What If The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Never Existed?

The Actual History

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) emerged in the 1960s during a period of acute nuclear anxiety. By then, five nations had successfully tested nuclear weapons: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that by the 1970s, the world could see "15 or 20 or 25 nations" with nuclear capabilities—a nightmare scenario that galvanized international efforts toward controlling nuclear proliferation.

The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, after years of complex negotiations primarily led by the United States and Soviet Union. It entered into force in 1970 after ratification by the required number of signatories. The treaty established a three-pillar system: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. It represented an unprecedented grand bargain: non-nuclear weapon states agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons, while the five recognized nuclear weapon states committed to pursuing disarmament. In exchange, the treaty affirmed the right of all signatories to develop peaceful nuclear technology under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The NPT initially had a duration of 25 years, but in 1995, it was extended indefinitely. It eventually became one of the most widely adhered-to arms control agreements in history, with 191 states parties. Only five UN member states have remained outside the treaty: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan, and North Korea (which ratified but later withdrew).

Despite its success in limiting proliferation, the NPT has faced significant challenges. The nuclear weapon states have made limited progress toward disarmament, creating tensions with non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty failed to prevent India and Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons in 1998, could not stop North Korea's nuclear program, and has been unable to address Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal.

Non-compliant behavior has presented additional challenges. Iraq's clandestine nuclear program was discovered after the 1991 Gulf War. In 2003, Iran was found to have concealed nuclear activities in violation of its safeguards agreement. Libya's secret nuclear weapons program was uncovered that same year, though Muammar Gaddafi subsequently abandoned it.

Despite these challenges, most experts agree the NPT has been largely successful in its primary aim: preventing widespread nuclear proliferation. Former U.S. President Barack Obama noted in 2009 that without the NPT, "we would live in a world with many more nuclear weapons, and the prospect of nuclear confrontation would be far more dangerous." The treaty established a powerful international norm against proliferation and created an enforceable verification system through the IAEA, which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for its efforts to prevent the military use of nuclear energy.

Today, the IAEA conducts regular inspections of nuclear facilities worldwide, monitoring approximately 1,300 nuclear facilities in 78 countries to ensure compliance with non-proliferation commitments. The NPT Review Conference convenes every five years to assess implementation and address emerging challenges, most recently grappling with issues like the Iranian nuclear deal, North Korean provocations, and the lack of progress on disarmament objectives.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had never come into existence? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the careful diplomatic balance struck in the mid-1960s collapses, preventing the landmark treaty from materializing and fundamentally altering the global nuclear landscape.

Several plausible factors could have derailed the NPT negotiations:

The most likely point of divergence centers on the contentious 1965-1967 negotiation period. The treaty's success hinged on a delicate compromise between nuclear and non-nuclear states, with particular friction concerning Article III's verification provisions. In our timeline, the superpowers made crucial concessions to reach agreement. In this alternate history, perhaps Soviet hardliners, concerned about intrusive inspections of their satellite states in Eastern Europe, successfully blocked these compromises. Alternatively, influential non-aligned nations like India might have mounted more effective opposition, convincing a critical mass of developing nations that the treaty entrenched nuclear apartheid.

Another possibility involves the key role of the Irish Resolution of 1961, which first established the framework for what became the NPT. If this resolution had failed or taken a significantly different form due to Cold War tensions, the conceptual foundation for the treaty might never have coalesced.

The timing was also crucial. The late 1960s represented a brief window of U.S.-Soviet détente that made cooperation possible. A more severe Berlin crisis, escalation in Vietnam, or a different outcome in the Cuban Missile Crisis could have poisoned superpower relations beyond the point where nuclear cooperation was possible.

Individual leadership also proved decisive. In our timeline, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin personally invested political capital in the NPT. Had Johnson lost the 1964 election to Barry Goldwater, a noted hawk, or had Kosygin been replaced by a hardliner in internal Soviet politics, the treaty might have lacked the necessary high-level support.

