What If The Maghreb Union Was More Successful?

The Actual History

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), known in Arabic as "اتحاد المغرب العربي" (Ittihad al-Maghrib al-Arabi), was established on February 17, 1989, in Marrakech, Morocco, as an ambitious attempt to unite the North African nations of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The formation came at a pivotal moment when the Cold War was ending and regional blocs were emerging worldwide. The Maghreb leaders, particularly King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria, envisioned creating a powerful regional organization that would strengthen economic ties, enhance political cooperation, and ultimately lead to a customs union similar to the European Economic Community.

The founding treaty outlined lofty goals: the free movement of goods and people, the development of common policies in various sectors, and the gradual progress toward deeper integration. The union established a Presidential Council comprising the five heads of state as its supreme organ, with presidency rotating annually among member states. Additional institutions included a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Secretariat General based in Rabat, Morocco, and specialized committees for various sectors.

Initial enthusiasm generated several promising agreements in the early years. The members signed documents on trade facilitation, investment protection, and avoidance of double taxation. The AMU also established a Maghreb Investment and Foreign Trade Bank to finance joint projects.

However, the union quickly encountered insurmountable obstacles. The most significant barrier was the longstanding dispute between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara territory. Morocco annexed the former Spanish colony in 1975, while Algeria supported the Polisario Front's independence movement. This fundamental disagreement poisoned bilateral relations and effectively paralyzed the AMU from the early 1990s onward.

Political differences further complicated cooperation. Libya under Muammar Gaddafi faced international sanctions from the early 1990s until 2003, isolating it from regional and global affairs. The political systems across the five countries varied dramatically, from Morocco's monarchy to Tunisia's controlled democracy to Libya's Jamahiriya system under Gaddafi.

Economic realities presented additional challenges. The five economies had limited complementarity, all heavily dependent on exports to Europe rather than intra-regional trade. Infrastructure connections between the countries remained underdeveloped, with closed borders between Algeria and Morocco since 1994 symbolizing the union's dysfunction. By the late 1990s, intra-Maghreb trade represented less than 2% of the countries' total trade volume—among the lowest rates of regional trade in the world.

The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, which began in Tunisia before spreading to Libya and affecting other members to varying degrees, dealt another blow to the already moribund organization. Libya descended into civil war, while Tunisia underwent a difficult democratic transition. The 2011 upheavals highlighted the divergent paths of the member states rather than their unity.

As of 2025, the AMU exists primarily on paper. The Presidential Council last met in 1994, and most joint initiatives have been abandoned or remain unimplemented. The organization's headquarters in Rabat maintains a skeletal staff, but meaningful cooperation has been replaced by bilateral arrangements or engagement with other frameworks such as the African Union or agreements with the European Union. Despite occasional rhetorical commitments to reviving the AMU, particularly from Tunisia, no substantial progress has been made in overcoming the fundamental political differences separating the five Maghreb nations.

The failure of the AMU represents a significant missed opportunity. Various economic studies, including a 2006 World Bank report, estimated that deeper integration could have added 5-6% to the GDP of member countries, potentially creating millions of jobs in a region plagued by high unemployment. Instead, North Africa remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world, with its countries looking primarily across the Mediterranean rather than to their neighbors.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Arab Maghreb Union had overcome its early challenges to become a successful regional organization? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where a series of different decisions and circumstances in the early 1990s allowed the AMU to survive its initial difficulties and develop into a functional regional bloc.

The point of divergence centers on the critical period of 1990-1994, when the AMU was still holding regular high-level meetings but beginning to encounter serious obstacles. Several plausible alternative paths could have emerged during this crucial window:

First, a breakthrough on the Western Sahara conflict might have occurred. In our timeline, the United Nations proposed a Settlement Plan in 1991 that included a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara. In this alternate history, Morocco and Algeria could have reached a compromise solution through AMU-sponsored negotiations—perhaps a form of meaningful autonomy for Western Sahara within Moroccan sovereignty, with guarantees for Sahrawi rights and a special economic relationship with Algeria. This would have removed the primary political obstacle to Maghreb integration.

