What If The Security Council Had Different Permanent Members?

The Actual History

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established in 1945 as one of the principal organs of the newly formed United Nations. Following the failures of the League of Nations and the devastation of World War II, the victorious Allied powers sought to create a more effective international body to maintain peace and security. The UNSC was designed with five permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China—each granted veto power over substantive resolutions.

This structure reflected the geopolitical realities at the end of World War II. The permanent members, often referred to as the "P5," were the main victorious powers of the war and the dominant military and political forces globally. The United States and Soviet Union were emerging as the two superpowers, while the United Kingdom and France remained significant colonial powers despite their diminishing global influence. The Republic of China (which later became Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War) initially held the China seat until 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly voted to recognize the People's Republic of China instead.

The veto power granted to the P5 was a critical feature, allowing any permanent member to block substantive resolutions regardless of how the other members voted. This mechanism was seen as necessary to secure the participation of the major powers, particularly the United States and Soviet Union, who might otherwise have been reluctant to join an organization that could act against their interests.

Throughout the Cold War (1947-1991), the Security Council was often paralyzed by ideological divisions between the Western bloc (led by the US) and the Eastern bloc (led by the USSR). Both superpowers frequently used their veto power to block resolutions unfavorable to their geopolitical interests or those of their allies. Between 1945 and 1990, the Soviet Union cast 119 vetoes, the United States 69, the UK 30, France 18, and China only 4.

As decolonization transformed the global landscape and more nations gained independence, criticism of the Security Council's structure intensified. Many newly independent states and emerging powers argued that the Council no longer represented the contemporary distribution of global power or geographic diversity. By the 1990s, countries such as India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa began advocating for permanent seats of their own, pointing to their significant economic, demographic, or regional importance.

Several reform proposals have been put forward over the decades, including expanding the number of permanent members (with or without veto power), creating a new category of semi-permanent members with longer terms, or increasing the number of non-permanent members. The "G4" nations (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) have jointly pushed for permanent seats, while the "Uniting for Consensus" group (including countries like Italy, Pakistan, and Argentina) has opposed adding new permanent members but supported expanding non-permanent membership.

Despite widespread agreement that the Council needs reform to enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness, no significant structural changes have been implemented. The P5's veto power extends to any amendments to the UN Charter, effectively allowing them to block any reforms that might dilute their privileged status. As of 2025, the Security Council remains structured much as it was in 1945, even as the global distribution of power has dramatically shifted and numerous conflicts have exposed the limitations of the current system.

The Point of Divergence

What if the United Nations Security Council had been established with a different configuration of permanent members? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the intense negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944) and the San Francisco Conference (1945) produced a significantly different Security Council structure.

Several plausible mechanisms could have led to this divergence:

First, the influence of smaller nations might have been stronger. In our timeline, the "Four Policemen" concept (the US, UK, USSR, and China) was expanded to include France at Churchill's insistence. However, if middle powers like Canada, Australia, and Brazil had formed a more effective coalition during the founding conferences, they might have successfully argued for a broader representation of regions and emerging powers.

Second, a different outcome of World War II could have altered the negotiating positions. Had the war ended with different power dynamics—perhaps with the Soviet Union playing an even greater role in defeating Nazi Germany, or if China under Chiang Kai-shek had contributed more decisively to the defeat of Japan—the balance of influence at the founding conferences might have shifted.

Third, Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision for the postwar order could have prevailed more completely. Roosevelt initially envisioned a Security Council with four permanent members (excluding France) but with additional regional representatives. Had he not died in April 1945, just before the San Francisco Conference, his continued leadership might have shaped a Security Council with greater regional representation.

Fourth, colonial independence movements might have gained international recognition earlier. If India, which participated in the San Francisco Conference despite still being under British rule, had been granted more autonomy in expressing its positions, it could have successfully advocated for representation of soon-to-be independent nations.

In this alternate timeline, the negotiations resulted in a Security Council with seven permanent members instead of five: the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China, India, Brazil, and Egypt. This configuration deliberately incorporated representatives from each major continent, acknowledging both the traditional European powers and the emerging importance of developing regions. The veto power was modified to require at least two permanent members to block a resolution, preventing unilateral obstruction while still protecting major powers' core interests.

This more inclusive structure fundamentally altered the dynamics of global governance in the postwar era, setting the stage for a significantly different development of international relations throughout the Cold War and beyond.

Immediate Aftermath

Shifting Cold War Dynamics

The expanded and more regionally diverse Security Council immediately altered the dynamics of the emerging Cold War. With the requirement for two permanent members to join in a veto, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could unilaterally block resolutions. This forced both superpowers to cultivate stronger relationships with other permanent members to protect their interests.

