What If The Scorpion Submarine Never Disappeared?

The Actual History

On May 22, 1968, the U.S. Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589) disappeared in the Atlantic Ocean while returning to its homeport at Norfolk, Virginia. The Scorpion, a Skipjack-class submarine commissioned in 1960, was completing a deployment to the Mediterranean Sea, operating as part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet during heightened Cold War tensions. The submarine had departed from Naval Base Rota in Spain on May 16, with 99 officers and crew aboard.

When Scorpion failed to arrive in Norfolk on May 27 as scheduled, the Navy initiated a massive search operation. Unlike the highly publicized loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) five years earlier, which prompted immediate search efforts when communications were lost during a test dive, Scorpion's disappearance was initially treated as a possible communications failure. The delay in recognizing the emergency meant that search efforts began days after the actual loss.

On June 5, 1968, Scorpion was officially declared "presumed lost with all hands." After an extensive search covering more than 700,000 square miles of ocean, the wreckage was eventually discovered by the oceanographic research ship USNS Mizar on October 30, 1968. The submarine was found 400 miles southwest of the Azores at a depth of approximately 10,000 feet (3,000 meters), broken into two major sections.

The Navy convened a Court of Inquiry which deliberated for months but could not conclusively determine the cause of the submarine's loss. Several theories emerged over the decades:

A torpedo accident, possibly involving a "hot-running" torpedo that activated inside the submarine
A catastrophic battery explosion
A sudden flooding event
A piping system failure leading to a major leak
Soviet military action (though officially discounted by both U.S. and Russian authorities)

Following a detailed forensic analysis of acoustic data in the 1990s, Dr. John Craven, former chief scientist of the U.S. Navy's Special Projects program, concluded that the most likely cause was an internal mechanical failure that led to uncontrolled flooding. The submarine likely imploded as it passed through crush depth.

The Scorpion disaster, along with the earlier Thresher incident, prompted significant changes in the U.S. Navy's SUBSAFE program—a quality assurance initiative designed to maintain the safety of the nuclear submarine fleet. The loss of Scorpion remains one of the most significant peacetime losses in U.S. Navy history and continues to be studied by naval engineers and historians as a critical case in understanding submarine safety.

The disaster's legacy extends beyond technical improvements; it deeply affected the submarine community, Naval policy, and the families of the 99 men lost. The site is now considered a war grave, and the Scorpion's sailors are memorialized at locations including Norfolk Naval Station and Arlington National Cemetery.

The Point of Divergence

What if the USS Scorpion never disappeared in May 1968? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where whatever catastrophic sequence of events that doomed the submarine in our reality was somehow averted, allowing the vessel and her 99 crew members to safely return to Norfolk.

Several plausible divergences could explain the Scorpion's survival:

Mechanical Intervention: If the leading theory about a mechanical failure is correct, perhaps in this alternate timeline, a vigilant crew member noticed early warning signs—unusual sounds, minor leaks, or instrumentation anomalies—prompting emergency repairs before the situation became catastrophic. The submarine's machinist's mates might have identified and isolated a failing pipe or valve system before it led to uncontrollable flooding.
Alternative Routing Decision: Captain Francis Slattery might have chosen a slightly different return route across the Atlantic, avoiding the extreme water pressure differentials or underwater geological features that some theories suggest could have contributed to the disaster. Naval historians have noted that the Scorpion's last known position was near an area with complex and potentially turbulent underwater terrain.
Equipment Handling Difference: If the "hot-running torpedo" theory holds merit, perhaps in this timeline, different ammunition handling procedures were followed, or a problematic Mark 37 torpedo was identified before activation. Even minor procedural changes during weapons system maintenance could have prevented a catastrophic accident.
Communications Variation: Some theories suggest the Scorpion may have been monitoring Soviet naval activities when disaster struck. In our alternate timeline, different communications or surveillance orders from Naval Command might have positioned the submarine away from a dangerous encounter or pressured operational environment.
Electrical Systems Management: Given that battery explosions remain among the plausible causes, perhaps different electrical load management decisions during the return journey prevented the cascade of failures that may have doomed the vessel.

