What If The Veto Power Never Existed in The UN?

The Actual History

The veto power within the United Nations Security Council emerged as a critical compromise during the founding of the UN in the aftermath of World War II. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 and later at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allied powers—the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China (with France later included)—negotiated the structure of the postwar international organization that would replace the failed League of Nations.

The veto provision, formalized in Article 27 of the UN Charter, granted each of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council—the United States, Soviet Union (later Russia), United Kingdom, France, and China—the ability to unilaterally block any substantive resolution, regardless of international support. This power was insisted upon particularly by the Soviet Union and the United States, who recognized that without this guarantee of protection for their vital interests, they would be unlikely to join or remain in the organization.

When the UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and came into force on October 24, 1945, this veto power was solidified. The first Soviet veto was cast on February 16, 1946, blocking a resolution on the withdrawal of French troops from Lebanon and Syria. Over the decades that followed, the veto has been used hundreds of times, with Russia/Soviet Union employing it most frequently (over 120 times), followed by the United States (over 80 times), the United Kingdom (approximately 30 times), France and China (fewer than 20 times each).

The veto has had profound effects on the UN's effectiveness. During the Cold War, mutual vetoes by the US and USSR frequently paralyzed the Security Council on major geopolitical issues. The Soviet Union blocked resolutions related to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, while the US vetoed numerous resolutions critical of Israel or its allies. After the Cold War, Russia has vetoed multiple resolutions regarding Syria's civil war, while the US has continued to veto resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Critics argue that the veto has rendered the UN ineffective in addressing major conflicts where permanent members have direct interests. The Security Council was unable to authorize action during the Rwanda genocide in 1994, remained deadlocked over the Syrian civil war, and has often been hamstrung on issues from Ukraine to Myanmar. Defenders counter that the veto ensures great power participation in the UN system and prevents major powers from being forced into positions that might escalate international tensions or conflicts.

Reform proposals have included limiting veto use in cases of mass atrocities, expanding the permanent membership to include countries like India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil, or creating a supermajority override mechanism. Despite decades of discussion, the P5's reluctance to relinquish this power has prevented any substantive reform of the veto system. By 2025, the veto remains a defining and controversial feature of global governance, symbolizing both the pragmatic compromises necessary for international cooperation and the inequalities inherent in the post-WWII international order.

The Point of Divergence

What if the veto power never existed in the UN Security Council? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the founders of the United Nations established a more democratic decision-making process in the Security Council, without giving special privileges to the great powers to unilaterally block resolutions.

The point of divergence occurs during the critical negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 and the Yalta Conference in early 1945. Several plausible alternative paths could have led to this outcome:

First, a more assertive stance by medium powers might have altered the course of negotiations. In our timeline, countries like Australia and several Latin American nations objected to the proposed veto power but ultimately acquiesced. In this alternate scenario, a broader coalition of middle powers, led perhaps by Canada, Australia, Brazil, and others, could have organized more effectively to resist the great powers' demands, threatening a more democratic alternative organization if their concerns weren't addressed.

Second, different domestic political calculations by key leaders could have changed positions. President Roosevelt, facing domestic criticism from internationalists who remembered the League of Nations' failures, might have decided that a more democratic UN would better secure Congressional approval and American public support. If Roosevelt had pushed more firmly for limitations on the veto, the Soviet Union and other powers might have been forced to compromise.

Third, the Soviet Union, still desperate for postwar American economic assistance and facing the enormous task of reconstruction, might have calculated that accepting limitations on the veto was a necessary concession to secure its broader objectives. Stalin, pragmatic when necessary, could have accepted a qualified majority voting system rather than an absolute veto if it seemed the best available option.

Finally, a compelling alternative mechanism might have emerged. Perhaps instead of absolute vetoes, the founders settled on a system requiring a "double majority" - both a majority of the Security Council overall and a majority of the permanent members. This would give the great powers significant influence without the ability to unilaterally block action.

In this alternate timeline, Article 27 of the UN Charter adopted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 established that decisions of the Security Council would require an affirmative vote of seven (later nine) members, including a majority of the permanent members, but no single nation could unilaterally block action. This seemingly modest procedural change would have profound implications for the development of international relations over the following decades.

Immediate Aftermath

Early Testing of the New System (1946-1949)

The immediate impact of a veto-free Security Council would have been felt during the first crises of the emerging Cold War. Without the Soviet veto, the Security Council would have been able to take more decisive action on early Cold War flashpoints:

The 1946 Iranian crisis, where Soviet troops remained in northern Iran beyond agreed withdrawal dates, would likely have seen stronger UN intervention. The Security Council could have authorized economic sanctions or even a multinational observer force, potentially curtailing early Soviet expansion attempts and establishing a precedent for enforcing withdrawal agreements.

The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) would have witnessed more substantial UN peacekeeping involvement. Without the Soviet veto blocking Western-supported resolutions, the UN might have deployed a significant peacekeeping force rather than merely establishing a border commission. This early peacekeeping operation would have set important precedents for UN intervention in civil conflicts.

The Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949 would have triggered not just Western action but potentially UN-authorized airlift operations and economic countermeasures. The Security Council might have formally declared the blockade illegal and authorized collective measures to overcome it, potentially shortening the crisis.

The Korean War and UN Authority (1950-1953)

The Korean War would have unfolded quite differently. In our timeline, the Security Council authorized the defense of South Korea only because the Soviet delegate was temporarily absent, boycotting the UN over the question of Chinese representation. In this alternate timeline, consistent UN involvement would have been guaranteed regardless of Soviet participation.

The UN Command would have received more consistent legitimacy throughout the conflict. Even after the People's Republic of China entered the war, the absence of vetoes would have allowed ongoing Security Council oversight of the conflict. This might have constrained General MacArthur's ambitions to expand the war and potentially created earlier opportunities for negotiated settlement.

The USSR would have remained engaged with the Security Council rather than boycotting it, as Soviet diplomats would have recognized they could not block resolutions through absence. This would have kept diplomatic channels open, potentially allowing for earlier armistice negotiations.

Colonial Conflicts and Decolonization (1947-1960)

The UN's approach to decolonization would have been transformed without British and French vetoes protecting their colonial interests:

The Suez Crisis of 1956 would have seen even stronger international opposition to Anglo-French-Israeli action. Beyond the General Assembly's condemnation, the Security Council could have authorized sanctions against the intervening powers, forcing an even more rapid withdrawal and further accelerating the decline of British and French colonial influence.

The Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) would likely have seen Security Council resolutions calling for French withdrawal and negotiations with Algerian nationalists. Without the French veto, international pressure through the UN would have been substantial, potentially shortening the conflict and saving thousands of lives.

The Portuguese Colonial War in Africa might have faced earlier and more effective international opposition. Security Council resolutions could have imposed sanctions on Portugal's dictatorship and provided material support to independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau years before their eventual independence in 1974-1975.

Institutional Adaptation (1946-1960)

Without the veto safety net, the permanent members would have developed alternative strategies to protect their interests:

The permanent members would have invested more heavily in coalition-building and diplomatic persuasion rather than relying on veto threats. This would have created a more negotiation-focused Security Council culture.

The General Assembly might have seen somewhat less power shift toward it, as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950 (which allowed the General Assembly to act when the Security Council was deadlocked) would have been less necessary in a Security Council that could not be paralyzed by a single veto.

Regional security organizations might have developed in closer coordination with the UN rather than as alternatives to it. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would still have formed, but they might have framed their activities more explicitly as complementary to the UN system rather than as separate security guarantees.

By the late 1950s, the UN Security Council would have established itself as a more functional forum for crisis management than in our timeline. The absence of vetoes would have created expectations of UN action on major international disputes. This would have placed greater pressure on the permanent members to find compromises rather than simply blocking actions contrary to their interests.

Long-term Impact

Cold War Dynamics (1960s-1991)

A More Interventionist United Nations

Without the veto power constraining Security Council action, UN peacekeeping and intervention would have evolved dramatically differently throughout the Cold War:

Expanded Peacekeeping Operations: The UN would have deployed significantly more robust peacekeeping forces earlier in its history. The Congo Crisis (1960-1965) would likely have seen even larger UN forces with stronger mandates. This early precedent would have established UN peacekeeping as a primary tool for conflict management globally.

Intervention in Cold War Proxy Conflicts: Civil wars and regional conflicts that became Cold War battlegrounds would have seen greater UN involvement. Conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia/Somalia, and Afghanistan might have featured UN-mandated peacekeeping forces attempting to contain superpower proxy warfare.

Cuban Missile Crisis Management: During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Security Council might have played a more central mediating role. Without Soviet and American vetoes blocking unwanted resolutions, both powers might have used the UN more actively as a face-saving third party through which to negotiate withdrawal terms.

Adapted Superpower Strategies

The superpowers would have developed different approaches to advance their interests:

Coalition Building: Both the US and USSR would have invested heavily in securing the support of non-permanent Security Council members. This would have enhanced the diplomatic influence of developing nations, as both superpowers competed more intensely for their votes.

Selective Engagement: The great powers would have become more selective about which issues they brought to the Security Council. When unfavorable outcomes seemed likely, they might have pursued their objectives through other means, potentially including regional organizations or coalition-based actions.

Military Autonomy: Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have maintained clear operational independence from UN oversight, as neither bloc would risk having vital security interests subject to potentially unfavorable Council votes.

The Post-Cold War Order (1991-2010)

A More Assertive Security Council

After the Cold War, the Security Council without veto constraints would have intervened more consistently in humanitarian crises:

Rwanda and Yugoslavia: Without veto threats hampering action, the UN response to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Yugoslav Wars would likely have been faster and more decisive. Peacekeeping forces with robust Chapter VII mandates might have been deployed earlier with authorization to use force to protect civilians.

