What If The SALT Treaties Never Happened?

The Actual History

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) represented one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the Cold War era, arriving at a critical juncture when both superpowers possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy human civilization many times over. By the late 1960s, the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached alarming proportions, with both nations continuously developing and deploying increasingly sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons systems.

The initial groundwork for SALT began in 1967 during the Johnson administration, but substantive negotiations only commenced in November 1969 under President Richard Nixon. Nixon, together with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, pursued a policy of détente—a relaxation of tensions—with the Soviet Union. This approach represented a pragmatic recognition that unconstrained competition in nuclear arms threatened both nations' security and economic well-being.

The SALT I agreement, signed by President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, in Moscow, consisted of two key components. The first was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited each country to two ABM sites (later reduced to one in a 1974 protocol), effectively preventing the deployment of nationwide missile defense systems. The ABM Treaty was premised on the concept of "mutual assured destruction"—the understanding that vulnerability to retaliatory strikes would deter either side from launching a first strike.

The second component was the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which froze the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tubes at existing levels for five years. This agreement acknowledged the Soviet numerical advantage in launchers while recognizing American technological superiority and greater number of warheads per missile.

The follow-up negotiations, known as SALT II, began in late 1972 and culminated in a treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. SALT II established equal aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for both sides, capped the number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems, and included provisions for verification through national technical means, primarily satellite reconnaissance.

Although the U.S. Senate never ratified SALT II due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, both countries generally observed its provisions until 1986. The SALT process established important precedents for arms control verification and laid groundwork for subsequent agreements, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations of the 1980s and early 1990s.

The SALT treaties significantly slowed the quantitative nuclear arms race, though qualitative improvements continued. They represented a crucial recognition by both superpowers that nuclear competition had reached a point of diminishing returns for national security. The treaties also established vital communication channels and negotiating frameworks that helped manage U.S.-Soviet relations during periods of heightened tension, potentially preventing misunderstandings that might have led to catastrophic conflict.

By the end of the Cold War, these arms control measures had helped create a more predictable strategic environment that facilitated the peaceful resolution of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The ABM Treaty remained in force until the United States withdrew in 2002, while elements of SALT's approach to strategic stability continue to influence nuclear policy discussions to this day.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union had collapsed, never resulting in signed agreements? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the delicate diplomatic dance between Cold War adversaries broke down, leaving the nuclear arms race unconstrained at a critical juncture in Cold War history.

Several plausible paths could have led to this divergence. The most likely point of departure occurred during the early SALT negotiations in 1970-1971. During this period, several factors nearly derailed the talks:

First, fundamental disagreements over scope could have proven insurmountable. The Soviet delegation, led by Vladimir Semenov, strongly resisted American proposals to include Soviet "heavy" ICBMs (particularly the SS-9) in the limitations, while U.S. negotiator Gerard Smith faced pressure from the Pentagon not to accept any agreement that excluded these weapons. A more rigid Soviet position or stronger Pentagon influence on Nixon could have created an impasse.

Alternatively, the October 1970 "submarine crisis"—when the Soviet Union appeared to be constructing a submarine base in Cuba in violation of understandings reached after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis—nearly caused Nixon to abandon the SALT process entirely. In our timeline, the Soviets backed down, but a more defiant Soviet response could have collapsed the negotiations.

Third, domestic political considerations might have intervened decisively. Nixon faced criticism from defense hawks who viewed SALT as surrendering American security interests. Had the "Vietnam syndrome" bred deeper distrust of diplomatic engagement with communists, or had Congressional opposition been more unified, Nixon might have calculated that pursuing SALT carried more political risks than rewards.

Finally, personality conflicts and misperceptions could have played a decisive role. The negotiations required building personal trust between adversaries. Had Kissinger's secret back-channel to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin been exposed prematurely, or had Brezhnev faced stronger opposition from hardliners in the Soviet Politburo (particularly from Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, who opposed constraints on Soviet military development), the fragile negotiating framework might have collapsed.

