The Actual History
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610, a Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, plunged into the Java Sea just 13 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia. All 189 passengers and crew perished in the crash. The nearly new aircraft had been delivered to Lion Air just two months earlier. Initial investigations revealed that the aircraft had experienced airspeed indicator problems on previous flights, including on its flight the day before the crash.
What initially seemed like a tragic but isolated incident took on greater significance less than five months later when, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, another 737 MAX 8, crashed six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 people aboard. The similarities between the two crashes were striking—both involved new aircraft that experienced flight control problems shortly after takeoff, with pilots struggling to maintain control as their planes pitched downward repeatedly.
Investigations into both accidents ultimately identified the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) as the primary culprit. Boeing had designed this automated flight control system specifically for the 737 MAX to compensate for the aircraft's larger engines, which altered its aerodynamic properties. MCAS would automatically adjust the horizontal stabilizer to push the aircraft's nose down when it detected a high angle of attack that might lead to an aerodynamic stall.
Critical flaws in the MCAS design included:
- Reliance on a single angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor, creating a single point of failure
- Repeated activation without pilot input
- Powerful control authority that could overwhelm pilots' manual inputs
- No adequate pilot training or even awareness of the system's existence
Perhaps most egregiously, Boeing had intentionally minimized documentation about MCAS to avoid triggering requirements for additional pilot training, which would have increased costs for airlines adopting the new aircraft. This decision was motivated by Boeing's competitive pressure from Airbus and the desire to expedite the certification process.
The aftermath was swift and severe. Aviation authorities worldwide grounded the entire 737 MAX fleet by March 13, 2019, just days after the Ethiopian Airlines crash. The 20-month grounding became the longest in U.S. aviation history, finally ending in November 2020 after Boeing implemented significant software changes, redesigned flight control systems, improved pilot training requirements, and submitted to intensified regulatory scrutiny.
The corporate fallout was equally dramatic. Boeing faced criminal charges resulting in a $2.5 billion settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice in January 2021. CEO Dennis Muilenburg was fired in December 2019. The company's reputation suffered immeasurable damage, and it recorded financial losses exceeding $20 billion, while cancellations of 737 MAX orders mounted. The crashes also triggered congressional investigations, revealing systemic failures in Boeing's safety culture and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) certification processes.
The 737 MAX crisis marked a watershed moment in aviation history—one that exposed dangerous corporate priorities, regulatory capture, and the life-threatening consequences when profit and production timelines supersede safety considerations.
The Point of Divergence
What if Lion Air Flight 610 had never crashed on that fateful morning in October 2018? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where a series of narrow escapes, rather than catastrophic failures, might have altered the trajectory of aviation safety and Boeing's corporate destiny.
Several plausible divergences could have prevented the crash:
Technical Intervention: The most straightforward divergence involves the aircraft's maintenance history. The day before the crash, the same Lion Air aircraft experienced similar MCAS-related problems, but pilots successfully countered them using a procedure to disable the trim system. In our alternate timeline, maintenance crews correctly diagnose the faulty angle-of-attack sensor after this incident and replace it, preventing the fatal malfunction on the subsequent flight.
Pilot Response: Another possibility involves the flight crew. In our timeline, the pilots on JT610 struggled for nearly 10 minutes against an automated system they didn't fully understand. If the captain had transferred control to the first officer sooner (who initially seemed to handle the situation more effectively) or if they had recognized the runaway trim condition faster and applied the appropriate emergency procedure, the outcome might have been different. In this alternate timeline, the pilots successfully diagnose the problem as a runaway stabilizer trim, disable the electric trim system using the cutout switches, and safely return to Jakarta with a serious incident report but no casualties.
AOA Sensor Redundancy: Perhaps an even earlier divergence could have occurred if Boeing engineers had prevailed in internal debates about MCAS design. In this scenario, the 737 MAX enters service with MCAS programmed to require agreement between both AOA sensors before activating, preventing the erroneous triggering that doomed the actual flights.