Most dramatically, a nuclear incident or limited exchange during the 1960s—perhaps during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, or the 1967 Six-Day War—could have fundamentally altered the psychological and strategic landscape, making a cooperative non-proliferation regime seem either impossible or irrelevant.

In this alternate timeline, we posit that a combination of more assertive non-aligned opposition, Soviet security concerns about verification, and a deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relationship led to the collapse of negotiations in 1968. Without the moral and legal framework of the NPT, nuclear restraint became the exception rather than the norm, setting the stage for a dramatically different nuclear future.

Immediate Aftermath

Accelerated Nuclear Development Programs (1968-1975)

Without the NPT's establishment in 1968, several countries with advanced nuclear technology rapidly pivoted toward weaponization:

Sweden accelerated its existing nuclear program. In our timeline, Sweden signed the NPT in 1968 and abandoned its weapons program. In this alternate reality, by 1972, Sweden conducted its first nuclear test in remote northern Lapland, becoming the sixth nuclear power. This development strained Swedish neutrality and complicated its position between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

West Germany faced enormous pressure to develop nuclear capabilities. Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, facing Soviet nuclear threats and uncertain about American security guarantees, authorized a covert weapons program in 1969. Leveraging Germany's advanced technical base and substantial plutonium stockpile from its civilian nuclear program, West Germany tested its first device in the Libyan desert in 1974 through a secret arrangement with the Libyan government, creating a major diplomatic crisis with both superpowers.

Japan, with its advanced technical capabilities and abundant plutonium from its civilian program, initiated a hedging strategy by 1970. Prime Minister Eisaku Satō, who in our timeline won the Nobel Peace Prize for Japan's three non-nuclear principles, instead pursued a policy of deliberate ambiguity. By 1975, U.S. intelligence estimated Japan had assembled several undetonated nuclear devices, an assessment that severely strained U.S.-Japanese relations and triggered a militaristic response from China.

Israel, which had been developing nuclear weapons capabilities since the late 1950s, became more overt without the NPT's constraints. Rather than maintaining its policy of "nuclear ambiguity," Israel conducted an underground test in the Negev Desert in 1971, becoming an acknowledged nuclear power and dramatically altering Middle East security dynamics.

Collapsed Nuclear Safeguards (1968-1973)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, struggled to maintain relevance without the NPT's mandate for comprehensive safeguards:

Verification Systems Weakened: Without the NPT requirement for comprehensive safeguards agreements, the IAEA's inspection authority remained limited to specific facilities voluntarily placed under safeguards. This created a significant verification gap, allowing countries to easily divert materials to military purposes.

Nuclear Trade Liberalized: The absence of NPT restrictions allowed nuclear supplier states to transfer sensitive technology with fewer constraints. The Zangger Committee, which in our timeline established guidelines for nuclear exports, never formed. Instead, a competitive commercial environment emerged where countries eager to expand nuclear exports routinely overlooked proliferation concerns.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Proliferated: Without the NPT's controls, the concept of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs) for civil engineering projects gained traction in developing nations. Countries like India, which in our timeline conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, were joined by Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt in pursuing PNE programs that provided thinly veiled cover for weapons development.

Regional Nuclear Arms Races (1970-1980)

The absence of the NPT triggered cascading regional nuclear competitions:

Middle East Nuclear Competition: Following Israel's 1971 test, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat immediately accelerated his country's nuclear program. With Soviet technical assistance (the USSR having no NPT commitments to constrain such help), Egypt tested a device in 1977. Iran under the Shah initiated a crash nuclear program in 1973, achieving weapons capability by 1979—just as the Islamic Revolution overthrew the monarchy, placing nuclear weapons in the hands of a revolutionary regime hostile to both the United States and Israel.

South Asian Nuclear Rivalry: India, unrestrained by NPT commitments, conducted its first nuclear test in 1971 rather than 1974, explicitly framing it as a weapons test rather than a "peaceful nuclear explosion." Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declaring that Pakistanis would "eat grass" if necessary to match India, accelerated Pakistan's program. With Chinese technical assistance, Pakistan tested its first device in 1976, three years after suffering defeat in the 1973 war with India.

