What If Yemen Remained Two Separate Countries?

The Actual History

The modern nation of Yemen is the product of a unification that occurred relatively recently in historical terms. Prior to May 22, 1990, the territory that comprises present-day Yemen existed as two separate sovereign states with distinct political systems and international alignments.

The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) emerged in 1962 following a revolution that overthrew the monarchy that had ruled the northern territories for centuries. This revolution sparked an eight-year civil war between republican forces, backed by Egypt, and royalist forces supported by Saudi Arabia. By 1970, the republicans had secured victory, establishing a state with traditional Islamic values and a mixed economy that maintained close relations with Western nations and neighboring Saudi Arabia.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), which gained independence from British colonial rule in 1967, took a dramatically different path. After internal power struggles, South Yemen became the Arab world's only Marxist-Leninist state, aligning itself firmly with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Its government nationalized much of the economy and implemented secular social policies that were progressive for the region, particularly regarding women's rights.

Despite their ideological differences, discussions about potential unification began as early as the 1970s, though these were frequently interrupted by border conflicts and proxy wars. The geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically in the late 1980s with the decline of the Soviet Union, which had provided substantial financial support to South Yemen. This development, coupled with the discovery of oil reserves near the border between the two states, created new incentives for unification.

On May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen officially united to form the Republic of Yemen under the leadership of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (formerly of North Yemen) and Vice President Ali Salim al-Beidh (formerly of South Yemen). The unification agreement established a transitional period with power-sharing between the two former states.

However, this arrangement quickly deteriorated. Political tensions, economic challenges, and disagreements over power-sharing led to the 1994 civil war when southern leaders attempted to secede. Northern forces prevailed, cementing the unity of Yemen under Saleh's increasingly authoritarian rule.

The subsequent decades saw Yemen struggle with economic stagnation, corruption, regional insurgencies, the rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and growing sectarian tensions. In 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring movements across the region, Yemenis rose up against Saleh's regime, eventually forcing his resignation.

The transition process that followed failed to address the country's deep-seated problems. By 2014, the Houthi movement (a predominantly Zaidi Shia group from northern Yemen) had seized control of the capital, Sana'a, and much of the north. This precipitated a devastating civil war when a Saudi-led coalition intervened in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognized government.

As of 2025, Yemen remains fractured, with multiple competing authorities controlling different territories. The war has created what the United Nations calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with millions facing severe food insecurity, displacement, and disease. The dream of a unified, stable Yemen has given way to a nightmare of fragmentation and suffering.

The Point of Divergence

What if North and South Yemen never unified in 1990? In this alternate timeline, we explore a scenario where the unification talks that culminated in the May 22, 1990 merger broke down, leaving two separate Yemeni states to forge distinct paths into the 21st century.

Several plausible mechanisms could have prevented unification:

First, the collapse of Soviet support for South Yemen might have played out differently. Perhaps Moscow, recognizing the strategic importance of maintaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, could have found ways to maintain some level of economic and military support for its ally despite its own internal struggles. This continued backing, even at reduced levels, might have given South Yemen's leadership enough confidence to resist the economic pressures pushing them toward unification.

Alternatively, the discovery of oil reserves near the border regions in the mid-1980s could have heightened rather than reduced tensions. If disputes over ownership and revenue sharing had intensified, negotiations might have broken down amid mutual recriminations and territorial claims, making unification politically untenable for leaders on both sides.

A third possibility involves the internal politics of South Yemen. The 1986 civil war within South Yemen had already resulted in thousands of deaths. If more hardline Marxist elements had retained greater influence in the aftermath of this conflict, they might have successfully opposed unification with the more conservative, Western-aligned North.

Finally, external actors could have played a more decisive role. Saudi Arabia, traditionally wary of a unified Yemen on its southern border, might have more actively opposed unification by offering extensive economic support to North Yemen conditional on maintaining separation. Similarly, Oman, concerned about border security, might have lobbied against unification.

In our alternate timeline, we'll consider a scenario where a combination of these factors came into play. In late 1989, as unification talks progressed, internal opposition within both states grew more vocal. In South Yemen, remaining hardliners warned against abandoning socialist principles, while in North Yemen, tribal leaders and conservative elements expressed concern about associating with a "godless" Marxist state. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, sensing an opportunity, offered President Saleh a lucrative economic assistance package that would help address North Yemen's financial challenges without requiring unification.