Whichever specific mechanism we consider, the essential point of divergence is this: instead of a catastrophic crash with 189 fatalities, Lion Air Flight 610 becomes a serious incident that lands safely—a near-miss that triggers urgent safety reviews but without the global shock and immediate grounding that followed the actual disaster.
This seemingly minor change—189 lives saved on an Indonesian domestic flight—would alter the course of aviation history, corporate accountability, and regulatory oversight in profound and far-reaching ways.
Immediate Aftermath
A "Serious Incident" Rather Than Disaster
In our alternate timeline, Lion Air Flight 610 experiences severe flight control anomalies but returns safely to Jakarta's Soekarno-Hatta International Airport after the pilots successfully diagnose and counteract the MCAS malfunction. Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT) immediately launches an investigation, classifying it as a "serious incident"—a significant event that nearly resulted in an accident.
The flight data recorder reveals the same pattern that occurred in our timeline: the MCAS system repeatedly forcing the aircraft's nose down based on erroneous data from a single faulty angle-of-attack sensor. However, without the emotional and political impact of 189 deaths, the incident receives limited international media coverage, primarily appearing in aviation industry publications and Indonesian news.
Boeing's Internal Response
Boeing faces a crucial decision point. The company's technical staff who investigate the incident identify the same fundamental problems with MCAS that were eventually discovered after the real-world crashes. Safety engineers within Boeing push for immediate action, arguing that the Lion Air incident exposes critical design flaws.
However, in this alternate timeline, without the pressure of a catastrophic accident, Boeing's corporate leadership might choose one of two paths:
Proactive Path: In the more optimistic scenario, Boeing's leadership recognizes the near-disaster as an opportunity to address a potentially fatal flaw before lives are lost. They voluntarily issue a service bulletin within weeks of the incident, implementing temporary operational procedures while fast-tracking a software update to:
- Limit MCAS's control authority
- Prevent repeated activations
- Require agreement between both AOA sensors before activating
Minimization Path: Alternatively, without the global scrutiny that followed an actual crash, Boeing's leadership might choose to address the issue more discreetly, classifying it as a pilot training issue rather than a design flaw. They might issue limited advisories about potential "uncommanded trim" without explicitly mentioning MCAS, while quietly developing software fixes on a less urgent timeline.
Given Boeing's demonstrated priorities in our timeline, the Minimization Path seems more historically plausible. This creates a dangerous period where the same fundamental flaws remain in the global 737 MAX fleet.
Regulatory Reaction
The FAA's response in this alternate timeline would likely mirror Boeing's approach. With no crash and limited public attention, the agency would likely accept Boeing's assessment and proposed solutions without the comprehensive review that eventually occurred in our timeline.
International regulators, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), would be notified of the incident but would initially defer to the FAA's certification authority. However, some agencies—particularly those with more independent relationships with Boeing—might begin asking more pointed questions about MCAS and its certification.
Lion Air and Customer Reactions
For Lion Air, the incident would be serious but not catastrophic. The airline would ground the specific aircraft involved for comprehensive inspection and potentially request compensation from Boeing for the maintenance issues. However, without the tragic loss of life, Lion Air would likely continue accepting delivery of its remaining 737 MAX orders.
Other airlines operating the 737 MAX would receive Boeing's service bulletins or advisories but would continue normal operations with minimal disruption. Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and other major 737 MAX operators would implement any required procedural changes but would not face the operational chaos caused by the actual grounding.
The Ethiopian Airlines Flight
Perhaps the most significant immediate consequence relates to Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. In our actual timeline, this flight crashed on March 10, 2019—about five months after Lion Air 610. The Ethiopian pilots had been made aware of the Lion Air crash and Boeing's subsequent directives, but the information provided was insufficient to prevent the same sequence of events.
In our alternate timeline, with only a "serious incident" at Lion Air and potentially less urgent or comprehensive safety measures implemented by Boeing, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 would almost certainly face the same fatal MCAS activation. However, the context would be dramatically different—instead of being seen as a tragic recurrence confirming a pattern, it would be perceived as a shocking first crash of the 737 MAX.