East Asian Proliferation Cascade: Taiwan, facing an existential threat from mainland China and observing Japan's nuclear ambiguity, launched a determined weapons program. Despite intense American pressure, Taiwan conducted a low-yield test in 1977. South Korea, concerned about North Korean aggression and uncertain about American security guarantees in a world of proliferating nuclear weapons, initiated its own program in 1974, achieving breakout capability by 1979.

Diplomatic and Institutional Responses (1968-1980)

The failure to establish the NPT prompted alternative approaches to manage nuclear dangers:

Regional Nuclear-Free Zones: In the absence of a global non-proliferation regime, Latin American nations successfully implemented the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1969, creating the first nuclear-weapon-free zone. Similar regional arrangements followed in Southeast Asia (1976) and Africa (1978), though these zones proved difficult to verify without IAEA safeguards.

Bilateral Arms Control: The United States and Soviet Union, recognizing the dangers of horizontal proliferation, pursued bilateral strategic arms limitations more aggressively. SALT I was signed in 1972 as in our timeline, but with additional provisions attempting to limit nuclear assistance to client states.

Crisis Management Mechanisms: A series of nuclear alerts and close calls in the early 1970s—particularly during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when newly nuclear Israel placed its weapons on high alert—prompted the creation of multilateral crisis communication channels. The Nuclear Crisis Resolution Center was established in Geneva in 1975, providing a permanent forum for preventing nuclear escalation in regional conflicts.

By 1980, the nuclear landscape had transformed dramatically. Instead of five nuclear powers, the world contained at least twelve acknowledged nuclear states: the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, China, Sweden, West Germany, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Taiwan—with Japan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Iran maintaining various degrees of nuclear ambiguity or advanced technical readiness.

Long-term Impact

The Multi-Nuclear World Order (1980-2000)

By the 1980s, the global nuclear landscape had fundamentally transformed the international system:

Nuclear-Armed Alliances and Security Guarantees

NATO became an alliance of multiple nuclear powers—the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany—creating complex command and control challenges. The Warsaw Pact similarly included both Soviet and potentially multiple Eastern Bloc nuclear forces. This multiplication of nuclear actors within alliances substantially complicated nuclear planning and crisis management.

Nuclear security guarantees proliferated haphazardly. Saudi Arabia secured a Pakistani nuclear umbrella in 1982 to counter the Iranian and Egyptian threats. Australia negotiated a nuclear arrangement with the United Kingdom in 1984 after Indonesia began pursuing nuclear capabilities. By 1990, most significant regional powers either possessed nuclear weapons or had secured guarantees from nuclear powers, creating a complex web of deterrence relationships.

Nuclear Terrorism and Non-State Actors

The dramatically increased number of nuclear programs created unprecedented vulnerabilities to theft and unauthorized access. The first confirmed case of nuclear terrorism occurred in 1985, when a radical faction obtained weapons-grade material from Pakistan's poorly secured program and detonated a crude radiological device in New Delhi, killing 23 people and contaminating a significant urban area.

This attack triggered the 1986 Nuclear Security Summit in Geneva, where major powers belatedly established minimum security standards for nuclear materials. However, compliance remained inconsistent. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, at least six serious incidents of attempted nuclear theft or sabotage were documented, including a 1992 attempt to seize tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine as the Soviet Union collapsed.

Economic and Environmental Impacts

The extensive nuclear buildup diverted significant resources from civilian needs. Brazil and Argentina's nuclear competition severely strained both nations' economies, contributing to Argentina's economic collapse in 1989. Egypt's nuclear program consumed nearly 8% of GDP during the late 1970s, severely impacting social programs and infrastructure development.

Environmental consequences proved significant. Without IAEA oversight, safety standards at many nuclear facilities were neglected. A serious accident at Taiwan's Taichung Nuclear Complex in 1987 released significant radiation, requiring the evacuation of over 200,000 people and rendering portions of Taiwan's western coast uninhabitable. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster still occurred as in our timeline, but with even more devastating regional consequences as neighboring states had fewer international assistance mechanisms.

