What If The Suez Canal Was Never Built?

The Actual History

The Suez Canal stands as one of humanity's most transformative engineering achievements, fundamentally altering global trade, imperial power dynamics, and the geopolitical significance of Egypt and the surrounding region.

The concept of connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas dates back millennia. Ancient Egyptians constructed primitive canal systems as early as the 13th century BCE under Ramses II. Later, around 600 BCE, Pharaoh Necho II attempted but never completed a more ambitious canal. Subsequent rulers including Persian King Darius I, Ptolemy II, and Roman Emperor Trajan each maintained or extended versions of these waterways, though these early canals typically connected the Red Sea to the Nile River rather than directly to the Mediterranean.

The modern Suez Canal emerged from 19th-century imperial ambitions and technological advances. In 1854, French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps secured a concession from Egyptian ruler Said Pasha to create and operate a canal company. The Suez Canal Company was established in 1858, funded primarily by French private investors, though the Egyptian government held significant shares. Construction began in April 1859, employing initially forced Egyptian labor (the corvée system) before shifting to mechanical dredgers and paid labor after international criticism.

After a decade of engineering challenges, financial difficulties, and diplomatic maneuvers, the canal opened on November 17, 1869, with elaborate ceremonies attended by European royalty and dignitaries. The 164-kilometer waterway reduced the sailing distance between London and Bombay by approximately 5,500 miles, eliminating the need to circumnavigate Africa.

The canal quickly became vital to European imperial powers, particularly Britain, which depended on it for access to its Indian colonies. In 1875, facing financial crisis, Egypt's Khedive Ismail sold his government's canal shares to Britain, giving the British a major stake in the operation. Britain's concern for the canal's security significantly shaped its foreign policy, contributing to its 1882 occupation of Egypt.

During both World Wars, the Suez Canal proved a critical strategic asset. Following the Second World War, rising Egyptian nationalism focused on the canal as a symbol of continued European influence. In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal, triggering the Suez Crisis when Britain, France, and Israel launched a military intervention that ultimately failed due to American and Soviet opposition.

The canal was closed twice due to Arab-Israeli conflicts: from 1956-1957 and more significantly from 1967-1975 following the Six-Day War. These closures demonstrated the waterway's continued importance to global trade, forcing ships to revert to the longer route around Africa.

In the modern era, Egypt has expanded the canal's capacity, most notably with the "New Suez Canal" project completed in 2015, which deepened the main waterway and created a 35km parallel channel to allow two-way traffic. Today, approximately 12% of global trade passes through the Suez Canal, which generates roughly $5-6 billion in annual revenue for Egypt. The canal's strategic importance was underscored in March 2021 when the container ship Ever Given ran aground, blocking the waterway for six days and disrupting global supply chains with estimated costs of $9 billion daily.

The Point of Divergence

What if the Suez Canal was never built? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the ambitious project to connect the Mediterranean and Red Seas failed to materialize in the 19th century, profoundly altering the course of global trade, imperial expansion, and Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Several plausible divergence points could have prevented the canal's construction:

First, Ferdinand de Lesseps might have failed to secure the crucial concession from Said Pasha in 1854. The Ottoman Empire, which held nominal sovereignty over Egypt, initially opposed the project fearing British influence would increase at their expense. In our timeline, de Lesseps leveraged his personal friendship with Said (formed when de Lesseps' father served as French consul in Egypt) to overcome this resistance. If Said had yielded to Ottoman pressure or if de Lesseps had not enjoyed this fortuitous connection, the concession might never have been granted.

Alternatively, the project could have collapsed financially. The Suez Canal Company struggled to attract sufficient investment, with French citizens eventually purchasing nearly half the shares while the Egyptian government took on significant debt to finance their portion. Had the 1855-1858 subscription period failed more dramatically—perhaps due to greater British opposition (initially they viewed the project as benefiting French interests) or a European financial crisis—the company might have dissolved before construction began.

A third possibility involves technical failures during construction. The canal faced enormous engineering challenges, including the need to excavate approximately 74 million cubic meters of sand and develop new dredging technologies. More severe technical setbacks, unsurmountable engineering problems in the difficult desert terrain, or the inability to solve the fresh water supply issues for workers could have rendered the project unviable.

Finally, political upheaval could have terminated the project. The use of corvée labor (essentially forced labor) drew international criticism. Had this practice continued rather than being replaced by mechanical dredgers, growing Egyptian resentment or international pressure might have halted construction. Additionally, European political realignments or a conflict between France and Britain over Egypt could have derailed the decade-long construction effort.