In this alternate timeline, we posit that a combination of these factors—particularly heightened tensions over Soviet activities in Cuba and stronger domestic opposition in both countries—led Nixon and Brezhnev to abandon the SALT process by mid-1971, before any agreements could be reached. Without the restraining influence of SALT, both superpowers remained locked in an unconstrained competition for nuclear superiority with profound consequences for global security and stability.

Immediate Aftermath

Accelerated Nuclear Deployments (1971-1975)

The immediate consequence of SALT's failure would have been a dramatic acceleration in the deployment of strategic nuclear systems by both superpowers. Without the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, both nations would have rapidly expanded their nuclear arsenals beyond the already dangerous levels of the early 1970s.

The Soviet Union, enjoying an advantage in heavy ICBM production capacity, would have likely accelerated deployment of its SS-9 and newer SS-18 missiles. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko, emboldened by the collapse of negotiations, would have pushed through plans to expand the Soviet ICBM force to over 2,500 launchers by 1975—far beyond the 1,618 permitted under the historical SALT I agreement. Additionally, without SALT's constraints, the Soviets would have expanded their submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet more aggressively, possibly deploying 70-80 ballistic missile submarines by mid-decade instead of the approximately 60 they actually built.

In the United States, the Nixon administration would have faced intense pressure to respond to these Soviet deployments. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird would have successfully advocated for expanding the Minuteman ICBM force beyond the 1,000 launchers deployed by 1972, possibly adding another 200-300 missiles. More significantly, the U.S. would have rapidly accelerated its MIRV technology deployment, placing more warheads on existing missiles while developing more sophisticated systems.

The most dramatic shift would have come in anti-ballistic missile systems. Without the ABM Treaty's limitations, the U.S. "Safeguard" ABM program would not have been limited to a single site in North Dakota. Instead, the full twelve-site deployment originally envisioned by defense planners would have proceeded, protecting major U.S. cities and ICBM fields at an estimated cost of over $40 billion (approximately $260 billion in today's dollars). The Soviet Union would have likewise expanded its Moscow ABM system and deployed additional sites protecting Leningrad and key ICBM fields.

Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations (1971-1973)

The collapse of SALT negotiations would have poisoned broader U.S.-Soviet relations, undermining other aspects of détente. President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to Moscow, which in our timeline produced not only SALT I but also agreements on scientific cooperation, preventing incidents at sea, and establishing a "hotline" upgrade, would either have been canceled or yielded far fewer results.

Trade relations would have suffered particularly severe consequences. In our timeline, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement opened the door for increased economic ties, including American grain sales to the Soviet Union. Without this agreement, the Soviet Union would have faced greater difficulty addressing its critical agricultural shortfalls of the early 1970s, potentially leading to food shortages and increased domestic instability.

The absence of regular diplomatic contact through SALT would have removed an important communication channel between the superpowers, making crisis management more difficult. This would have proven especially dangerous during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, when tensions escalated dramatically as the Soviet Union threatened to intervene militarily to prevent the defeat of its Arab allies. In our timeline, the backchannel communications established during SALT helped prevent this crisis from spiraling out of control. Without these connections, we might have witnessed a much more dangerous confrontation, possibly including nuclear alerts beyond the limited DEFCON 3 status ordered by Nixon.

European Security Implications (1972-1976)

The failure of SALT would have complicated European security dynamics considerably. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik—his policy of normalization with Eastern Europe—would have faced greater obstacles without the supportive environment created by U.S.-Soviet détente. The 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany might have been delayed or abandoned entirely, prolonging Berlin's status as a flashpoint.

NATO would have faced increased strain as European allies grew alarmed by an intensifying nuclear arms race. Domestic anti-nuclear movements across Western Europe would have gained strength earlier and more dramatically than in our timeline, creating political difficulties for governments aligned with the United States. The French government under Georges Pompidou would have found its independent nuclear deterrent (Force de Frappe) increasingly insufficient in a world of rapidly expanding superpower arsenals, potentially leading to calls for an expanded and accelerated French nuclear program.

In Eastern Europe, increased Soviet military spending necessitated by the intensified arms race would have further strained already weak economies, potentially leading to greater unrest. The Warsaw Pact would have conducted larger and more frequent military exercises, increasing tensions along the Iron Curtain and raising the risk of accidents or miscalculations.