Regional Dynamics Transformed (1980-2010)

Europe: Nuclear Germany and Power Balancing

West Germany's nuclear status dramatically altered European politics. France initially responded with alarm, but by the mid-1980s, French and German leaders established the European Nuclear Coordination Council, integrating their nuclear planning. This Franco-German nuclear partnership became the cornerstone of an increasingly independent European defense identity.

After German reunification in 1990, questions about the expanded Germany's nuclear status created a major crisis. The eventual compromise—allowing a unified Germany to retain nuclear status but with reductions and international monitoring—still generated significant tensions with Russia. By 2000, European security rested on a precarious balance between Russian and German-French nuclear forces, with diminished American influence.

Middle East: Nuclear Multipolarity and Persistent Crises

The Middle East became the world's most nuclearized region, with Israel, Egypt, and Iran as confirmed nuclear powers by the 1980s, and Saudi Arabia securing a Pakistani nuclear umbrella. This nuclear multipolarity paradoxically both restrained and intensified regional conflicts.

The 1982 Lebanon War nearly escalated to nuclear use when Israeli forces approached Syrian positions covered by Egyptian nuclear guarantees. The crisis prompted the first-ever multilateral Middle East Nuclear Consultation Agreement in 1984, establishing guidelines for preventing nuclear escalation. However, conventional wars continued, including the devastating Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), where both sides possessed nuclear capabilities but refrained from use due to mutual deterrence.

The 1991 Gulf War became significantly more complex in this timeline. Iraq, having benefited from the absence of IAEA safeguards, possessed several crude nuclear devices. Coalition forces had to conduct operations with the constant risk of Iraqi nuclear use, requiring unprecedented nuclear counter-force operations by American, British, and French special forces to neutralize Iraq's nuclear capabilities in the war's opening days.

Asia: Nuclear Dominos and Maritime Disputes

Northeast Asia's nuclear environment grew increasingly complicated. North Korea, leveraging technology and materials from an expanded international nuclear black market, tested its first nuclear device in 1992 rather than 2006. Taiwan's nuclear status led to severe tensions with mainland China, which threatened nuclear strikes during the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Southeast Asia witnessed a second wave of proliferation, with Indonesia testing its first nuclear device in 1996, developed with assistance from Pakistan. Vietnam, alarmed by Chinese nuclear capabilities and assertiveness in territorial disputes, secured nuclear guarantees from the Soviet Union, creating a nuclear-backed standoff in the South China Sea by the late 1990s.

Nuclear Governance in the 21st Century (2000-2025)

Patchwork Regulation Emerges

Without the NPT's global framework, nuclear governance evolved through a patchwork of bilateral agreements, regional arrangements, and crisis-driven regulations:

The Global Nuclear Security Initiative, established after the New Delhi radiological attack, eventually expanded to include verification protocols similar to those the IAEA would have implemented under the NPT. However, compliance remained voluntary, and several nuclear states, including Egypt and Pakistan, refused to participate fully.

Fissile material production controls emerged as a priority in the early 2000s after intelligence agencies identified nearly thirty countries with the technical capability to produce weapons-grade materials. The 2003 Fissile Material Control Treaty, while not as comprehensive as the never-realized Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty of our timeline, established the first global restrictions on producing weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

Technology and Proliferation in the Digital Age

Cyber vulnerabilities created unprecedented nuclear risks. The first major cyber attack targeting nuclear facilities occurred in 2007, when unknown actors (suspected to be American and Israeli) deployed a sophisticated computer worm against Iran's nuclear program. Unlike the more limited Stuxnet attack in our timeline, this operation caused a significant release of radiation at the Bushehr facility.

This incident prompted the 2009 Digital-Nuclear Security Accord, establishing international guidelines for cybersecurity at nuclear facilities. However, the dual challenge of securing both physical nuclear materials and their digital control systems taxed even advanced states' capabilities, leading to several near-miss incidents involving compromised command and control systems.