This delayed first crash would still likely trigger a global grounding of the 737 MAX fleet, but under different circumstances and with Lion Air's earlier incident suddenly receiving new scrutiny as a missed warning sign.
Long-term Impact
The Delayed Safety Reckoning
In our alternate timeline, the most profound consequence is a temporal shift in the aviation safety crisis that Boeing and the industry eventually faced. With Lion Air 610 landing safely, the first fatal crash of a 737 MAX would instead be Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019.
This five-month delay would have significant ripple effects:
- Approximately 350 additional 737 MAX aircraft would have been delivered to airlines worldwide before any grounding occurred
- Boeing's financial position would be marginally stronger at the onset of the crisis
- Public and regulatory trust in Boeing would suffer a different pattern of erosion
The eventual grounding, when it did occur after the Ethiopian crash, might have lasted longer in this timeline. Investigators would need to look backwards to the Lion Air incident, asking why more wasn't done to address the identified problems—potentially exposing even more egregious negligence than in our timeline.
Boeing's Corporate Trajectory
Boeing's corporate fate would follow a different path in this alternate timeline. Without the catastrophic one-two punch of Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes occurring within five months, the company might have maintained its market position more effectively through 2019.
However, the delayed reckoning would still arrive, potentially with sharper consequences:
Leadership Changes: CEO Dennis Muilenburg might have survived longer in this timeline, but the Ethiopian crash would still likely lead to his eventual departure. The board's decision to replace him with David Calhoun would probably still occur, though perhaps months later than in our timeline.
Financial Impact: Boeing's financial losses would follow a different pattern—less immediate shock in 2018-2019, but potentially a longer recovery period extending further into the 2020s.
Cultural Transformation: The critical question is whether Boeing would implement the same degree of safety culture reforms with only one major crash instead of two in quick succession. The evidence from our timeline suggests that entrenched cultural problems at Boeing required the maximum shock to initiate real change.
By 2025 in this alternate timeline, Boeing might be in a marginally stronger financial position, having delivered more aircraft before the grounding and potentially returning to normal production rates sooner. However, the fundamental challenges of rebuilding trust and safety culture would remain.
Regulatory Reform
The FAA's relationship with Boeing would undergo a similar reckoning, but with a crucial difference. In our timeline, the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes exposed how thoroughly the FAA had delegated certification authority to Boeing itself through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program.
In the alternate timeline:
Delayed Reforms: The Technical Amendment to the FAA reauthorization bill, which instituted significant certification reforms, might have been delayed or watered down with only a single crash driving the urgency.
International Regulatory Divergence: Other international regulators like EASA and Transport Canada might have asserted their independence from FAA certification determinations even more forcefully, having seen that the FAA failed to act adequately after the Lion Air incident.
Certification Process Changes: By 2025, the fundamental reforms to aircraft certification would likely still exist, but might be less comprehensive or implemented more gradually.
The 737 MAX Program and Future Aircraft Development
The 737 MAX program itself would follow a different trajectory:
MAX 10 Certification: The 737 MAX 10, the largest variant, has faced certification challenges extending into 2023-2024 in our timeline. In the alternate world, these challenges might be somewhat reduced, potentially allowing the MAX 10 to enter service earlier.
New Clean-Sheet Designs: Perhaps the most significant long-term impact concerns Boeing's decision-making about future aircraft programs. In our timeline, the 737 MAX crisis consumed so much financial and organizational bandwidth that Boeing's planned "New Midsize Airplane" (NMA) was postponed indefinitely.
In the alternate timeline, with potentially less financial damage from the 737 MAX crisis, Boeing might have proceeded with the NMA program, aiming for entry into service in the mid-2020s. This would have given the company a more competitive response to the Airbus A321XLR and potentially positioned Boeing better for the post-pandemic recovery.
Aviation Safety Culture
The most profound difference might be in the broader aviation safety culture. The Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes in our timeline created a watershed moment that forced a re-examination of the relationship between manufacturers, regulators, and commercial pressures.