Domestic Political Shifts (1973-1976)

In the United States, the failure of SALT would have altered the political landscape. President Nixon, unable to claim the diplomatic achievement of arms control agreements, would have faced an even more difficult political environment amidst the unfolding Watergate scandal. His successor, Gerald Ford, would have confronted a more polarized foreign policy debate, with reduced opportunity for reaching across the aisle on matters of national security.

Within the Soviet leadership, the failure of SALT would have weakened General Secretary Brezhnev's position relative to military hardliners like Defense Minister Grechko. The increased influence of the military establishment would have likely resulted in even greater prioritization of defense spending over consumer goods, exacerbating the economic stagnation that ultimately contributed to Soviet decline. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalism, already controversial within the Soviet Communist Party, would have been further delegitimized.

By 1976, the world would have been a far more dangerous place than in our timeline—locked in an intensifying nuclear arms race, with fewer diplomatic guardrails, reduced communication channels, and greater risk of miscalculation between the superpowers.

Long-term Impact

Nuclear Arsenal Expansion and Diversification (1975-1985)

The absence of SALT would have led to nuclear arsenals that dwarfed even the massive stockpiles of our timeline. By 1980, instead of the roughly 25,000 nuclear warheads possessed by each superpower historically, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals might have grown to 35,000-40,000 warheads each. More concerning than sheer numbers would be the diversification of delivery systems and erosion of strategic stability.

Without the SALT II restrictions on MIRV technology, both nations would have placed ever-increasing numbers of warheads on individual missiles. The Soviet SS-18, which carried 10 warheads in our timeline, might have been developed to carry 15-20. Similarly, American Minuteman III and later MX missiles would have been designed with significantly higher warhead capacities.

The most destabilizing development would have been the unrestricted deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. In our timeline, NATO's decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe beginning in 1983 triggered major protests and eventually led to the 1987 INF Treaty eliminating these weapons. Without the precedent of SALT, this deployment would likely have occurred earlier and on a larger scale, with a more aggressive Soviet counter-deployment of SS-20 missiles targeting Western Europe.

The 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars")—President Reagan's proposed space-based missile defense system—would have been merely one component of a much larger, earlier, and more comprehensive effort to deploy ballistic missile defenses. With ABM systems already deployed around major cities since the mid-1970s, both superpowers would have invested enormous resources in increasingly sophisticated defense technologies, including directed-energy weapons, kinetic interceptors, and space-based systems.

Economic Consequences (1975-1990)

The unconstrained arms race would have imposed tremendous economic burdens on both superpowers. In the United States, defense spending would have consumed a significantly larger portion of GDP—perhaps reaching 8-10% by the early 1980s compared to the roughly 6% peak during the Reagan administration in our timeline. This increased military spending would have exacerbated inflation during the late 1970s and required either higher taxes or larger budget deficits, potentially delaying economic recovery in the 1980s.

For the Soviet Union, the economic consequences would have been far more severe. The historical Soviet defense burden—estimated at 15-17% of GDP during the late 1970s—might have reached an unsustainable 20-25% in this alternate timeline. This massive military spending would have further deprived the civilian economy of resources and innovation, accelerating the technological gap with the West and deepening economic stagnation.

The forced prioritization of heavy industry and military production would have worsened consumer goods shortages in the Eastern Bloc, potentially triggering broader unrest earlier than occurred historically. Soviet leaders would have faced increasingly difficult choices between maintaining military competition and addressing domestic economic problems.

Globally, the increased military spending would have diverted resources from development, environmental protection, and poverty reduction. The economic progress seen in developing nations during the 1980s and 1990s might have been significantly curtailed, with lasting consequences for global poverty and inequality.

Geopolitical Realignments (1980-2000)

The failure of SALT would have altered the trajectory of the Cold War in fundamental ways. Without the diplomatic framework established by arms control, superpower competition would have remained more confrontational, with higher risks of direct conflict.

China's opening to the West, which began with Nixon's 1972 visit, might have proceeded differently. Beijing would have viewed both superpowers as more aggressive and unpredictable, potentially leading to a more cautious approach to international engagement. China might have accelerated its own nuclear modernization program in response to the unconstrained U.S.-Soviet arms race, creating a more complex trilateral nuclear competition by the 1990s.