Alternatively, the leadership in both countries might have made a strategic decision to "compartmentalize" the Western Sahara dispute, agreeing to disagree while pursuing integration in other areas. This approach has precedent in other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, which has successfully maintained cooperation despite significant territorial and political disputes among its members.

A third possibility involves external incentives creating stronger impetus for cooperation. The European Union, concerned about stability across the Mediterranean following the fall of the Soviet Union, might have offered a more substantial "Mediterranean Partnership" conditional on Maghreb integration—essentially offering preferential access to European markets for a unified Maghreb rather than separate bilateral arrangements. This economic carrot could have motivated political compromise.

Finally, the trajectory might have changed due to different domestic political developments. If Algeria's military coup and subsequent civil war had been avoided in 1992 through a negotiated political solution, the country could have maintained its initial enthusiasm for Maghreb integration. Similarly, an earlier shift in Libya's foreign policy away from international confrontation (which in our timeline didn't occur until the early 2000s) could have facilitated Libya's constructive participation in the union.

In this alternate timeline, we posit a combination of these factors: a provisional agreement on Western Sahara that deferred the most contentious issues while allowing practical cooperation to proceed; stronger economic incentives from Europe that made integration more attractive than bilateral arrangements; and slightly more stable domestic politics in Algeria that prevented the complete closure of its border with Morocco in 1994. These changes, while individually modest, together created sufficient diplomatic space for the AMU to establish functional institutions and demonstrate early economic benefits, generating a positive feedback loop of increasing integration.

Immediate Aftermath

Preserving Momentum (1994-1997)

In this alternate timeline, the crucial fifth AMU summit in Tunis in 1994 marks a significant turning point rather than the beginning of institutional paralysis. With a provisional agreement on Western Sahara in place, the five heads of state approve an ambitious "Carthage Protocol" that establishes concrete steps toward economic integration.

The most immediate practical change is the decision to keep the Algeria-Morocco border open despite political tensions. Special economic zones are established at major border crossing points at Oujda-Tlemcen and Figuig-Béchar, creating immediate economic benefits for communities on both sides. These zones operate under AMU jurisdiction, effectively becoming the first territories where the union exercises direct administrative authority.

The AMU Secretariat in Rabat receives expanded powers and resources, with each member state contributing 0.1% of its GDP to fund integration initiatives. Former Tunisian finance minister Mohamed Ghannouchi is appointed as the first Secretary-General with enhanced authority, bringing technocratic expertise rather than political baggage to the role.

European Partnership Agreement (1995-1998)

The European Union, noting this progress, negotiates the comprehensive Euro-Maghreb Partnership Agreement (EMPA) with the AMU as a bloc rather than pursuing strictly bilateral agreements. This approach, championed by Spain's Felipe González and France's Jacques Chirac, offers substantial economic incentives:

A phased reduction of tariffs on industrial goods entering the EU market
Expanded quotas for agricultural exports
A €2 billion development fund specifically for cross-border infrastructure
Technical assistance for regulatory harmonization
Educational exchange programs focusing on economic integration

The EMPA negotiations force the Maghreb countries to develop common positions on trade, investment, and migration issues. Tunisian and Moroccan officials, with their more developed economic bureaucracies, provide technical leadership, while Algeria contributes its expertise in energy policy and Libya offers financial resources from its oil wealth. This process of joint negotiation builds institutional capacity and personal relationships among the national administrations.

Early Economic Initiatives (1996-2000)

By 1996, several concrete integration initiatives begin to show tangible results:

Transportation Infrastructure: Construction starts on the Trans-Maghreb Highway, connecting Nouakchott to Tripoli with modern road infrastructure. Railway modernization focuses on creating interoperable standards, with the Tunis-Algiers line upgraded as a showcase project.