In our alternate timeline, we'll consider a combination of factors: persistent Ottoman opposition persuading Said Pasha to revoke de Lesseps' concession in 1856, followed by insufficient capital raising during the subscription period and growing British diplomatic opposition, culminating in the project's abandonment before substantial construction began.

Immediate Aftermath

Continued Maritime Status Quo

The immediate consequence of the Suez Canal's absence would be the continuation of established global maritime patterns through the 1870s and 1880s:

Preserved Route Around Africa: European vessels bound for Asia would continue navigating around the Cape of Good Hope, maintaining voyage lengths that typically took 3-4 months rather than the 6-8 weeks possible via the Suez route. This longer journey required larger coal supplies, more extensive provisioning, and resulted in higher insurance costs.
Extended Sailing Ship Era: Without the canal shortcut, the transition from sail to steam power might have proceeded more gradually. The canal favored steamships, which could navigate the windless and narrow passage while sailing vessels struggled. In this alternate timeline, the economic advantage of steam-powered vessels would be less pronounced on the longer African route where sailing ships could utilize prevailing winds.
Continued Importance of Coaling Stations: Britain's network of coaling stations along the African route—including Sierra Leone, Cape Town, and Mauritius—would retain greater strategic significance longer, potentially receiving additional investment rather than seeing their importance diminished as occurred after the canal opened.

Altered Egyptian Development

Egypt's trajectory would differ significantly from our timeline:

Financial Stability: Without the massive debt incurred to finance Egypt's portion of the canal project (reaching approximately 100 million francs), Khedive Ismail's government would avoid the financial crisis that ultimately led to foreign financial control and the 1875 sale of Egypt's canal shares to Britain.
Delayed Colonial Control: The absence of direct British investment in the canal would have removed one of Britain's primary motivations for occupying Egypt in 1882. While Egyptian sovereignty might eventually face European encroachment for other reasons—particularly related to cotton production and debt—the specific circumstances and timing would differ substantially.
Different Development Patterns: Without the canal as a focal point, Egyptian infrastructure development would likely concentrate on Nile Delta improvements, Alexandria's port facilities, and the Cairo-Alexandria-Suez railway (which already existed before canal construction). The eastern desert region would remain largely undeveloped, without the new canal cities of Port Said and Ismailia that emerged in our timeline.

Redirected Imperial Strategies

European imperial powers, particularly Britain and France, would adjust their strategies:

Anglo-French Rivalry Redirection: The intense rivalry between Britain and France over canal control that characterized the late 19th century would manifest differently. France might direct more attention toward North Africa (particularly Tunisia and Morocco), while Britain would focus on securing its longer route to India through expanded African coastal possessions.
Russian Strategic Calculus: Russia would continue pursuing warm-water ports with potentially greater focus on the Black Sea and Persian Gulf. The strategic imperative to counter British canal access to India would be replaced by different concerns about British naval dominance around Africa.
Dutch Colonial Advantage: The Netherlands, with its significant East Indies colonies (modern Indonesia), might retain a comparative advantage with its established Cape route expertise and facilities, potentially slowing the relative decline of Dutch colonial power.

Economic Repercussions

The absence of a transformative shortcut between Europe and Asia would reshape economic development patterns:

Higher Shipping Costs: The persistent need to circumnavigate Africa would maintain higher transportation costs for European-Asian trade, potentially slowing the growth of trade volumes by an estimated 20-30% compared to our timeline's canal-enabled expansion.
Delayed Port Development: Red Sea ports like Aden, Jeddah, and Massawa would not experience the rapid growth seen after the canal's opening. Instead, ports along the African coast would remain vital layover points, with Lagos, Luanda, and Durban potentially seeing greater development.
Modified Colonial Resource Exploitation: Higher transportation costs would alter the economic calculations for extracting certain colonial resources. Low-value, high-bulk commodities from Asia might become less profitable to ship to Europe, while African resources along the cape route might see accelerated exploitation due to their relative accessibility.
Ottoman Empire Economic Impact: The Ottoman Empire would avoid losing the transit fees and trade that shifted to the canal, potentially strengthening its economic position in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea regions.

