security concerns that drove GCC formation and cooperation.
Saudi-Iranian Competition: The sectarian dimension of Saudi-Iranian regional competition was intensified by the Iran-Iraq War. A less militarized rivalry might have remained focused on diplomatic and economic competition rather than proxy conflicts throughout the region.

Economic and Social Transformations

The economic trajectories of both countries—and the region—would have been substantially different:

Iraq's Developmental Path

Potential Economic Diversification: Iraq's substantial oil wealth, combined with its educated population and Saddam's modernization ambitions, could have produced a more diversified economy if not for the war and subsequent sanctions. Agricultural development, industrial expansion, and infrastructure projects planned in the late 1970s might have continued, creating a development model distinct from other Gulf states.
Social Development: Iraq's pre-war social indicators, including women's education, healthcare, and literacy, were among the most progressive in the Arab world. This trajectory might have continued, though still within the constraints of an authoritarian political system.
The Kurdish Question: Kurdish autonomy aspirations would have remained a challenge for Baghdad. Without the extreme measures taken during the war (including the Anfal campaign and chemical attacks), a different accommodation might have evolved, potentially involving greater regional autonomy within a centralized Iraqi state.

Iranian Economic Evolution

Post-Revolutionary Stabilization: Without war expenditures, Iran's economy might have stabilized earlier after the revolutionary disruption. The debate between state control and market economics that dominated Iranian economic policy discussions might have been resolved differently without wartime emergency measures.
Sanctions and International Trade: Iran faced some Western sanctions after the hostage crisis, but the comprehensive isolation that characterized later decades might have evolved differently. Trade relationships with Europe, Russia, and Asia could have developed earlier and more substantively.
Social Reform Pressures: The war allowed the postponement of addressing social tensions between revolutionary ideology and popular aspirations. Without this delay, the reform movements that emerged in the late 1990s might have gained traction earlier, potentially leading to a different balance between clerical authority and popular sovereignty.

Regional Economic Development

Oil Market Stability: More stable oil production from both Iran and Iraq would have affected global energy markets throughout the 1980s and beyond. Steadier prices might have altered economic development throughout the oil-producing states and changed consumer nation policies regarding energy security and alternative energy investment.
Reduced Militarization: The massive military expenditures that characterized the region might have been directed toward development, potentially altering the economic landscape across the Middle East.

Religious and Ideological Currents

The war profoundly shaped religious and ideological developments that might have taken different paths:

Evolution of Political Islam

Iranian Model: Without the war's rallying effect, the Iranian revolutionary model might have been forced to demonstrate its economic and governance viability earlier. Its appeal throughout the Muslim world might have been more closely tied to its practical successes or failures rather than its defiance of external threats.
Sunni-Shia Relations: The sectarian dimensions of the conflict exacerbated religious tensions throughout the region. Without this polarization, the relationship between Sunni and Shia communities in mixed countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia might have evolved less antagonistically.
Alternative Islamic Political Models: Without the Iran-Iraq War dominating discourse about political Islam, alternative models—from Turkey's approach to Malaysia's development path—might have received greater attention in debates about governance in Muslim-majority societies.

Extremism and Terrorism

Jihadist Development: The war coincided with the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), another formative conflict for militant Islamist movements. Without the Iran-Iraq War's sectarian dimensions and militarization of religious identity, the trajectory of groups like al-Qaeda might have differed, though the Afghan experience would remain influential.
Sectarian Extremism: Groups exploiting Sunni-Shia tensions emerged partly from the war's aftermath. Organizations like ISIS, which later capitalized on sectarian divisions in Iraq, might have found less fertile ground without the historical wounds and institutional weaknesses the war created.

Technological and Military Developments

The absence of the war would have altered military and technological trajectories:

Chemical Weapons and WMDs: Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons normalized these tactics in regional conflicts. Without this precedent, international norms against chemical weapons might have remained stronger. Both countries' pursuit of other weapons of mass destruction might have followed different paths.
Military Doctrines: The Iran-Iraq War influenced military planning throughout the region and globally, demonstrating the continued relevance of conventional warfare, chemical weapons, and human wave tactics. Without these lessons, military development might have focused differently, perhaps more on counter-insurgency or precision capabilities.
Defense Industries: Both countries developed domestic arms industries in response to wartime needs and international restrictions. Without this impetus, the regional arms manufacturing landscape would look substantially different today.

By 2025, this alternate Middle East—shaped by rivalry but not outright war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s—would present a substantially different geopolitical, economic, and social landscape. While counterfactual history cannot predict exact outcomes, the absence of this devastating conflict would have removed a critical catalyst for many of the region's subsequent challenges, potentially allowing for different paths of development and international engagement.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Vali Nasr, Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University, offers this perspective: "The Iran-Iraq War became a critical formative experience for both regimes, essentially freezing their revolutionary and ideological evolution. Without that conflict, I believe we would have seen the pragmatic turn in Iranian politics emerge much earlier than the 1990s. The war allowed both regimes to postpone addressing fundamental governance and economic challenges by focusing on external threats. In its absence, both Baghdad and Tehran would have been forced to establish their legitimacy through performance rather than resistance. The sectarian dimension of regional politics, while not eliminated, would likely have remained less militarized and acute without the war's polarizing effect."

Professor Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, provides a contrasting analysis: "While avoiding the Iran-Iraq War would have spared the region immense suffering, we should be careful about assuming too positive an outcome. Both regimes were fundamentally expansionist and authoritarian in nature. The tensions between revolutionary Iran and Ba'athist Iraq reflected genuine ideological and geopolitical conflicts that would have manifested in other ways. The question isn't whether conflict would have occurred, but what form it would have taken. Without the catastrophic conventional war, we might have seen decades of proxy conflicts, insurgency support, and covert operations that could have destabilized the region in different but equally destructive ways."

Dr. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Lebanese political analyst and expert on Shi'a politics, emphasizes the religious dimension: "The Iran-Iraq War fundamentally transformed Shi'a political identity throughout the region. It militarized the Iranian revolutionary model and deeply influenced organizations from Lebanon's Hezbollah to Iraq's Shi'a movements. Without this war, political Shi'ism might have developed more along the lines of civil resistance and grassroots organization seen in pre-war mobilization. The relationship between religious authorities in Najaf and Qom would have evolved differently as well, potentially creating a more diverse and less militarized landscape of Shi'a political thought. The absence of war might have allowed for a more organic development of Shi'a political identity less defined by its opposition to Sunni power structures."