The most probable divergence combines several of these elements—an early warning sign detected by an alert crew member, followed by decisive action by Captain Slattery and his officers to address the emerging situation before it escalated beyond control. In this timeline, rather than a mysterious disappearance and tragic loss, the Scorpion's May 1968 deployment would have concluded with a routine, if perhaps somewhat eventful, return to port.

Immediate Aftermath

Continued Service in a Tense Cold War Environment

In our alternate timeline, USS Scorpion returns to Naval Station Norfolk on or near its scheduled arrival date of May 27, 1968, greeted by the routine welcome of families and naval personnel awaiting a submarine completing a standard Mediterranean deployment. While the crew might have reported some mechanical issues requiring maintenance, these would have been handled through normal naval repair procedures.

The Scorpion would likely have entered a standard maintenance period following its deployment, addressing any wear and tear accumulated during operations. Unlike our timeline, where the Scorpion's loss prompted immediate soul-searching within the submarine force, in this alternate scenario, the submarine would have continued as one of the workhorses of America's nuclear attack submarine fleet.

Impact on U.S. Naval Strategy and Operations

The continued presence of Scorpion would have maintained the U.S. Navy's projected submarine force levels during a critical period of Cold War tensions. 1968 was a particularly volatile year in the Cold War, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurring just months after Scorpion would have returned. The submarine would likely have been prepared for rapid deployment if the Czechoslovakian crisis had escalated further.

Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear navy, would not have had to confront the loss of another nuclear submarine on his watch. In our timeline, the loss of both Thresher and Scorpion within five years raised significant questions about submarine safety. Without the Scorpion tragedy, Rickover's focus might have remained more on expanding capabilities rather than addressing safety concerns, potentially accelerating submarine development programs.

The operational tempo for attack submarines like Scorpion would have remained high. By 1968, the Soviet Union was rapidly expanding its submarine fleet, and U.S. attack submarines were essential in tracking Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Scorpion would have continued to play a crucial role in these shadowing operations throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Technological and Safety Developments

Without the second major submarine disaster in five years, the Navy's SUBSAFE program—initiated after the Thresher loss—might have evolved differently. In our timeline, the Scorpion incident reinforced and intensified safety protocols; in this alternate reality, the SUBSAFE program would still exist but might have developed more gradually without the urgency created by a second disaster.

Captain Slattery and several of his officers would likely have continued their naval careers, bringing their accumulated submarine expertise to future commands and potentially influencing naval policy throughout the 1970s. The 99 men who perished with Scorpion in our timeline would instead have continued their service, with many eventually rising to senior positions within the submarine force and broader Navy.

Intelligence Implications

The Scorpion's final deployment included intelligence gathering on Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean. In our alternate timeline, the data collected during this mission would have been successfully delivered to naval intelligence, potentially providing valuable insights into Soviet capabilities and operations. If Scorpion had indeed been monitoring specific Soviet vessels or activities before its loss in our timeline, the successful completion of this mission might have yielded intelligence advantages.

Some conspiracy theories in our timeline suggested Soviet involvement in Scorpion's disappearance (though these have been generally dismissed by serious historians and naval authorities). In an alternate timeline where Scorpion returned safely, these Cold War tensions might have played out differently, perhaps with less suspicion between the superpowers on this particular front, though overall Cold War naval confrontations would have continued unabated.

Public and Political Reaction

The safe return of Scorpion would have meant no dramatic headlines about a missing submarine, no agonizing wait for families, and no national mourning for lost sailors. The American public would have remained largely unaware of the submarine's routine deployment, as was typical for most submarine operations during this era of classified Cold War activities.

Within the political sphere, the Navy would have avoided congressional inquiries into submarine safety that followed the Scorpion's loss in our timeline. Defense budget allocations might have been marginally different, without the pressure to address perceived safety issues in the submarine fleet that emerged after losing two submarines in five years.