Long-term Impact

Transformed Global Trade Patterns

The absence of the Suez Canal would fundamentally reshape global maritime commerce into the 20th century and beyond:

Enduring Shipping Routes

Cape Route Dominance: The route around Africa would remain the primary connection between Europe and Asia into the modern era. This would necessitate ongoing investment in port infrastructure in southern Africa, creating a more developed maritime service economy in countries like South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique.
Alternate Shortcuts: Without Suez, other potential time-saving routes would gain greater attention. The Panama Canal (completed 1914) might have been constructed earlier with more substantial capacity. Proposals for a Nicaragua Canal would likely have received more serious consideration, potentially resulting in its construction by the mid-20th century as trade volumes demanded additional capacity.
Trans-Continental Railways: Land bridges would gain greater significance. The Trans-Siberian Railway (completed 1916) might have received additional investment and expansion. Similarly, rail networks connecting the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf through the Ottoman territories (later the Berlin-Baghdad Railway) could have developed into major trade arteries by the 1920s.

Economic Development Disparities

Delayed Asian Economic Integration: The higher costs and longer transit times to Asian markets would likely slow the integration of Asian economies into global trade networks. The development of Japan as an industrial power might have proceeded more gradually, while China's economic opening could have been further delayed.
African Economic Rebalancing: The continued importance of the Cape route would create a more economically developed southern cone of Africa, with greater European investment in infrastructure. This might have partially counterbalanced the extractive nature of colonialism, leaving a stronger economic foundation post-independence.
Shipping Technology Evolution: Ship design would evolve differently, with continued emphasis on vessels optimized for longer voyages. The development of containerization (which in our timeline began in the 1960s) might have emerged earlier as a solution to the higher costs of the longer route, driving efficiency gains.

Alternative Colonial Trajectories

The absence of the Suez Canal would significantly alter colonial empires and their eventual dissolution:

British Empire Reconfiguration

Diffused Middle Eastern Focus: Without the strategic imperative to control the canal, Britain's involvement in Egypt and the surrounding region would likely be less intensive. Instead of occupying Egypt in 1882, British imperial attention might have remained more concentrated on India itself and the African territories securing the cape route.
Stronger South African Position: South Africa would retain greater strategic importance as a waypoint to India and the East, potentially receiving additional British investment and migration. This might have created a more entrenched white settler population and possibly delayed or altered the eventual path to majority rule.
Different Indian Independence Timing: The logistical challenges of maintaining control over India without the canal shortcut might have accelerated Britain's withdrawal from the subcontinent, potentially occurring years earlier than the 1947 partition and independence.

Middle East Political Development

Ottoman Longevity: Without the strategic imperative the canal created for European powers to intervene in Egypt and surrounding territories, the Ottoman Empire might have maintained control over its Arab provinces longer. This could have delayed the formation of modern Middle Eastern states or resulted in different boundaries than those drawn after World War I.
Altered Egyptian Nationalism: Egyptian nationalism, which in our timeline often focused on the canal as a symbol of foreign control, would have developed differently. Without the sharp division between canal and non-canal regions of the country, Egyptian political identity might have evolved more cohesively around Nile Valley agrarian interests.
Different Oil Politics: When Middle Eastern oil fields were developed in the early 20th century, their exports would face higher transportation costs to reach European markets. This might have accelerated pipeline development through the Levant to Mediterranean ports and created different political alignments around these alternative export routes.

20th Century Conflicts Reimagined

Major conflicts would unfold differently without the Suez Canal as a strategic focal point:

World Wars Altered

WWI Naval Strategy: During World War I, the absence of the canal would eliminate a key vulnerability for Britain and change the strategic calculation around Ottoman entry into the war. The Gallipoli Campaign might never have been launched, while German naval strategy would focus more exclusively on the Atlantic rather than attempting to threaten British interests in the Indian Ocean.
WWII Mediterranean Theater: In World War II, the lack of a canal would reduce the Mediterranean's strategic importance, potentially weakening the rationale for Italy's entry into the conflict. North African campaigns might have been limited or entirely avoided, freeing Allied resources for other fronts.
Post-War Decolonization: The process of decolonization might follow a different timeline and pattern. Without the Suez Crisis of 1956—a pivotal moment marking the limit of European colonial power—European powers might have maintained colonial ambitions longer, leading to more protracted independence struggles in Africa and Asia.