By early 1990, these pressures had effectively stalled the unification process. The formal announcement of a unified Yemen, scheduled for May 22, 1990, never occurred. Instead, the two states issued a joint communiqué announcing continued "brotherly relations" but acknowledging that "conditions for complete unity have not yet matured."

Immediate Aftermath

Political Reconfigurations

The failure of unification talks immediately triggered political recalibrations in both Yemeni states. In North Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had staked significant political capital on the unification project, faced criticism from opposition figures who portrayed the collapse of negotiations as a diplomatic failure. However, Saleh, ever the political survivor, quickly pivoted to emphasize the economic assistance secured from Saudi Arabia as evidence of his government's diplomatic success.

In South Yemen, President Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas found himself walking a precarious political tightrope. With Soviet support dwindling but not entirely gone, he needed to chart a course between maintaining socialist principles and pursuing economic pragmatism. By late 1990, al-Attas initiated a program of gradual economic liberalization while maintaining the state's control over key industries and resources. This "Socialist Reform Initiative" aimed to attract limited foreign investment while preserving the PDRY's political system.

Economic Divergence

The early 1990s saw the two Yemeni states pursue markedly different economic strategies with varying degrees of success:

North Yemen, benefiting from Saudi patronage, experienced a modest economic boom. The Saudi assistance package included preferential oil prices, direct budgetary support, and infrastructure development projects. Additionally, remittances from North Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided a crucial source of foreign exchange. President Saleh used these resources to consolidate his power, rewarding loyal tribal leaders and military officers while expanding patronage networks.

South Yemen faced more significant economic challenges as Soviet aid continued to decrease. The government's reform program achieved mixed results: some sectors, particularly the port of Aden, saw increased activity as restrictions on foreign commerce were eased, but overall economic growth remained sluggish. By 1992, South Yemen had established new trading relationships with China, India, and several East African nations, partially offsetting the loss of Soviet markets.

The Gulf War Impact

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War had profound implications for both Yemeni states. North Yemen, despite its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, adopted a nominally neutral stance while quietly supporting the U.S.-led coalition. This relatively supportive position preserved its vital relationship with the Saudis.

South Yemen, with its anti-imperialist ideology, more vocally opposed the Western military intervention, though it condemned the Iraqi invasion. This position further strained its already troubled relationship with Gulf monarchies but won it some goodwill from Iraq and other opponents of the intervention.

The aftermath of the Gulf War saw approximately 800,000 Yemeni workers expelled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states due to their governments' positions during the conflict. Most of these workers came from North Yemen, creating a sudden crisis as remittances plummeted and unemployment soared. President Saleh's government struggled to reintegrate these returnees, leading to growing social unrest.

Border Tensions and Negotiations

The poorly defined border between the two Yemeni states remained a source of friction, particularly as exploration revealed more potentially valuable oil and gas reserves in the frontier regions. In 1991-1992, several minor skirmishes occurred along the border, though both governments worked to prevent escalation.

By mid-1992, recognizing the economic benefits of cooperation, the two states established the "Joint Yemeni Resource Commission" to coordinate exploration and revenue sharing in disputed areas. This pragmatic arrangement, while falling short of political unification, demonstrated the potential for functional cooperation between the ideologically divergent neighbors.

International Relations

The international positions of the two Yemeni states evolved significantly in the early post-Cold War period:

North Yemen strengthened its ties with the West and Gulf monarchies, receiving increased economic and military assistance from the United States as Washington sought to expand its influence in the post-Cold War Middle East. In 1992, North Yemen signed its first formal military cooperation agreement with the United States, allowing limited American access to military facilities.

South Yemen, facing the collapse of its traditional socialist allies, pursued a more diversified foreign policy. While maintaining its socialist system domestically, it established diplomatic and economic ties with Western European nations and sought investment from East Asian economies. By 1993, South Yemen had also cautiously improved relations with neighboring Oman, resolving long-standing border disputes in exchange for economic cooperation.

By 1994, when the unified Yemen in our timeline was experiencing civil war, the two separate Yemeni states in this alternate timeline had established a wary but functional coexistence, each pursuing distinct development paths shaped by their different ideological foundations and international alignments.

Long-term Impact

The Two Yemens Through the 1990s

As the decade progressed, the divergent trajectories of the two Yemeni states became increasingly pronounced.