Long-term Impact

Evolution of Naval Submarine Forces (1970s-1980s)

Different Development Path for Los Angeles-class Submarines

The loss of both Thresher and Scorpion in our timeline heavily influenced the design of subsequent submarine classes. In this alternate reality, with only the Thresher disaster as a reference point, the Los Angeles-class submarines (whose design was being finalized in the late 1960s) might have incorporated different features and capabilities.

Without the specific lessons learned from the Scorpion investigation, the Los Angeles boats might have featured more aggressive performance specifications and potentially different safety systems. The first Los Angeles-class submarine was commissioned in 1976, and the class eventually grew to 62 vessels—the backbone of the U.S. attack submarine fleet. Even subtle design differences would have multiplied across this large class, potentially altering the nature of underwater warfare capabilities.

Altered Force Structure and Deployment Patterns

The continued service of Scorpion would have maintained the planned submarine force levels, potentially allowing for different deployment patterns during the tense 1970s. Specific missions in the Mediterranean, which became critical during Arab-Israeli conflicts, might have included Scorpion among the available assets. The submarine would likely have participated in surveillance of the growing Soviet Mediterranean squadron, which expanded significantly in the early 1970s.

By the mid-to-late 1970s, assuming a typical service life, Scorpion would have undergone a major refueling and overhaul, extending its operational capacity into the 1980s. This would have coincided with the Reagan-era naval buildup, where every available submarine was valuable in maintaining America's undersea advantage over the Soviet Union.

Impact on Cold War Naval Dynamics (1970s-1990s)

Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering

The continued presence of Scorpion would have provided the Navy with an additional platform for monitoring Soviet naval activities during the height of the Cold War. Attack submarines like Scorpion were essential in tracking Soviet ballistic missile submarines and gathering intelligence on new Soviet submarine capabilities.

This intelligence function became increasingly important in the late 1970s and 1980s as the Soviet Union deployed more advanced submarine classes like the Victor III and Akula. Having additional experienced submarine crews—particularly those who would have advanced from Scorpion's complement to command positions on newer submarines—might have provided marginal but important advantages in this undersea chess game.

Crisis Response Capabilities

During several Cold War crises, including the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its aftermath, when nuclear forces were placed on heightened alert, having additional nuclear attack submarines available for rapid deployment could have altered specific tactical situations. While one submarine would not have changed the strategic balance, its presence in a particular crisis area might have influenced Soviet calculations or provided critical intelligence.

Technical and Procedural Evolution

Modified SUBSAFE Program Development

The SUBSAFE program, established after the USS Thresher disaster, would have evolved differently without the reinforcing impact of the Scorpion loss. While still rigorous, it might have been seen as addressing a single incident rather than a potential pattern of failures. This could have resulted in somewhat different certification procedures and potentially a different balance between performance and safety considerations in submarine design.

The absence of the Scorpion disaster might have altered the Navy's approach to submarine acoustics and silencing technologies as well. In our timeline, analysis of the Scorpion wreckage provided valuable information about structural failure modes that influenced later designs. Without this data, submarine hull and systems designs might have followed a slightly different evolutionary path.

Crew Training and Emergency Procedures

Emergency procedure training would have developed along a different trajectory without the specific lessons derived from theories about Scorpion's loss. In our timeline, scenarios based on the leading theories of the Scorpion disaster became standard training elements. In this alternate timeline, different incident scenarios might have been emphasized in training programs.

Geopolitical Implications Through the End of the Cold War

U.S.-Soviet Naval Relations

The mysterious loss of Scorpion contributed to mutual suspicion between U.S. and Soviet naval forces, despite official denials of any hostile action. In an alternate timeline where Scorpion safely returned, this particular source of tension would have been absent, potentially allowing for marginally less adversarial naval interactions during the 1970s.