The Soviet Union initially viewed this development with alarm, as the Western-aligned members (UK, Brazil) outnumbered their potential allies. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin intensified diplomatic outreach to India, which under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was pursuing a policy of non-alignment. Soviet economic and technical assistance to India began earlier and at a larger scale than in our timeline, as Moscow sought to secure a reliable partner on the Security Council.

The United States, meanwhile, found its freedom of action somewhat constrained. Secretary of State George Marshall directed American diplomats to establish deeper ties with Brazil and Egypt, seeing them as potential counterweights to Soviet influence. This accelerated American withdrawal of support for European colonial powers, as maintaining good relations with postcolonial states on the Council became a strategic priority.

Decolonization and Regional Representation

The presence of India, Brazil, and Egypt as permanent members significantly accelerated the decolonization process. In 1947, when the question of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands came before the Security Council, the traditional European powers could not block intervention as they might have in our timeline. With strong support from the non-Western permanent members, the UN took a more active role in mediating the Indonesian National Revolution, leading to Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by 1949, several years earlier than in our timeline.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 unfolded very differently. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, its status as a permanent member made the Anglo-French-Israeli military intervention politically untenable. The UK, unable to secure the necessary second veto to protect its actions, faced unprecedented diplomatic isolation. Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned even sooner than in our actual history, and British imperial retreat accelerated dramatically.

France, excluded from permanent membership, pursued an even more independent foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle, accelerating its development of nuclear weapons and establishing itself as a third force in Western Europe, distinct from the Anglo-American alliance.

UN Peacekeeping and Intervention

The modified veto requirement allowed the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping missions more readily during the 1950s and 1960s. The first major test came with the Korean War in 1950. With the Soviet delegate unable to single-handedly block UN intervention (and failing to secure India's support for a joint veto), the UN-authorized defense of South Korea proceeded with broader international participation.

This pattern continued with the creation of the first formal UN peacekeeping force during the Suez Crisis, which in this timeline was deployed with a stronger mandate and greater resources due to Egyptian influence on the Council. Throughout the Congo Crisis (1960-1965), the UN operation was more robust and effective, with Brazilian and Indian peacekeepers playing prominent roles alongside contingents from Western nations.

Economic Development and North-South Dialogue

The presence of developing nations as permanent members forced earlier attention to economic development issues at the Security Council. Brazil successfully advocated for the establishment of the UN Development Programme in 1958, several years earlier than in our timeline, with a larger initial budget and mandate.

India, drawing on its own experience with planned economic development, pushed for greater technical assistance programs for newly independent nations. This led to the creation of a specialized UN agency for industrial development in 1960, preceding our timeline's UNIDO by several years.

The altered Council structure also enabled what became known as the "North-South Dialogue" to begin much earlier and with greater institutional support. By 1962, development issues were regularly discussed alongside traditional security concerns in Council meetings, creating a more holistic approach to international security that recognized the connections between poverty, instability, and conflict.

Long-term Impact

Transformation of Cold War Alliances

As the Cold War progressed through the 1960s and 1970s, the more diverse Security Council fundamentally altered alliance structures. The rigid bipolar system of our timeline gave way to a more fluid, multipolar arrangement, with the non-aligned permanent members exercising significant influence.

The Non-Aligned Movement

India, already a founding leader of the Non-Aligned Movement in our timeline, wielded substantially more influence in this alternate history. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-1977, 1980-1984) used India's permanent seat to institutionalize non-alignment as a respected diplomatic position rather than a marginalized "third way." By the mid-1970s, the Non-Aligned Movement functioned as a genuine third bloc in international politics, with India serving as its representative on the Security Council.

Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successors, similarly leveraged its permanent seat to advocate for Arab and African interests. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars played out differently, with Egypt's Security Council status forcing earlier and more substantive international mediation. The Camp David Accords of 1978 were preceded by UN-brokered preliminary agreements, making the final peace more stable and comprehensive.

Brazil, initially aligned with the United States, gradually charted a more independent course under Presidents Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart. When military rule began in 1964, Brazil's international standing as a permanent member made the United States more cautious in supporting the regime. By the 1980s, with democratization, Brazil had established itself as the leading voice for Latin American interests in global governance.

Modified Superpower Competition

The requirement for coalition-building to exercise veto power forced both superpowers to moderate their more extreme Cold War policies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 faced immediate Security Council condemnation when the USSR failed to secure India's support for a blocking veto. The resulting resolution, while not preventing the invasion, imposed significant diplomatic costs on Moscow and contributed to broader international support for Afghan resistance.

Similarly, controversial US interventions in Latin America faced greater scrutiny and constraint. When the Reagan administration sought to escalate support for the Contras in Nicaragua during the early 1980s, Brazil's opposition in the Security Council forced a more measured approach and earlier negotiated settlements in Central American conflicts.