Energy Integration: The Maghreb Electricity Committee evolves from a technical coordination body into the nucleus of an integrated power market. The Algeria-Morocco-Spain power interconnection, completed in 1997, becomes the template for broader regional integration. Libya and Tunisia join the grid in 1999, creating the foundation for a unified electricity market.

Financial Services: The Maghreb Investment and Foreign Trade Bank, headquartered in Tunis, begins funding cross-border projects, prioritizing transportation, energy, and telecommunications. Morocco's relatively sophisticated banking sector leads efforts to standardize banking regulations and payment systems across the five countries.

Educational Cooperation: The establishment of the Maghreb University in Oran, Algeria in 1998 creates a symbol of intellectual cooperation. The university specializes in technical fields relevant to regional development: agricultural science, energy engineering, information technology, and public administration.

Political and Security Coordination (1997-2000)

As economic integration progresses, political cooperation gradually follows. The AMU establishes a regular consultation mechanism on security issues, focusing initially on non-controversial areas like disaster response, counterterrorism information sharing, and anti-smuggling operations.

The political benefits become evident during crises. When terrorist attacks strike Algiers in 1998, Moroccan and Tunisian intelligence services provide concrete assistance, helping to identify perpetrators and prevent follow-up attacks. This security cooperation, while limited, demonstrates that the AMU can deliver practical benefits beyond economic integration.

Libya's position within the union remains complicated, but Gaddafi gradually modifies his more disruptive foreign policy positions to preserve the economic benefits of Maghreb integration. The AMU provides a framework for slowly reintegrating Libya into regional and eventually international diplomacy, with Algeria and Tunisia serving as intermediaries.

By 2000, the AMU has established a permanent presence in the regional landscape. Border crossings between countries are streamlined for both goods and citizens of Maghreb countries. Regular ministerial meetings in key sectors create ongoing coordination mechanisms. Trade within the region, while still modest compared to external trade, rises to approximately 8% of total Maghreb trade—a fourfold increase from 1990 levels.

Perhaps most importantly, a generation of civil servants, business leaders, and technical experts across the five countries develop professional networks through AMU institutions and projects. These human connections create a constituency with a vested interest in further integration, laying the groundwork for more ambitious steps in the new millennium.

Long-term Impact

Economic Transformation (2000-2010)

As the new millennium began, the Arab Maghreb Union entered a phase of deepening integration that significantly altered the region's economic trajectory. The most visible manifestation was the implementation of the Maghreb Free Trade Area (MFTA) in 2002, which eliminated tariffs on most goods traded between member states. While agricultural products remained partially protected in the first phase, industrial goods moved freely across borders, stimulating competition and specialization.

The economic impact played out across several dimensions:

Industrial Development: Regional value chains emerged as manufacturers took advantage of different competitive advantages across the Maghreb. Morocco's automotive sector integrated components from Tunisia and Algeria, while Algerian petrochemical firms established downstream processing facilities in neighboring countries. By 2008, approximately 30% of Maghreb industrial exports contained value added from multiple member states.

Energy Market Integration: The completion of the Pan-Maghreb Gas Pipeline in 2005, connecting Algeria's natural gas fields to Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia, created an integrated energy market. This infrastructure enabled more efficient electricity generation and provided energy security for the region. The Maghreb Power Pool, established in 2004, optimized electricity distribution across national grids, reducing costs and improving reliability.

Agricultural Modernization: Coordinated agricultural policies, including standardized regulations on food safety and plant health, facilitated specialization based on comparative advantage. Tunisia's olive oil industry expanded its reach, Morocco developed fruit and vegetable export capacity, and Algeria focused on cereals, creating complementary rather than competing agricultural systems.