Regional conflicts would have carried higher risks of superpower involvement and escalation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which in our timeline led to the collapse of détente, would have occurred in an already far more confrontational environment. The U.S. response might have been more direct, potentially including not just support for Afghan insurgents but more aggressive measures against Soviet interests worldwide.

The absence of the arms control process would have complicated management of the Cold War's final chapter. Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 might have been delayed or prevented entirely if Soviet hardliners had maintained greater influence due to heightened international tensions. Without the foundation laid by SALT, the dramatic arms reduction agreements of the late 1980s and early 1990s (INF Treaty and START) would have been far more difficult to achieve, potentially prolonging the Cold War.

Nuclear Proliferation and Global Security Architecture (1980-2025)

Perhaps the most consequential long-term impact would have been on nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, was strengthened by superpower arms control efforts that demonstrated commitment to Article VI's disarmament obligations. Without this commitment, the NPT regime would have been significantly weakened.

Countries with nuclear ambitions would have faced less normative pressure against pursuing weapons programs. Nations like South Africa (which developed nuclear weapons but dismantled them in the early 1990s) might have maintained their arsenals. India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" might have led to a more rapid development of an operational weapons capability, potentially triggering earlier Pakistani nuclearization.

The threshold nuclear states of the 1980s—including Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Taiwan—might have crossed the nuclear threshold rather than abandoning their programs. By 2025, instead of the nine nuclear-armed states of our timeline, this alternate world might contain 15-20 nuclear weapons states, creating a far more complex and potentially unstable strategic environment.

The international security architecture would have evolved differently without the cooperative framework established by arms control. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which in our timeline emerged from the détente era and eventually transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), might never have developed into a meaningful forum. Regional security organizations would have focused more exclusively on military deterrence rather than cooperative security approaches.

By 2025, this alternate world would likely feature higher military spending, more numerous and diverse nuclear arsenals, weaker international institutions, and greater risk of both conventional and nuclear conflict. The absence of SALT would have represented not just a missed opportunity for arms limitation, but the loss of a crucial framework for managing international security in the nuclear age.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Richard Garwin, physicist and long-time defense consultant who helped design the first hydrogen bomb, offers this perspective: "The failure of SALT would have been catastrophic for strategic stability. Without the ABM Treaty's constraints on missile defenses, both sides would have poured resources into largely ineffective defensive systems, while simultaneously expanding their offensive capabilities to overcome the other side's defenses. This action-reaction cycle would have created a far more dangerous world while making both sides less secure. The economic costs would have been staggering, but the increased risk of nuclear war—through miscalculation, technical failure, or the breakdown of command and control during a crisis—would have been the truly frightening consequence."

Dr. Elena Kamenskaya, Professor of Soviet Studies at Moscow State University and former advisor to the Russian Foreign Ministry, provides a different assessment: "While the conventional Western view holds that SALT benefited both superpowers, many in the Soviet military establishment believed the treaties disproportionately constrained Soviet advantages in heavy ICBMs while allowing American technological superiority in MIRV technology and bomber capabilities. Without SALT, the Soviet Union would have deployed a much larger ICBM force—providing a counterweight to NATO's advantages in other areas. However, the economic consequences would have been severe, potentially accelerating the economic crisis that ultimately contributed to Soviet collapse. The increased defense burden might have forced reform earlier, but under more difficult circumstances."

Ambassador Thomas Graham, former Special Representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament during the Clinton Administration, emphasizes the broader implications: "SALT represented more than just numbers of weapons—it created a framework for strategic dialogue that helped manage the Cold War. Without this process, every regional crisis from Angola to Afghanistan would have carried greater escalation risks. Moreover, the NPT regime would have been severely undermined without the superpowers' demonstrated commitment to eventual disarmament. The resulting wave of proliferation would have created a multipolar nuclear world decades earlier, with all the attendant instabilities. Perhaps most importantly, SALT established verification principles and built expertise on both sides that ultimately facilitated the more dramatic arms reductions at the Cold War's end. Without this foundation, the peaceful resolution of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry might have proven far more elusive."