North Yemen: Authoritarian Stability

North Yemen under President Saleh established itself as a conservative, pro-Western state with a mixed economy dominated by tribal and military elites. The discovery and development of oil fields in the Marib region provided crucial revenue that Saleh used to strengthen his patronage networks and security apparatus. By the late 1990s, North Yemen had established itself as a moderate Arab state aligned with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while maintaining a distinct national identity.

However, this period also saw the emergence of Islamist movements, including elements that would eventually form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The return of Afghan war veterans, combined with economic inequality and the perceived corruption of the Saleh regime, created fertile ground for radicalization in certain regions, particularly in governorates like Shabwa and Abyan.

South Yemen: Pragmatic Socialism

South Yemen underwent a more dramatic transformation. The "Socialist Reform Initiative" expanded throughout the 1990s, creating what some political scientists termed "Arabian market socialism." While maintaining single-party rule, the government allowed increasing private enterprise in non-strategic sectors while retaining state control of key resources, particularly the Port of Aden and newly developed oil fields.

The relative secularism of South Yemen made it something of an anomaly in the region. Women's rights, literacy programs, and secular education continued to be priorities, creating a society markedly different from its northern neighbor. By 1999, South Yemen had the highest female literacy rate on the Arabian Peninsula.

Response to the Rise of Al-Qaeda

The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa and the subsequent rise of Al-Qaeda as a global threat created new dynamics for both Yemeni states:

North Yemen found itself under increasing U.S. pressure to confront Islamist extremists operating in its territory. President Saleh employed a complex strategy of limited cooperation with American counterterrorism efforts while also accommodating certain Islamist elements to maintain domestic stability. This balancing act became increasingly difficult after the USS Cole bombing in 2000, which occurred in Aden Harbor but was planned by operatives based in North Yemen.

South Yemen, with its secular ideology and historical antipathy toward religious fundamentalism, positioned itself as a stalwart ally in counterterrorism efforts. The South Yemeni government, seeing an opportunity to improve relations with Western powers, provided intelligence and allowed limited U.S. operations against extremist targets. This cooperation brought increased economic assistance and international legitimacy despite the country's nominally socialist system.

The Impact of 9/11 and the War on Terror

The September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terror created new geopolitical realities for both Yemeni states:

North Yemen became a complicated partner in counterterrorism operations. The Saleh government officially supported the U.S.-led War on Terror while carefully managing domestic opposition to American military action in Muslim countries. North Yemen received significant military aid during this period but used much of it to strengthen forces loyal to Saleh rather than pursuing AQAP leaders in remote regions.

South Yemen, leveraging its secular credentials and strategic location, became a more straightforward ally in counterterrorism efforts. By 2003, South Yemen had permitted the establishment of a small U.S. military presence focused on training and intelligence operations. While this cooperation brought economic benefits and international support, it also made the government a target for jihadist propaganda.

Economic Development Divergence

By the early 2000s, the economic paths of the two states showed marked differences:

North Yemen remained largely traditional in its economic structure, with oil revenues, agriculture, and remittances from expatriate workers forming the backbone of the economy. While Sana'a saw some development, rural areas remained largely neglected, creating growing regional disparities that fueled discontent.

South Yemen, building on its strategic location and relatively stable governance, successfully developed its port infrastructure in Aden, positioning itself as a regional shipping and logistics hub. The government used oil revenues more systematically for development projects, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure. While still poor by global standards, South Yemen achieved significantly better human development indicators than its northern neighbor.

The Arab Spring and Divergent Political Evolutions

The Arab Spring movements of 2011 affected the two Yemeni states very differently:

In North Yemen, decades of corruption, inequality, and authoritarian rule under President Saleh sparked massive protests similar to those in our timeline. Military units defected, tribal alliances shifted, and by late 2011, Saleh was forced to relinquish power to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered deal.

In South Yemen, the ruling Yemen Socialist Party had already implemented gradual political reforms in the 2000s, including limited multiparty elections and press freedoms, while maintaining overall control. This evolutionary approach, combined with better economic performance and social services, meant that Arab Spring protests were significant but not regime-threatening. The government responded with a combination of concessions (including constitutional reforms) and limited repression, ultimately maintaining stability.

The Rise of the Houthi Movement

In our actual timeline, the Houthi movement emerged from the Zaidi Shia population of northern Yemen and eventually captured the capital in 2014. In this alternate timeline, the movement's evolution would have occurred entirely within North Yemen:

Without unification, the Houthi movement (formally known as Ansar Allah) would have remained a primarily religious revival movement among the Zaidi population of North Yemen's northwestern highlands. The movement would still have been influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and regional sectarian politics, but its trajectory would differ significantly.