Service Sector Liberalization: By 2007, the AMU implemented mutual recognition of professional qualifications in key sectors including accounting, engineering, medicine, and law. This allowed skilled professionals to work throughout the region, addressing skill imbalances and creating knowledge transfer. Tunisian medical professionals found opportunities in Libya and Mauritania, while Moroccan financial experts contributed to developing Algeria's private banking sector.

Innovation Ecosystem: The Maghreb Innovation Network, launched in 2006 with hubs in Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis, connected universities, research centers, and technology firms across borders. This initiative particularly benefited Tunisia's nascent technology sector, which expanded beyond its domestic market to serve the region.

By 2010, intra-Maghreb trade had reached approximately 18% of total trade—still below the levels of integration seen in ASEAN or the EU, but a dramatic improvement over the dismal starting point. More significantly, economic growth across the region averaged 5.7% annually between 2000-2010, compared to 3.8% in our timeline, creating millions of additional jobs.

Political Evolution and the Arab Spring Alternative (2011-2015)

The economic integration process gradually fostered political convergence, though significant differences in governance systems remained. Regular summits and ministerial meetings created a framework for discussing sensitive issues, while economic interdependence raised the cost of diplomatic ruptures.

When social and political pressures that led to the Arab Spring in our timeline emerged in 2010-2011, the AMU provided an institutional framework that significantly altered the region's response:

Managed Reforms in Tunisia: When protests erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, President Ben Ali initially responded with repression as in our timeline. However, faced with unified pressure from Maghreb partners concerned about regional stability, he implemented a managed transition instead of fleeing. The "Carthage Accord" of January 2011 established a transitional government including opposition figures, with presidential elections scheduled within one year.

Contained Libyan Crisis: The AMU Council intervened early in Libya's unrest, with Algeria and Morocco mediating between Gaddafi and opposition forces. Rather than descending into civil war, Libya underwent a negotiated transition to a constitutional monarchy under Mohammed El-Senussi (heir to the pre-Gaddafi Libyan throne), with Gaddafi receiving immunity but being required to relinquish power. This monarchical solution, while imperfect, prevented Libya's collapse into failed state status.

Accelerated Moroccan Reforms: King Mohammed VI accelerated constitutional reforms in response to protests, but within the AMU framework. The 2011 Moroccan Constitution granted greater powers to the elected government while preserving the monarchy's religious and symbolic authority. This reform process, observed throughout the region, established a template for gradual political liberalization without destabilization.

Algeria's Managed Transition: President Bouteflika, facing health issues and growing dissatisfaction, did not pursue the additional terms he sought in our timeline. Instead, Algeria began a carefully controlled political opening within the existing system, with expanded parliamentary powers and local governance reforms.

By channeling protest energy into institutional reforms rather than revolutionary upheaval, the Maghreb region avoided much of the instability that characterized our timeline's Arab Spring aftermath. This relatively peaceful evolution preserved the economic gains of the previous decade and allowed for continued integration.

Global Repositioning (2015-2025)

By the mid-2010s, the AMU had evolved into a recognized regional power bloc that could negotiate more effectively with larger partners:

Enhanced European Partnership: In 2016, the AMU and European Union signed the Advanced Integration Framework, establishing a relationship similar to the European Economic Area. This agreement provided Maghreb products preferential access to European markets while gradually aligning regulatory standards. Maghreb universities joined the Erasmus+ program, facilitating educational exchange.

Energy Hub Status: As Europe sought to diversify away from Russian energy in the 2020s, the integrated Maghreb energy infrastructure positioned the region as a critical alternative supplier. The massive Moroccan-Mauritanian solar projects, developed with AMU coordination, exported clean energy to Europe via Spain, while Algeria's gas exports to Europe increased through expanded pipeline capacity.

Migration Management: The AMU developed a common migration policy that balanced labor market needs with security concerns. Regular migration channels for sub-Saharan Africans to work in Maghreb economies reduced irregular migration pressure toward Europe. This approach gave the AMU leverage in negotiating comprehensive migration agreements with the EU that included legal pathways rather than just enforcement measures.