Public Health and Environmental Legacy

The combination of weapons testing, poorly regulated nuclear power, and radiological incidents left significant public health challenges. Studies published in 2015 identified elevated cancer rates in at least fourteen countries directly attributable to nuclear contamination. The World Health Organization established the Global Radiation Health Monitoring Network in 2010 to track and treat radiation-related illnesses across affected regions.

Environmental consequences continued to accumulate. Without NPT-driven constraints, underground nuclear testing continued well into the 2000s, with over 300 documented tests worldwide between 1970 and 2010 (compared to approximately 2,000 total tests in our timeline, mostly conducted before the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). These tests left a legacy of environmental contamination in test sites across Central Asia, North Africa, and the Pacific.

Contemporary Reality (2025)

By 2025 in this alternate timeline, nuclear weapons have become a standard feature of major power status and regional security dynamics. Approximately twenty-five nations possess nuclear weapons, with another dozen maintaining various degrees of latent capability or technical readiness.

Nuclear deterrence theory has evolved to address multipolar nuclear environments, with complex game theory models attempting to manage the risks of nuclear use in regional conflicts. Despite several near-misses, no nuclear weapons have been used in warfare since 1945, suggesting that even in a highly proliferated world, nuclear taboos provide some restraint.

However, the world lives with significantly elevated nuclear risk. Nuclear terrorism remains a persistent threat, with non-state actors actively seeking access to nuclear materials. Regional conflicts, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, regularly feature nuclear threats and counter-threats. Environmental and public health impacts from poorly regulated nuclear activities continue to affect millions worldwide.

Recent efforts to establish retrospective nonproliferation measures have gained limited traction. The 2020 Global Nuclear Responsibility Accord, signed by eighteen nuclear powers, represents the first meaningful attempt to establish universal standards for nuclear behavior, though critics note it essentially codifies existing practices rather than meaningfully constraining nuclear arsenals or use doctrines.

Public opinion surveys indicate widespread nuclear anxiety, with over 70% of respondents in a 2024 global poll expressing the belief that nuclear use in conflict is "somewhat likely" or "very likely" within their lifetime—a stark contrast to the more contained nuclear fears of our actual timeline.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Eliza Montgomery, Professor of International Security Studies at Georgetown University, offers this perspective: "The absence of the NPT would represent one of the most consequential divergences in modern history. What we've learned from studying proliferation is that technical capacity alone doesn't determine whether states pursue nuclear weapons—norms and institutions matter enormously. Without the NPT establishing non-proliferation as the global default, the presumption would have shifted toward proliferation being the rational choice for capable states. By 2025, we might have seen not fifteen or twenty nuclear powers as Kennedy feared, but potentially twenty-five to thirty. The resultant security dilemmas would have transformed international politics into a precarious multipolar nuclear balance with dozens of potential escalation pathways."

Professor Sergei Karavaev, Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation at Moscow State University, provides a contrasting assessment: "The failure of the NPT would not have been as catastrophic as Western analysts suggest. Alternative regulatory frameworks would have emerged, likely based on regional arrangements and great power management. Without the NPT's inherently discriminatory structure dividing 'nuclear haves' from 'have-nots,' we might have developed more equitable approaches to managing nuclear technology. The most significant difference would be regional—the Middle East and Asia would feature multiple nuclear powers in complex deterrence relationships, while Europe might have developed an independent nuclear identity separate from American guarantees. These arrangements would be less stable than our current system but not necessarily prone to nuclear use."

Dr. Ananya Chatterjee, Chair of Strategic Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, emphasizes the Global South perspective: "Without the NPT, the nuclear landscape would reflect power politics rather than legal distinctions. Countries like India, which in our timeline faced decades of nuclear sanctions despite exemplary nonproliferation behavior outside the NPT framework, would have developed their capabilities earlier and without stigmatization. The result would be a more honest nuclear order acknowledging security realities, but also a more dangerous one lacking universal verification standards. The greatest impact would fall on developing regions—we would likely see nuclear competitions in the Middle East, South Asia, and eventually Africa consuming resources desperately needed for development. The resulting world would be more equitable in terms of the distribution of nuclear status, but significantly more vulnerable to catastrophic miscalculation."