Cold War Geopolitics

Different Superpower Competition: Soviet naval strategy during the Cold War would develop differently without the possibility of Mediterranean access to the Indian Ocean. This might have intensified Soviet interest in establishing bases in Africa, creating additional proxy conflicts on the continent.
Middle East Alignment: Without the canal as a focal point for Western strategic interest in the region, Middle Eastern countries might have experienced less intensive superpower competition. Israel's strategic importance to Western powers might be somewhat reduced, potentially altering the dynamics of Arab-Israeli conflicts.

Contemporary World (2025)

By our present day, the absence of the Suez Canal would have created a substantially different global landscape:

Economic Geography

Shipping Hub Evolution: Instead of the massive container ports that developed in the Mediterranean-Red Sea corridor, we would see greater development of mega-ports along the Atlantic-Indian Ocean route. Locations like Cape Town, Durban, Lagos, and Luanda might rival Rotterdam and Singapore as global shipping hubs.
Energy Transport Systems: The global energy trade would rely more heavily on overland pipelines and possibly liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The economic viability of Middle Eastern oil exports would be reduced by higher transportation costs, potentially resulting in earlier and more intensive development of alternative energy sources.
Different Globalization Pattern: The higher cost of shipping between Europe and Asia might have slowed certain aspects of globalization, resulting in more regionalized production networks. Asian manufacturing might focus more on regional markets, with less export to Europe, while European manufacturers might maintain more domestic production.

Current Geopolitical Landscape

African Development: Countries along the Cape route would likely have stronger economies and greater geopolitical significance. South Africa might be a more prominent global player, while East African nations would lack the strategic position they gained from proximity to the canal-enabled shipping lane.
Middle East Configuration: Without the canal as a defining feature of regional geography and politics, the Middle East's political boundaries and alliances might be organized differently. Egypt would likely be less strategically important but potentially more economically self-sufficient with less dependence on canal revenues.
Maritime Security Concerns: Rather than the concentrated vulnerability presented by the canal, global shipping would face different security challenges distributed along the much longer African route. Piracy might be more dispersed, while narrow chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca would gain even greater relative importance.
Military Deployments: Naval powers would maintain different deployment patterns, with greater emphasis on bases along the African coast. The U.S. Navy, for instance, might operate major facilities in West and South Africa rather than maintaining its current significant presence in Bahrain and the Persian Gulf.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Amira Hassan, Professor of Middle Eastern Economic History at the American University in Cairo, offers this perspective: "The absence of the Suez Canal would have fundamentally altered Egypt's modern development trajectory. Without the massive debt incurred to finance canal construction, Egypt might have avoided the financial crisis that led to European control of its finances in the 1870s and subsequent British occupation. Egypt might have experienced more gradual, internally-directed modernization focused on agricultural improvements in the Nile Valley rather than becoming a strategic chokepoint in global trade networks. While Egypt would have forfeited the substantial canal revenues that have supported its economy for generations, it might have developed a more diversified economic base and possibly retained greater political autonomy through the colonial era."

Dr. Jonathan Blackwell, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Maritime Strategic Studies, suggests: "Without the Suez Canal, the entire calculus of naval power projection would be fundamentally different. The British Royal Navy's global dominance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries would have faced greater logistical challenges, potentially accelerating Britain's relative naval decline. For contemporary naval powers, particularly the United States, the inability to rapidly redeploy fleets between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans would necessitate larger naval forces permanently stationed in each region or acceptance of reduced presence. The strategic premium on preserving maritime chokepoints would shift from the Suez and Red Sea to places like the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Malacca. I believe we'd see a more regionally compartmentalized approach to maritime security, with powers like India, Brazil, and South Africa playing more prominent roles in their respective oceanic regions."

Professor Elena Vardari, Chair of International Trade Economics at the London School of Economics, analyzes: "The economic implications of a world without the Suez Canal extend far beyond simple increases in shipping costs. The canal's absence would have created a fundamentally different global economic geography. The massive container ports of East Asia might have developed more gradually, with manufacturing possibly more distributed globally due to higher transportation costs. European colonial powers would have maintained stronger economic relationships with Africa, potentially resulting in different post-colonial economic relationships. Most intriguingly, the higher friction in global trade might have produced more regionally self-sufficient economic blocs, possibly delaying the hyperglobalization we've experienced since the 1990s. Climate change impacts would differ too—while ships would burn more fuel on longer journeys, the intense concentration of shipping emissions in the Red Sea and Mediterranean would be avoided, creating a different pattern of maritime environmental impact."