Regional Integration and Security Mechanisms

The presence of regional powers as permanent members accelerated the development of regional integration organizations. The Organization of American States (OAS) evolved more rapidly into an effective security mechanism with Brazil's backing, while the Organization of African Unity (OAU) received stronger Egyptian support and established more robust peacekeeping capabilities by the 1970s.

In South Asia, India's permanent membership created incentives for regional cooperation. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1976, nearly a decade earlier than in our timeline, and with more substantive security and economic cooperation mechanisms.

The End of the Cold War and Post-Soviet Transition

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 occurred through broadly similar mechanisms as in our timeline, but the transition period was managed with greater international coordination. The Security Council, with its more diverse membership, established special working groups to address nuclear security, economic transition, and humanitarian needs in the former Soviet republics.

Russia's inheritance of the Soviet seat was still recognized, but the process involved more substantial commitments to international norms and cooperation. President Boris Yeltsin, needing international legitimacy and support, agreed to more transparent monitoring of nuclear stockpiles and greater UN involvement in managing conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

Post-Cold War Interventions and the Responsibility to Protect

The genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1992-1995) tested the reformed Security Council structure. In both cases, the requirement for multiple vetoes allowed for earlier and more decisive intervention than in our timeline. While neither tragedy was entirely prevented, the UN response was significantly more robust.

In Rwanda, an expanded peacekeeping force was authorized in April 1994 as the genocide began, rather than withdrawn as happened in our actual history. In Bosnia, UN safe areas received stronger protection mandates and resources, reducing the scale of atrocities like the Srebrenica massacre.

These relative successes accelerated the development of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine. By 2001, the Security Council had formally adopted principles establishing criteria for humanitarian intervention, providing a more structured framework than exists in our timeline.

Contemporary Global Governance (2000-2025)

By the early 21st century, the Security Council's different composition had yielded a more balanced approach to global security challenges. The response to the September 11, 2001 attacks still included strong international solidarity, but military interventions were subjected to greater multilateral oversight.

The 2003 Iraq War unfolded very differently. Without the ability to unilaterally veto resolutions, the United States needed to build broader consensus. The resulting operation was authorized only with stricter conditions, mandatory UN weapons inspections, and a clear exit strategy. The UN maintained primary authority over Iraq's political transition, avoiding many of the governance failures that plagued our timeline's occupation.

Climate security emerged as a Security Council priority much earlier in this alternate timeline. With Brazil's advocacy for Amazon protection and India's vulnerability to climate impacts, the Council recognized climate change as a security threat in 2007, establishing monitoring mechanisms and authorizing assistance for climate adaptation as part of conflict prevention.

By 2025, the Security Council in this alternate timeline continues to face criticism over representation—with calls for African rotation, Japanese inclusion, and European consolidation—but its fundamental legitimacy is stronger than in our world. Its more diverse permanent membership has enabled it to address a wider range of security challenges, from traditional armed conflicts to human security issues like pandemics, climate disasters, and mass migration, with greater effectiveness and global support.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Amrita Narlikar, Professor of International Relations at the University of Hamburg, offers this perspective: "The inclusion of Global South powers as permanent Security Council members from its inception would have fundamentally altered the postcolonial power dynamics of the 20th century. Instead of international institutions being perceived as Western impositions, they would have had greater legitimacy as genuinely multilateral creations. India, Brazil, and Egypt would have developed different diplomatic traditions—less oppositional and more constructive—while Western powers would have learned earlier to accommodate non-Western perspectives and priorities. The result would likely be a more balanced international order today, with stronger norms of multilateral cooperation and less North-South polarization."

Professor Thomas G. Weiss, Distinguished Scholar at the CUNY Graduate Center and former president of the International Studies Association, notes: "The modified veto requirement—needing two permanent members to block a resolution—represents the road not taken in 1945. This small but crucial design change would have addressed the fundamental flaw in the Security Council that has hampered its effectiveness for eight decades. The UN would still have secured great power participation while avoiding unilateral obstruction. During the Cold War, this would have prevented the most egregious cases of Council paralysis, while in the post-Cold War era, it would have enabled more consistent responses to mass atrocities. The requirement for coalition-building would have encouraged a diplomatic culture of compromise rather than confrontation."

Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, former Singapore Permanent Representative to the UN and Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, provides this analysis: "A Security Council with permanent members from Asia, Latin America, and Africa would have accelerated the end of colonialism and created a more genuine rules-based international order. Western powers would have been forced to align their actions with their stated principles much earlier, as they could not simply protect their interests through the veto. However, we should not be naive about power politics. The Global South permanent members would have faced immense pressure from the superpowers during the Cold War, and they would have had to navigate treacherous geopolitical waters to maintain their independence. The ultimate success of this alternate system would depend on whether these regional powers could develop sufficient economic and military capability to act as genuine balancers rather than clients of the superpowers."