In the alternate timeline:
Pilot Training Emphasis: With potentially more focus on the Ethiopian pilots' responses (without the comparative data from Lion Air), there might be greater emphasis on pilot training factors rather than system design flaws.
Automation Philosophy: The fundamental questions about automation philosophy and human-machine interface in modern aircraft would still emerge, but possibly with different conclusions or emphasis.
Global Standardization: The push for global standardization of pilot requirements and training might be less urgent without the clear pattern established by two nearly identical crashes.
By 2025 in this alternate timeline, the aviation industry would have still implemented significant safety reforms, but the narrative surrounding those reforms might emphasize different aspects of the system—potentially placing more emphasis on operational factors and less on the fundamentals of aircraft design and certification.
The COVID-19 Pandemic Wild Card
The COVID-19 pandemic remains a fixed point in both timelines, arriving in early 2020 and devastating the aviation industry globally. In our timeline, Boeing faced this crisis already weakened by the 737 MAX grounding.
In the alternate timeline:
Financial Resilience: Boeing might enter the pandemic with somewhat stronger financials and more delivered aircraft generating revenue for the company.
Production Capacity: With potentially less disruption to production systems before the pandemic, Boeing might maintain better manufacturing capability through the downturn.
Recovery Positioning: As the industry recovers post-pandemic, Boeing might be better positioned to ramp up production and compete with Airbus, which gained significant market share advantage during Boeing's actual crisis.
By 2025, as the industry fully recovers from the pandemic, this alternate Boeing might hold a somewhat stronger market position, though still facing the fundamental challenges of an aging product line and the need to develop next-generation aircraft with improved efficiency and environmental performance.
Expert Opinions
Dr. Todd Curtis, aviation safety analyst and former Boeing safety engineer, offers this perspective: "The Lion Air incident in this alternate timeline represents what we call in aviation safety a 'free lesson'—a serious event where you learn critical information without paying the ultimate price in lives lost. The question is whether Boeing and the regulatory system would have properly heeded that lesson. Historical patterns suggest that without the shock of mass casualties, the urgency for fundamental change would have been diminished. The Ethiopian crash, when it eventually occurred, would have been viewed not just as a tragedy but as a failure of the entire system to act on clear warning signs."
Professor Mary Cummings, Director of the Humans and Autonomy Laboratory at Duke University, provides this analysis: "The central issue with the 737 MAX crisis wasn't just about a single flawed system, but about the increasingly complex relationship between humans and automated systems in safety-critical environments. In this alternate timeline, without the immediate grounding after Lion Air, we might have seen a different evolution of automation philosophy. The question becomes whether the industry would have still recognized the fundamental problems with designing automated systems that pilots don't fully understand. Without two identical crashes in quick succession, it's plausible that the industry would have focused more on pilot training and less on the deeper questions about how we design and certify increasingly autonomous systems."
Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, famed pilot and aviation safety advocate, might have observed: "In aviation, we have built our safety systems on lessons written in blood. In this alternate scenario, the Lion Air crew's successful handling of the MCAS malfunction could have been categorized as just another example of pilots saving the day, rather than exposing a fundamentally flawed system. This represents a dangerous mindset—the expectation that pilots should routinely compensate for design flaws. Without the clear pattern established by two fatal crashes, I fear the industry might have continued down a path where economic pressures erode the foundations of safety, expecting pilots to be the final safeguard for increasingly complex and poorly documented systems. The eventual Ethiopian crash would still have forced a reckoning, but critical months would have been lost, and the lessons might have been framed differently."
Further Reading
- Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing by Peter Robison
- Air Wars: The Global Combat Between Airbus and Boeing by John Newhouse
- The Crash Detectives: Investigating the World's Most Mysterious Air Disasters by Christine Negroni
- Airframe by Michael Crichton
- Meltdown: Why Our Systems Fail and What We Can Do About It by Chris Clearfield and András Tilcsik
- Boeing Versus Airbus: The Inside Story of the Greatest International Competition in Business by John Newhouse