Foreign Direct Investment: The stability and market size of the integrated Maghreb attracted significantly higher investment flows. Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects initially focused on infrastructure but gradually expanded into manufacturing as Chinese firms sought production locations with preferential access to European markets. By 2022, the Maghreb had emerged as Africa's second-largest manufacturing hub after South Africa.

Western Sahara Resolution: The provisional agreement that preserved the AMU in the 1990s evolved into a permanent settlement by 2020. The "Maghreb Compromise" established Western Sahara as an autonomous region within Morocco but with special economic ties to Algeria and Mauritania. A portion of resource revenues were directed to development funds benefiting the Sahrawi population. While not satisfying purists on either side, this pragmatic solution removed the most significant obstacle to deeper integration.

By 2025, the Arab Maghreb Union represents a population of approximately 110 million people with a combined GDP exceeding $1.2 trillion—roughly equivalent to South Korea or Spain. While political systems across the five countries remain distinct, they have converged toward more participatory governance models with stronger institutions and accountability mechanisms.

Intra-regional trade has reached 25% of total trade, infrastructure connections are robust, and a generation has grown up accustomed to relatively seamless movement across the region for education, employment, and tourism. The Maghreb Dinar, introduced in 2023 as a parallel currency for intra-regional transactions, represents the beginning of monetary cooperation, though full currency union remains a distant prospect.

Most significantly, the successful integration has dramatically reduced the development gap with Southern Europe. Average per capita income across the Maghreb has reached approximately 40% of the EU average—still showing significant disparity but representing a substantial improvement from the 15% level of the late 1980s when the AMU was founded.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Amal Bensalah, Professor of International Political Economy at Mohammed V University in Rabat, offers this perspective:

"The successful integration of the Maghreb represents a profound challenge to Eurocentric assumptions about regional development models. Unlike the European Union, which began with coal and steel before expanding to broader economic and political dimensions, the AMU had to simultaneously address political, security, and economic challenges from its inception. The pragmatic approach of compartmentalizing contentious issues while demonstrating concrete economic benefits proved crucial. What's particularly noteworthy is how the AMU avoided being captured by authoritarian preservation interests—instead, economic integration gradually created pressure for political modernization across the region. While the transition has been more evolutionary than revolutionary, the trend line toward more accountable governance is clear."

Professor Robert Fishman, Director of Mediterranean Studies at Sciences Po Paris, provides this analysis:

"In our research comparing the economic trajectories of Southern Europe and North Africa, what's striking is how the Maghreb integration process effectively narrowed the development gap across the Mediterranean. In the counterfactual scenario where the AMU failed—as seemed likely in the early 1990s—we would likely see much higher migration pressures, lower foreign investment, and potentially more extremism in the region. The virtuous cycle between economic integration, institutional development, and political stabilization created regional resilience that proved crucial during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 political upheavals. However, it's important to note that integration has not solved all problems—income inequality within Maghreb countries remains significant, and the peripheries of the region, particularly Mauritania and southern Libya, have benefited less than the coastal zones. The AMU's next chapter will likely focus on these internal disparities."

Dr. Khalid Zerouali, former Secretary General of the AMU and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, reflects:

"What many outside observers miss about the Maghreb integration process is the cultural dimension. Beyond the economic statistics and political reforms lies a profound shift in regional identity. Young Maghrebis today move between Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli with the same ease that Europeans cross their internal borders. University students routinely take courses in multiple Maghreb countries, professionals develop region-wide networks, and cultural production increasingly speaks to a shared Maghrebi sensibility that transcends colonial-era divisions. This hasn't eliminated national identities, but it has created a layered sense of belonging similar to what we see in Scandinavia—distinct national identities operating within a recognized cultural and economic community. The social infrastructure of integration—from regional media to professional associations to university partnerships—may ultimately prove more durable than the formal institutional architecture."