Following President Saleh's fall in 2011, the political vacuum and weak transitional government created opportunities for the Houthis to expand their influence. By 2014, as in our timeline, the movement had captured significant territory in North Yemen's northwestern governorates and threatened the transitional government in Sana'a.

The Houthi Conflict and Regional Intervention

The rapid expansion of Houthi control in North Yemen from 2014 onward would still have triggered Saudi concerns about Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula. However, the existence of a separate, stable South Yemen would have significantly altered the regional dynamics:

When Saudi Arabia formed its coalition to intervene against the Houthis in 2015, South Yemen would likely have provided support, allowing coalition forces to use its territory and airspace. This would have given the coalition a secure base of operations from which to counter Houthi advances.

The conflict would have remained largely contained within North Yemen's borders, rather than engulfing the entire country as in our timeline. The humanitarian crisis, while still severe, would have affected a smaller population, and South Yemen could have served as a refuge for displaced northerners fleeing the conflict.

Present Day (2025) Situation

By 2025 in this alternate timeline, the Arabian Peninsula would present a very different picture:

North Yemen

North Yemen would likely be divided between:

Areas under Houthi control, including the capital Sana'a and much of the northwest
Southern and eastern regions controlled by the internationally recognized government and Saudi-backed forces
Pockets dominated by tribal authorities and Islamist groups, including AQAP

The conflict would continue at varying levels of intensity, creating a humanitarian crisis similar to but somewhat less severe than in our timeline due to the smaller territory affected.

South Yemen

South Yemen would stand as a relatively successful example of gradual political and economic evolution in the Arab world. While still maintaining aspects of its socialist heritage in social services and strategic economic sectors, it would have a mixed economy increasingly integrated into global markets.

The country would continue to benefit from its strategic location, with the Port of Aden serving as a major shipping hub. Its political system would have evolved into a managed democracy with the Yemen Socialist Party still dominant but operating within a multiparty framework.

South Yemen would maintain balanced international relations, cooperating with Western powers on security issues while also maintaining economic ties with China, Russia, and regional powers.

Regional Geopolitical Implications

The existence of two separate Yemeni states would have significantly altered regional dynamics:

Saudi Arabia would have a more complicated relationship with the Arabian Peninsula, facing instability in North Yemen while dealing with a more independent and assertive South Yemen on its border.

Iran would still seek influence through the Houthis in North Yemen, but would face a more coherent opposition from the Saudi coalition operating from secure bases in South Yemen.

The United States and other Western powers would likely have a stronger position in the region, with South Yemen serving as a relatively stable partner in counterterrorism operations and maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Expert Opinions

Dr. Hassan Al-Hamdani, Professor of Middle Eastern Politics at American University of Beirut, offers this perspective:

"The continued existence of two separate Yemeni states would represent one of the most significant counterfactuals in modern Middle Eastern history. The maintenance of South Yemen as an independent entity would have provided a 'third way' development model between Gulf monarchies and failed states. While unification seemed inevitable in 1990 given the collapse of Soviet support, a continued separate existence might have allowed both states to develop more organically according to their distinct social and historical contexts. The humanitarian catastrophe we've witnessed in unified Yemen since 2015 might have been significantly mitigated, though North Yemen would likely still have experienced substantial conflict."

Dr. Sarah Reynolds, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggests:

"From a security perspective, two Yemens might have actually enhanced regional stability. A separate South Yemen, even with its socialist heritage, would likely have evolved into a pragmatic partner in counterterrorism efforts given its secular orientation and strategic interests. The current conflict, which has turned Yemen into a proxy battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran, might have been contained within North Yemen's boundaries. However, we shouldn't romanticize this alternate history—both states would have faced significant governance challenges, and South Yemen's transition from Marxism would not have been without turbulence."

Professor Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Saud, Director of Security Studies at King Saud University, contends:

"The Saudi kingdom has always preferred stable, predictable neighbors, even when ideologically different. A gradually reforming South Yemen might have ultimately proved a more reliable partner than the unified state that emerged from the 1994 civil war. The current conflict could have been more effectively managed if coalition forces had a stable southern state from which to operate. That said, Saudi concerns about Iranian influence via the Houthis would have remained, and intervention in some form would likely still have occurred—but with better prospects for success and less devastating humanitarian consequences."