Iraq and Kosovo Interventions: The 2003 Iraq War would have faced a clear vote in the Security Council, which would likely have rejected the US-led invasion given the opposition from France, Russia, and many non-permanent members. This would have created a stark choice for the US between multilateralism and unilateralism. Similarly, the 1999 Kosovo intervention might have received explicit UN authorization rather than proceeding through NATO.

Terrorism and Non-State Threats: The international response to terrorist groups after 9/11 would have been more coordinated through UN mechanisms. With the Security Council able to act decisively without veto constraints, international counterterrorism operations might have carried greater multilateral legitimacy rather than being primarily US-led initiatives.

Emerging Power Dynamics

The lack of veto power would have accelerated changes in global governance:

Security Council Reform: Without the veto as the primary prize of permanent membership, Security Council reform might have progressed further by the early 2000s. Countries like India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany might have already achieved permanent member status, though without vetoes, this expansion would have been less threatening to existing powers.

Responsibility to Protect: The "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, formalized in 2005, would have had much stronger implementation mechanisms. Without vetoes blocking intervention in humanitarian crises, R2P would have moved beyond a normative framework to become operational international law with consistent application.

Trade and Economic Governance: The more functional Security Council model might have influenced reforms in other international institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, potentially leading to more democratic decision-making structures in global economic governance.

The Contemporary World (2010-2025)

Recent Conflicts and Crises

The handling of major international crises would look substantially different:

Syrian Civil War: Without Russian and Chinese vetoes protecting the Assad regime, the UN would have authorized more substantial humanitarian intervention in Syria from 2011 onward. This might have included no-fly zones, protected humanitarian corridors, and potentially even peace enforcement operations similar to those in Yugoslavia. While not necessarily ending the conflict more quickly, the humanitarian toll might have been significantly reduced.

Ukraine Crisis: The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine would have faced stronger UN responses. The Security Council likely would have condemned the annexation and possibly authorized peacekeeping forces for Eastern Ukraine, creating significant diplomatic complications for Russia's strategy.

Climate Security: Climate change would have been formally recognized as a security threat by the Security Council earlier and with stronger commitments to action. Without vetoes from reluctant powers, climate security resolutions might have established binding carbon reduction targets with enforcement mechanisms.

Contemporary Global Governance

By 2025, the international system would reflect decades of more functional multilateralism:

Enhanced Secretariat Powers: The UN Secretary-General would wield significantly greater authority, commanding a larger peacekeeping apparatus and more substantial crisis response capabilities. The UN's rapid deployment capacity would be more developed, with standing arrangements for troop contributions.

Regionalization and Subsidiarity: Regional organizations would have evolved in closer coordination with the UN system, operating under a clearer principle of subsidiarity where regional bodies handle local issues while remaining accountable to Security Council oversight.

Great Power Adaptation: The great powers would have developed more sophisticated methods of advancing their interests within multilateral constraints. This might include greater emphasis on economic leverage, coalition-building, and indirect influence rather than direct military intervention.

Legitimacy and Compliance: The Security Council's decisions would carry greater legitimacy due to their more democratic nature, though compliance challenges would remain when resolutions contravened major power interests. The system would balance between greater multilateral legitimacy and the reality of power disparities.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Thomas Reynolds, Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and former UN adviser, offers this perspective: "The veto power has been both the UN's fatal flaw and its saving grace. Without it, we would likely have seen a more interventionist Security Council throughout history, with significantly more peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. However, it's questionable whether the great powers would have remained as engaged with the institution without this protection for their core interests. The most likely outcome would have been cyclical—periods of effective multilateralism alternating with major power disengagement when the Council acted against their perceived interests. By 2025, we might have seen a more legitimate but potentially less universally accepted UN system."

Dr. Maria Chen, Director of the Global Governance Institute and specialist in Security Council dynamics, suggests: "A veto-free Security Council would have fundamentally altered the development of international humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect. Without the veto obstacle, norms regarding humanitarian intervention would have evolved much more rapidly, and been implemented more consistently. Rwanda, Darfur, Syria—these humanitarian catastrophes might have seen more robust international responses. However, this would have created its own problems, including potential overreach and intervention fatigue. The greater irony is that a more active Security Council might have actually increased great power competition in other domains, as nations sought alternative ways to secure their interests when they couldn't rely on blocking unfavorable resolutions."

Ambassador Jean-Pierre Kabila, former African Union representative to the United Nations, provides a perspective from the Global South: "The absence of the veto would have dramatically enhanced the influence of non-permanent members and regional blocs. Rotating members would have become the kingmakers in close votes, giving smaller nations substantially more leverage. African, Latin American, and Asian countries would have wielded collective influence far beyond what we've seen in our timeline. This would have accelerated decolonization and potentially created more equitable development policies. However, we should not be naïve—the economic and military power disparities would have remained, and great powers would have simply shifted their influence strategies rather than accepting unfavorable outcomes. The formal democracy of the Council might have been counterbalanced by more intense informal pressure on non-permanent members."