This might have been particularly relevant during the periods of détente, where the absence of the Scorpion incident could have facilitated somewhat more productive naval arms limitation discussions. However, the fundamental Cold War competition would have continued largely unchanged by a single submarine's survival.

Post-Cold War Transition

By the 1990s, Scorpion would have been approaching the end of its service life. As the Cold War concluded, the submarine might have been decommissioned along with many others during the post-Cold War drawdown. However, the expertise of its crew members—many of whom would have risen to senior leadership positions by this time—would have influenced how the submarine force transitioned to post-Cold War missions.

Legacy and Historical Understanding (2000s-Present)

Different Historical Focus

In our timeline, the Scorpion disaster remains one of the most studied submarine losses, with books, documentaries, and technical analyses examining the various theories. In this alternate timeline, naval historians would instead study different incidents, and the Scorpion would be remembered—if at all—simply as one of many submarines that served during the Cold War.

The families of the 99 men lost with Scorpion would have had dramatically different lives. Children who grew up without fathers in our timeline would have had their parents present. Some of these individuals, who might have led ordinary lives in our timeline, could have made significant contributions in various fields in this alternate reality.

Modern Submarine Design Influence

Modern submarine safety systems, which incorporate lessons from both Thresher and Scorpion disasters, would have developed differently. While the Thresher incident alone would still have driven significant safety improvements, the specific influences of the Scorpion case would be absent. This might have resulted in subtly different approaches to certain systems, particularly those involving weapons handling, battery systems, or emergency surfacing capabilities.

By 2025, this alternative historical path would have produced a submarine force with slightly different characteristics and operational approaches—the cumulative result of thousands of small decisions made differently without the shadow of the Scorpion disaster influencing submarine development over the preceding five decades.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Norman Friedman, Naval Historian and author of numerous books on submarine warfare, offers this perspective: "The loss of Scorpion in 1968 represented a pivotal moment in U.S. submarine development. Had the submarine returned safely, we might have seen a more aggressive pursuit of performance in subsequent designs, particularly the Los Angeles class. The Scorpion disaster, coming just five years after Thresher, created a powerful institutional emphasis on safety that occasionally came at the expense of tactical capabilities. Without that second disaster reinforcing safety concerns, the balance between performance and safety might have tilted differently during the crucial submarine development programs of the 1970s and 1980s. That said, it's important to remember that the fundamental trajectory of the Cold War underwater chess match would likely have remained largely unchanged by a single submarine's survival."

Rear Admiral William Houston (Ret.), former submarine commander and Naval strategist, suggests: "What often gets overlooked in these counterfactual scenarios is the human element. Had Scorpion not been lost, Captain Slattery and many of his officers would likely have continued to rise through the ranks, potentially commanding future submarines and perhaps reaching flag rank by the 1980s. Their perspectives, shaped by their experiences on Scorpion, might have influenced submarine force policy during the critical latter stages of the Cold War. Beyond strategic considerations, we must also consider the 99 families who wouldn't have suffered devastating losses. Some of those sailors' children, who grew up without fathers in our timeline, might have followed their fathers into naval service or made contributions in entirely different fields. The ripple effects of 99 lives continuing rather than ending prematurely extend far beyond naval operations."

Dr. Katherine Epstein, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, provides this analysis: "The Scorpion incident occurred during a period when submarine intelligence gathering was taking on increasing importance in the Cold War naval balance. If Scorpion had returned safely, whatever intelligence it had gathered during its final deployment would have been properly analyzed and disseminated. More importantly, the Navy wouldn't have had to divert significant resources to the massive search operation and subsequent investigation. From a broader perspective, the absence of the Scorpion disaster might have allowed slightly more transparent naval communications between the superpowers during the early détente period, as mutual suspicions about the incident—which persisted despite official denials—would never have materialized. That said, we should be careful not to overstate this effect; Cold War naval competition was driven by deep structural factors that the fate of a single submarine wouldn't fundamentally alter."